Contemporary populism in Croatia:

Human Blockade and Workers’ Front

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Abstract

As a consequence of the financial crisis in 2008 and with it associated prolonged political crisis, new political parties gained notable electoral support. Media often label them as populist without a clear understanding of the notion and despite obvious differences among them. During parliamentary elections 2015 in Croatia two small parties Human Blockade (Živi Zid) and Workers’ Front (Radnička Fronta) competed as new contesters in the Croatian established party system. The aim of this research is to determine the characteristics of populist discourse analysing Facebook posts of these two parties during the 2015 election campaign. The methodology utilized is the discursive theory developed by Laclau and Mouffe. By relying on the discursive theoretical framework, this research tries to challenge the prevailing 'ideational' theory and normative issues that it entails. The qualitative analysis also allows the identification of the discourse characteristics for each respective party. This approach has only been recently deployed for researching contemporary populism.
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1. Introduction

During 2014 presidential elections campaign young underdog Ivan Sinčić, one of the leaders of the activist group Human Blockade (Croatian: Živi Zid) stopping evictions, became public sensation securing strong third position among presidential candidates (Grbeša, Šalaj, 2016). Not long after Human Blockade grew into political party and declared political ambitions. The party Human Blockade originates from 2011 Facebook protests from and activist work of Sinčić and Ivan Pernar, both young and fresh personalities in political realm. Ideologically their propositions proved incoherent these and are centred on monetary sovereignty as a solution to crisis. Domestically, they advocate combination of direct democracy and stronger presidency and in foreign relations - exiting EU and international neutrality (Raos, 2015a). During this period, in 2014 Workers' Front (Croatian: Radnička Fronta) was established by former activists, union members and workers as a broad leftist political initiative that was a year later registered as a political party (Workers' Front Webpage, 2016).

Both parties share strong oppositional stance to all Croatian established political parties and mostly to two biggest due to which Croatian political party system can be described as dualistic party system. Human Blockade enjoys steady and strong electoral appeal since its emergence as third or fourth political option while Workers' Front is still relatively small and has some representatives on local level1. How can we characterise their discourse and thus better understand the emergence of those parties? In this paper the questions would be tackled within the framework of populism. We try to understand populism in a post-2008 context of prolonged economic and political crisis in the West. In the literature and media populism is often described as a threat to democracy2.

1 In the capital Zagreb as a part of coalition “Zagreb je naš!” it secured one representative in the City Council with 7% of votes in the city of Pula it won 3 % and Istrian county 2 % From: National Electoral Committee of the Republic of Croatia. (Državno izborno provjerenstvo RH.) http://www.izbori.hr/izbora-izbora/index.html#/app/lokalni-2017 Retrieved: 30.05.2018

While we acknowledge that populism challenges representative liberal democracy, here we try to understand it in the context of the changing nature of democracy. In medical dictionary, we try not to perceive populism as a disease that is threatening to weaken the liberal democracy, but as a symptom caused by deficits of contemporary liberal democracy. To overcome this normative issue in the research of populism methodology utilize is a type of discourse analysis – discursive methodology developed by Laclau and Mouffe. Deploying this methodology, the research will aim to analyse the discourse of parties Human Blockade and Workers´ Front during 2015 parliamentary election campaign on their official Facebook pages in a theoretical framework of populism as well as determine characteristics of their discourse.
2. Literature Overview

The phenomena of populism in Croatia has only recently gained attention of researchers. In total, not more than a dozen articles and two books were published on this topic. In comparison, political science primarily but also other disciplines are extensively researching and writing about populism during last couple of decades in the Western Europe and North America.

Research of Obućina (2012) of radical right in Croatia is often mentioned alongside contemporary research of populism. Obućina is not concerned with the notion of populism and uses this term rarely. When he does is not grounded in theory. However, he states that “populism is one of the many terms used by academics when describing radical right” (p.94). His understanding of radical right is mostly based on the concept of nationalism and its anti-democratic attitudes. However, his exploration of causes of strengthening of radical right in post-communist countries (2012) share many characteristics with explanation of rise of populism in general, especially socioeconomic theory, protest vote theory and anti-systematic ideas of voters.

In the literature there are few approaches to populism. On the one hand there is ‘demand-side’ approach that is concerned with the potential of populism, i.e. values and attitudes that are ‘breeding ground’ for populist actors. There was only one sociological research on the ‘demand-side’ of populism in population (Derado, Dergić, Međugorac, 2016) that analysed values of youth in Croatian capital, Zagreb. Authors use a theory of Laclau (2005a, 2005b) and Mouffe (2013) to contextualize the environment of political crisis where certain social groups feel that their interests are not represented in existing political system. To operationalize populism, they interpret Mudde’s definition (2004) and define three core contents of populism – anti-elitism, affirmative stance towards the people and prioritizing ‘the will of the people’ in politics. Additionally, they concentrated on features of far-right populism. Authors concluded that there are strong anti-systematic and anti-elitist attitudes combined with a preference of a
leader politics among youngsters included in the sample. This approach is highly valuable to political scientists interested in research of the causes of populism and populist electorate body.

On the other hand, most of the empirical researches (Kasapović, 2010, Zakošek, 2010, Šalaj, 2013, Matić, 2013, Grbeša, Šalaj, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b Matić, 2014, Hrstić, Mustapić, 2015, Albertini, Vozab, 2017 and Mustapić, 2017) are examining the ‘supply-side’ of populism so their unit of analysis are political parties or political actors. In this approach that is more common among political scientists, there is differentiation of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ populism research. In general, we can say that in Croatia focus was on ‘top-down’ approach, even in cases where object of interest were parties with characteristics of the movement they are primarily being regarded as a political party. Grbeša and Šalaj (2014, 2016, 2017, and 2018a, 2018b) are the pioneers of comprehensive research of populism in Croatia. Their theoretical approach to populism is a synthesis of the mainstream ideological approach as well as populism as a political communication style which they name ‘inclusive approach’. To detect ‘ideological’ populism author believes that presence of two variables is necessary – positive referring to ‘the people’ and diffused ant elitism. Also, in operationalizing populism as a communication style they introduce variables of privatization strategies, e.g. on-formal communication style and use of ‘empty signifiers’ as understood by Laclau (2005a), i.e. phrase of elusive meaning (Grbeša, Šalaj, 2018b, p.52-64). After operationalization based on their theory, they further deploy quantitative content analysis on textual material. Their researchers include comparative as well as case studies. In the end, based on the definition of populism authors determine whether the certain party or politician is a case of populism and eventually determine some specifiers of the case. Grbeša and Šalaj developed their specific methodological approach and provided universal questionnaire that is applicable to test other alleged cases of populism. The biggest concern with such approach with pre-defined categories to be analysed in a discourse is that it potentially excludes some other manifestation of the phenomena that were not previously considered in theory. This becomes even more problematic considering that populism is an elusive concept and depends heavily on the contextualization.
Šalaj (2012a, 2012b) is interested in contemporary populism on a theoretical level and opens a numerous questions that are already interest of political scientists. His preoccupation is what constitutes populism as an ideology with references to relevant authors that also use this approach. His analysis is oriented mainly towards theory of populism as a political ideology mostly in a way it was defined by Canovan (2002) and Mudde (2004). Moreover, he is trying to explore the problem of causes of the populism in democratic systems and effects of it for democracy (Šalaj, 2012a). In his theoretical considerations, Šalaj (2012b) is also interested in historical use of term populism starting with People’s Party in the US. The most important link between the historical examples of populism with contemporary understanding of populism is that political program of People’s Party included ‘direct democracy applied to all levels of political decision-making’ (Šalaj, 2012, p.56).

The book Populism and Globalisation, Milardović (2004) is mainly theoretical overview of the most important work on populism and relation of populism to different contemporary phenomena but also analyses of different expression of populism since 19th century according to the author. This work focuses only briefly on Croatian and regional politics. He traces populism in all regimes of what is today Croatian political space throughout 20th century and classifies subtypes of populism according to Canovan’s typology (1981). According to Milardović first expression was “agrarian populism of Croatian Peasant Party in 1920s”. Following are three examples of political populism all linked to a strong populist leader – first “right-populist dictatorship of Ante Pavelić during WWII”, then “leftist populist totalitarian dictatorship during the presidency of Josip Broz Tito”. In the 1990s we can find it in “defensive rhetoric of new popular government of president Tuđman in the war context”. He concludes that in 2000s referring to 'the people' is common among all the parties and political candidates as political mobilization technique. Mudde (2007) agrees that “Tuđman's regime was closest to populism” from today's perspective on populism. In the period during and after dissolution of Yugoslavia Laclau (2005a) detects the “populist nationalism” (p.197) as dominant political discourse. From the book it is not evident that Milardović’s conclusions about populism throughout 20th century in Croatia was grounded on empirical analysis
even though he is always referring to empirical examples. Milardović (2004) is also interesting from a theoretical viewpoint. He believes that populism is a social response to modernization, so in his book he tries to explain contemporary populism as a reaction to globalization. Author claims that nationalistic populisms are reaction of people feeling threatened by loss of identity due to globalization processes and their answer is usually xenophobic. There are as well leftist radical populists that direct their critique towards organizations that are direct product of globalization such as IMF and WTO.

One of the first empirical analysis of contemporary populism in Croatia from the perspective of political scientist was Berto Šalaj’s (2013) analysis of accusations for populism of governing party at the time SDP (Social Democrat Party) towards Croatian Labour Party. He tries to answer to question which strategies political parties use to detain new populists on political scene. Šalaj's intention was not trying to determine whether the Croatian Labour Party is populist as the title of the article suggests. In his words, answering this question requires “comparative analysis of Labour and other parties” (p.19). Author concludes that at the time governing party president and Prime Minister Milanović “uses strategies of isolation and conflict to undermine Croatian Labour Party” (Šalaj, 2013, p.17).

Šalaj together with Grbeša (2014) conducts comprehensive empirical research analysing rhetoric of six controversial politicians as well as the five most prominent established politicians at the time in an attempt to determine their populist characteristics. They analysed selected interviews from the Croatian newspaper spanned from 2009 to 2013. In this research they develop theoretical and methodological framework – inclusive approach – that will be deployed in their following researches. Beside analysis of characteristics of populism as political communication style they analysed three categories of populism as an ideology – referring to the people, ant elitism and ‘dangerous other’. Their analysis of anti-elitism spans through several dimensions. Firstly, they analyse referring to political elites, self-identification with political elites as well as their understanding of politics. In later empirical studies they kept first and eventually second category of analysis of anti-elitism, but excluded question of understanding the politics, a category that could be very useful in grasping the
phenomena of populism. In the end, they concluded that it is possible to label four politicians (Milan Bandić, Željko Kerum, Ivan Grubišić and Dragutin Lesar) as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ populist out of eleven politicians analysed in total. All four were from the category of those previously labelled as politician but authors concluded that not all that were labelled in media are populist in accordance with their methodology (Šalaj, Grbeša, 2018b).

In their comparative analysis of populism among four presidential candidates during presidential elections in 2014/2015 Grbeša and Šalaj (2016) conclude that populist rhetoric is present strongly in the rhetoric of the candidate I.V. Sinčić and Milan Kujundžić and that certain degree of populist political communication can be found among all candidates. Additionally, by identifying ‘dangerous other’ in rhetoric of candidates they label Sinčić “conditionally left-wing populist and Kujundžić conditionally national populist” (p.122). They did not analyse further what constitutes their subtypes of populism but have concluded that Kujundžić cannot be labelled as right-wing because he expressed strong positive attitude towards national category – Croatian people but at the same time he did not mentioned any minority group as ‘dangerous other’. In the end they believe that only “populism of Sinčić was positively transferred to electoral support” (Grbeša, Šalaj, 2016, p.123).

Many researchers of populism are in favour of comparative researches of established politicians, political newcomers and those already labelled as populist in the public. So far, this was the only research of populism among already established politicians in Croatia. Comparative approach of establishment and ‘populists’ political actors allows us to grasp the phenomena of populism in its political context and determine what differs populist actors from non-populists. On the other hand, as Grbeša and Šalaj (2016) themselves confirmed it is possible to finds some characteristics of populism in rhetoric of all analysed politicians which is the strongest critic of such an approach that leans towards gradualism. In gradualist approach, it is hard to determine the populists and populism because it’s characteristics we can usually find on the whole political spectrum.
Newly emerged political party in Croatia The Bridge (Most) was point of interest for Grbeša and Šalaj (2018a). The party became sort of surprising phenomena in Croatian party system because 2015/16 parliamentary election’s success allowed them to be the crucial party in forming governing coalition – first time in modern Croatia one political party became viable third option. Their analysis of during pre- and post- election periods of statements given by the most prominent representatives of Most published in the country’s major newspapers and magazines lead them to a conclusion that The Bridge is a “combination of centrist populism and an anti-establishment reform party” (p.7). This empirical analysis of same authors had similar theoretical framework and methodological approach as their previous empirical studies. However, in this analysis authors further developed their quantitative content analysis methodology with three dimensions of analysis for a defined codebook. Innovation in their research both on theoretical and methodological level is applying the Robert Barr’s theory that makes a distinction between anti-elitism and anti-establishment parties. They define anti-establishment as “a milder version of anti-elitism” that “targets options that are or were at some point in power” (Grbeša, Šalaj, 2018a, p.22). According to their research, The Bridge does not articulate strong anti-elitism rhetoric in comparison with other ‘true’ populists in Croatia. Beside this, their anti-establishment rhetoric was much stronger during first elections, but in 2016 campaign in one they even advocated coalition with establishment party HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union).

Not only empirical researches but also elaborations of Grbeša and Šalaj on theory and methodology of populism is contribution to research on populism in Croatia. The tried to asses and offer further arguments to their approach of researching populism (Grbeša, Šalaj, 2017). Already mentioned, they use ideological approach to populism and argue that is plausible to make such an argument relying on Freeden (1996, 2003) and Heywood (2002) understanding of political ideology, i.e. political ideology as ideas about how the world is and how it should be governed. However, in their methodological considerations they introduce populism as a political communication style. In detail they develop conceptualization and operationalization of populism in their approach. Following Mudde’s definition (2004) two elements are necessary to labelling
someone an “ideologically” populist – anti-elitism and referring to the people. If only latter is present, authors claim that those actors use populism as a political strategy. They consider introducing third dimension that is advocating direct democracy. For their analysis, they used categories of ‘dangerous other’ and ‘empty signifier’ to operationalize subtype of populism. For right wing populist ‘dangerous other’ are minorities and immigrants and political actors that claim that foreign companies and large entrepreneurs are a threat to ‘the people’ are usually labelled as left wing populists. Authors agree that this classification is not an ideal tool because in practice there might be overlapping. Therefore they operationalisation of ‘empty signifier’ as a better tool to determine some other subtypes of populism. For example, in their research on Croatian politician priest Grubišić they determined strong presence of ‘moral’ as a ‘empty signifier’ and state that we can label him as a ‘moral populist’. Authors believe that not enough researches so far that considered such an approach and that it could be one of possible methodological directions in future.

Theoretical, methodological and conceptual framework of Grbeša and Šalaj was published together with their above-mentioned empirical studies in the first extensive book on contemporary populism in Croatia (Šalaj, Grbeša, 2018b). Novelty is broader theoretical inquiry of populism, in particular the question of causes of populism, media and populism and comparison with some other phenomena such as nationalism and technocracy. Based on the relevant theoretical works they develop a model that tries to explain the causes of later strengthening of populism in Europe and elsewhere. Their model consists of structural dimension and the agency of political actors. In a situation where structural conditions are met, i.e. social, economic and political crisis populism may thrive if strong political leader ready to use populist strategy appears. What is particularly interesting as a structural condition is authors’ claim supported by previous research that there is latent cause of populism inherent in liberal democracies. They believe dis-balance between democracy and liberalism in favour of liberal tradition, creates a latent cause for populism (Šalaj, Grbeša, 2018b).

Other researchers studied different political actors labelled as populist in media deploying case study method (Kasapović, 2010, Zakošek, 2010, Matić, 2013,
Matić, 2014, Hrstić, Mustapić, 2015) but mostly lacking precisely defined theoretical framework. Zakošek (2010) claims that 2010 presidential elections campaign of Milan Bandić was the first eruption of populism in modern Croatian politics. He analysed some of Bandić’s speeches and overall style during election campaign and compared them with characteristics of populism found in different works on populism. Based on characteristics that author analysed his understanding of populism is as an ideology, that he names “Bandić’s instant ideology” (p.9). However, author also mentions some of characteristics of a campaign such as “complete shift of the rhetoric against values he not long ago advocated or collecting sympathies sending personal letters to voters and implies that these acts were populist” (p.7-9). Based on this observation author believes populism can also be a political strategy. Referring to electoral defeat of the candidate Bandić author makes a claim that it was an “example of ‘contained populism’ in Croatian politics and victory for its democracy” (p.10). In this regard, author is close to those researchers that consider populism exclusively as an anomaly of the democracy.

Matić (2014) confirms findings of Zakošek (2010) that Bandić was a populist actor using a sample from local election campaigns in 2009 and 2013 as well as press articles about candidates in Croatian relevant press. In her analysis, she includes another local political contender, Željko Kerum. Her methodological position is qualitative content analysis based on different features of populism developed by various theorists that view it as an ideology and political style. Analysis confirmed her presumptions that both local candidates are populist actors.

In retrospect on legacy of former Croatian president Stjepan Mesić Kasapović (2010) does label him as a populist that tried to present himself as “one of us” and “citizen president” (Kasapović, 2010, p.17) but she does not consider the characteristics of populism or any theory on this regard.

Matić (2013) examines priest turned politician don Ivan Grubišić and his political work first as a parliamentary candidate and MP as well as later during the local elections when Grubišić attempted to win County Prefect position of his native town Split. Matić clearly understands populism as an ideology in the
definition of Mudde (2007) but his analysis does include some characteristics of populist style. He analyses Grubišić political decisions as well as rhetoric and style. In the end, author labels Grubišić’s political work as a “spiritual populism” and makes a parallel with Grubišić and Latin American liberation theology but he makes a claim that his clearly anti-elitist stance is dissolved once Grubišić entered the political arena and started to make coalitions. Grubišić’s rhetorical aversion towards Croatian parliament is for the author one of the characteristics of a populist political actor.

Hrstić and Mustapić (2015) made a case study of presidential candidate Sinčić in 2014 elections and found inherent characteristic of populism as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ in his public performance. Similar to work of Grbeša and Šalaj they utilized quantitative content analysis to Sinčić’s three TV debates with other presidential candidates as well as his statements published in two prominent Croatian daily newspaper, Jutarnji list and Večernji list. As for their theoretical framework, they analysed six characteristics of populism as an ideology found in Taggart (2004) and three characteristics of populist political communication developed in a work of Jagers and Walgrave (2007). Their conclusion is that Sinčić was “populist in an ideological sense due to his referring to ‘the people’, anti-elitism and naming the ‘dangerous other’ - authors believe that in his case ‘dangerous other’ are two mayor Croatian political parties” (p.81, 82). In theory, this animosity towards established political parties was usually expression of anti-elitism or anti-establishment and the category ‘dangerous others’ is usually referring to other groups such as minorities or economic elites.

Above mentioned are researches of ‘top-down populism’ in Croatia but there is an absence of researching “populism from below” (Brentin, Pavasović, 2016, p.1) such as populism in social movements, popular culture etc. Analysis of Mustapić (2017) is an overview of political and social context in Croatia since 2008 that author considers a thriving ground for populism – by politicians but also different protests and initiatives. Author makes a direct connection of populism and position of Croatia as a transition country burdened by corruption and nepotism. His opinion is that Croatian social and political environment generates the lack of trust in political institution and democracy in general thus creating a thriving ground for populism.
Theoretical analysis of Derado (2014) is dealing primarily with the analysis of cause of populism in a context of crisis of model of liberal democracy and with reference to neoliberal economic model present in those democracies. He is mainly concerned with countries with long democratic tradition in Western Europe, but he tries to apply this perspective to Croatia rightfully pointing out similar processes happening in all European countries. His thesis that populism is a symptom of ineffective liberal democracies is inspired mostly by Crouch’s (2007) theory of ‘post democracy’ where politics and power is exclusively in the hands of political elites and Mouffe (2013) work about ‘crisis of representative politics’, in which voters do not have viable representatives to grant their vote to. Economic dimension of his theory he explains with Standing’s (2011, 2014) elaboration of the concept of ‘precariat’ class in neoliberal economic model. He detects presence of all those variables in Croatian society – “high percent of absolute and relative poverty and voter’s abstinence as a fertile ground for populist actors” (p.19-32).

Since populism is a term often used in Croatian public and labelling someone populist is a common way of vilifying politicians in the media it is surprising lack of media analysis in regard to populism. There is only one analysis of discretization of Sinčić in media (Hrstić, Mustapić, 2015). This was part of their broader case study of Sinčić during presidential campaign 2014 and right after the elections. Their analysis of media portrayal of presidential candidate Sinčić in two most prominent Croatian daily newspaper showed that media portrays him mostly negative or neutral. When negatively, he is described as a “complete outsider, anarchist, ignorant, naïve, liar” (Hrstić, Mustapić, 2015, p.78). There is an evident increase of articles published about Sinčić right after his surprising electoral appeal. Even though he received much more media attention, media still described his electoral success relatively negatively. Hrstić and Mustapić (2015) further concluded that Sinčić did not gained necessary space in the newspaper media to articulate his ideas, but this was compensated in the format of presidential candidate TV debates.

Research of populism in Croatia could benefit from empirical analysis of neglected political actors and extend to different theoretical and methodological approaches. This said, researchers should not overlook non-traditional sample
such as new media. Empirical analysis of populism in Croatia used exclusively texts of interviews with politicians as the sample, except Mustapić and Hrstić (2015) that included TV debate even though their analysis was as well of rhetoric. One analysis of political communication on Facebook page during 2015 parliamentary elections showed that the party Human Blockade (Živi Zid) used populist discourse, mostly negative rhetoric towards political elites and media and talked less about diverse ideological issues (Albertini, Vozab, 2017). This research opens an issue of sample choice when researching populism, where traditional sources usually predominate. However, it would be interesting to compare how populist message is communicated via social media versus traditional media.

Many theorists emphasize contextualization of the phenomena of populism especially when empirically researching some cases of populism. In this regard, attempts to determine subtype of populism is still rather novelty in research of populism in Croatia. Grbeša and Šalaj (2017) believe that this would be a next step in the research of populism in Croatia.

Political parties in general, as an object of research of populism, have been usually neglected in favour of populist politicians. However, empirical researches confirm that populism is not inherent only for populist actors and there are cases of populist parties without charismatic and strong leader. There are only two examples of research of populist political parties. Grbeša and Šalaj (2018) made a case study of new political party The Bridge (Most) and one research analysed the party Human Blockade (Albertini and Vozab, 2017). Beside these there was no attempt to research to analyse mayor establishment Croatian parties and there is total absence of parties with small electoral support in research of populism. However, success of political party is not always measured by their electoral success and representation in parliament. Workers´ Front does not have representatives on national level, however it was more successful during local elections 2017 and in some Croatian cities has representatives in city councils (Zagreb, Pula), including Istrian County council (Državno izborno provjerenstvo RH, 2018).
Considering relative but constant electoral success since presidential elections in 2014 Human Blockade is more often mentioned by political scientists usually as a part of bigger election analysis. Vučković (2016) mentions the party’s president Sinčić in a context of personalization of politics during 2016 parliamentary elections as he was portrayed in the media as a political leader among other presidents of running political parties. Raos (2015a) claims that during same presidential elections “Sinčić imposed topics to the election campaign” (p.). According to Raos two established politicians that competed in the second round changed their rhetoric introducing social topics in an attempt to attract Sinčić’s voters. This confirms researchers that claim that populist biggest success is in ability to change political rhetoric of the mainstream parties. Raos believes that the biggest surprise of the elections was that 16% of voters supported ‘antisystem’ candidate Sinčić. For him that shows “deep political crisis” and a “problem of legitimacy of political elites” (p.37). He characterizes ideas of Sinčić and other members of Human Blockade as “anti-establishment” and “populist” (p.37) Raos (2015b) analysis of 2015 parliamentary elections, confirmed his prediction that Živi Zid (Human Blockade) will not follow the success of Sinčić during presidential elections (Raos, 2015a) with only one mandate won in Croatian parliament.

In a report about left actors in Croatia Workers' Front is mentioned as explicit anti-capitalist political actor that is engaging in their public discourse on Marxist ideology. They emphasize relations between labour and capital in all other civic issues are discussed within social justice framework. For example „issues of nationalism, chauvinism, racism, sexism and xenophobia are addressed as ideologies of division of the oppressed“. Supporters of a Workers’ Front come from diverse social groups such as teachers, workers, students and unemployed as well as small business owners. As for their public message it is „high in volume but thematically undifferentiated, often tending towards sloganeering“ (Buble, Kikaš, Prug, 2018).

Literature review already pointed to some possible new approaches and analysis that lack in a research of contemporary populism in Croatia. In this research as the biggest novelty we introduce a methodology that was not previously applied to examine populist cases in Croatia – namely discursive methodology. Benefits
of applying that methodological approach will be further discussed in methodology section. Utilizing such methodology on a what is now becoming less unconventional sample such a social media is another original contribution in populism research in Croatia.

3. Research Goal and Research Question

3.1. Research Goals

Initial idea about this research started as an interest in the emergence of new political parties that emerged during last decades in political environment of Europe and in particular Croatia as an integral part of European political sphere. The one commonality between them is their challenge of the political establishment and in some cases strong resonance among voters. At the same time, public space was being contaminated with 'populist hype' (De, Cleen, Glynos and Mondon, 2018) and populism was used as a label of every new political party. This research is an attempt to identify characteristics of populism articulated by relatively new parties Human Blockade and Workers' Front. More specifically, the objective is to empirically test the assumption of the populist character of two recently emerged political parties in Croatia. Harsh critique of political establishment, type of organization, activist background, and understanding of politics as well as methods of political activity are their main similarities. Ideologically, Worker`s Front clearly positions itself at political (radical) left and Human Blockade is proclaimed themselves above right-left ideology. Above mentioned commonalities as well as differences also have analytical purpose because they allow broader sample to test subtype of populism. The research is however not a comparative analysis, but comparatively same criteria is applied to both units of analysis and this was taken into consideration during the whole course of analysis so in the conclusion reader can make comparation between two parties.

There are additional two underlying goals of this research that were considered during the research. First, it is an attempt to contribute to emerging academic study of populism in Croatia by the deployment of discursive theoretical and
methodological framework of populism that was not deployed in previous researches on Croatian populism. By relying on discursive theoretical framework, this research tries to challenge prevailing 'ideational' theory and normative issues that it entails. Utilizing such a theoretical work is due to presumption of its appropriateness to the research question that is qualitative and deliberatively open-ended. Also, such an approach is an attempt to critically engage with the concept of populism in order to understand it better.

Secondly, research tries to provide new empirical knowledge based on choice of unite of analysis that was not analysed before as well as choice of sample. Social media play an intensive role in contemporary politics but are not typical sample for analysis by social scientists. When choosing such sample, it is important to reflect on implications of the media on analysis results, what this paper briefly considers on both theoretical and methodological level.

It is also an attempt to nest the presumed cases of populism in Croatia in the larger European context by determining the characteristics of populism. It is common to explain social reality in Croatia in comparison with other European ex-communist countries and especially states of South Eastern Europe. For example, Stanley (2017) is researching populism in countries in Central and Eastern Europe as a separate entity (In: The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 2017). In this research, we use conceptual framework that is usually being empirically applied to Western European long-established democracies. We claim that Croatia, after introducing multi-party parliamentary democracy and as the newest EU member since 2013 shares similar experience with other European countries. Of course, this is done with keeping in mind the need of contextualization and necessity to detect social peculiarities of Croatian political sphere.

3.2. Research questions

Based on research goals, following set of research questions is developed for each unit of analysis:
(1) How did Human Blockade and Worker's Front articulated populist discourse during 2015 parliamentary election campaign on their official Facebook page(s)?

(2) What are characteristics articulated in the discourse of the Human Blockade/Worker's Front during 2015 parliamentary election campaign on their official Facebook page(s)

4. Theory

4.1. Challenges in defining populism

Academic debate around populism is going on for decades but there seems not be little advancement in developing coherent theory of populism. Question proposed by Ionescu and Gellner (1969) about is it even possible to ‘catch’ an essence of populism was repeated in almost every comprehensive work written about populism since then and academics rightfully question their own approaches and definitions and criticize others. Laclau’s (1977) remark that populism is an 'elusive' concept is as issue on the table in most of the pieces written on populism until today. It seems that only those that are not oblige to theoretical examine the term know are certain in what populism is. Some authors as Taguieff (1995) went so far in defining populism as concept that encompasses many dimensions of political and thus of no analytical validity. It is also been proposed to dismiss it and use other concepts to understand the social reality. There are not many concepts that are so often used in media, in public and among academics but without minimal consensus about its meaning. The presence of the populism or only ‘populist hype’ (De Cleen, Glynos and Mondon, 2018) today proves it is the concept worthy of the research if only that in the end one comes to conclusion that the concept is theoretically and practically incompetent to explain current political occurrences.

According to Rooduijn (2014) there are three bodies of literature of populism each assigned to a specific geographical area. Namely, populism in the USA, Latin America and Western Europe. Lately there are more attempts to research populism extensively in other parts of the world, from Africa to New Zealand (Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart and others, 2017). Every geographical
contextualization differs in the conceptualization of the phenomena of populism. Definitions and conduct of researches from one area are not applicable for other. Nevertheless, recently there are attempts for cooperation between authors of these three areas in developing universal definition of contemporary populism.

Apart from geographical division in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (2017), one of the first publications that tried to encompass the most relevant researchers of contemporary populism, editors mention three conceptual approaches to populism: ideational, political-strategic and socio-cultural approach. Also, economic approach developed by Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) could be regarded as fourth, but editors question its validity as it is applicable only to specific cases of left-wing populism. Ostiguy (2017) in already mentioned *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* develops socio-cultural approach in accordance with first two approaches including sociological and cultural aspects. In general, first two approaches are of most interest to political theorists.


Despite overwhelming image of disagreement among confronted theoretical blocks it is evident that most of the authors are close to consensus when it comes to defining what are the core characteristic of populism or what does differ this phenomenon in political reality of many existing phenomena. For this purpose, they usually propose minimal definition and try to explain numerous of connected phenomena, such as the role of crisis and leader, within their theoretical work. However, usually defining populism has implications in the choice of methodology, namely unit of analysis and analytical tools. But chosen theoretical framework has normative implications. Aslanidis (2015) explains that
portraying populism as ideology swells the scope and purported impact of the phenomenon and forces analysts to take sides in favour or against it“ (p.7).

Among researchers of populism there are two main groups of theoretical approaches. First group is consisted of those academics that use what they call ‘ideational’ approach that is mainstream in contemporary political science. There is no single definition or single method all these researchers use and there are as well many differences in their theoretical interpretation. Also, they may quarrel on the ground of populism as an ideology, but this is often questioned by them or supplemented by other perspectives on populism. What they have in common is that their theory is grounded on liberal theory of democracy. Second group, smaller but recently becoming more influential is formed around those academics that research populism in a post-Marxist manner and generally they are considered to establish what could be named discursive approach.

This kind of understanding the division in populist research could point to us that the biggest disagreement among academics is not that of defining the common characteristics of the concept but of normative nature. This however has a tremendous impact on their research beginning with vocabulary attributed to their framework to empirical analysis and who is ‘labelled’ as populist. Aslandis (2015) noticed liberal theorists use populism as an “accusation” and would usually attribute it to far-right political projects while leftist tend to view it as “originally progressive political outlook” (p.7) and are defenders of left-wing populism. At the same time they tend to define right-wing populists as far-right or fascist movements.

There are other approaches to populism as a concept such as one developed by Taggart (2000). While he advocates universal approach that tries to develop universal definition, some researchers, especially popular for analysing historical cases, resort to explaining only one example of populism in its context. In contemporary political science there is strong tendency towards universal approach.

One such attempt to develop a universal definition is by trying to investigate representative sample of populist cases and find common characteristics that would make a minimal definition by Rooduijn (2014). Rooduijn findings
discovered the ideational nature of populism and will be mentioned in following text. Problematic with such approaches is their claimed ‘objectivity’ and failure to acknowledge their normative positions.

4.2. Mainstream ‘ideational’ liberal approach

The most prominent definition and widely of populism in contemporary Political Science is that of Cas Mudde (2004) that advocated 'ideational' approach. The core of populism in his view is that “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p.543). Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) use the same logic defining populism as “an ideology that pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous others...” (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008, p.3). Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) added the concept of 'dangerous other' to the definition of populism. According to authors populism needs next to elites the 'dangerous other' as another enemy that further unites 'the people'. However, even authors that use such an ideological approach agree on core set of ideas that populism contains acknowledge that it is not enough to call populism an full ideology. Based on Freeden’s (1996) understanding on political ideologies and notions of thick and thin ideologies, where thick are coherent system of belief and thin are lacking content and can easily be combined with other thick ideology, Stanley (2008) proposed that similarly to nationalism, populism is a „thin ideology“ that is usually combined in its empirical manifestation with ‘full’ ideologies (Stanley, 2008, p.95). Taggart (2000) names this “empty heart of populism” (p.4) and emphasizes that due to ideological 'emptiness' populism has the ability to combine with other ideologies.

Because of 'ideological emptiness' as one the main characteristics of populism there is general consensus that it is possible if not necessary to determine further ideological affiliations of a specific populist case. The biggest step forward in that direction was conceptual framework that tries to identify the subtype of
populism usually in dichotomous classification of ideal types: right-/ left-wing, inclusionary/exclusionary populism (Mudde, Kaltwasser, 2013). Right-wing populism is typically characterized by exclusionary approach when constructing 'the people' category in comparison to left-wing populists. Latter is typical for Latin American populists and former for region of North Europe (Mudde, Kaltwasser, 2013). Cases of inclusionary populist parties are not bound only to Latin America, but found also in European Southern countries (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, 2014). This view that populism in practice usually does not exist without affiliation to some other ideologies is grounded in theoretical approach of populism proposed by Laclau. Laclau (2005a) explains that contextualization is important because “populism consists in the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology” (p.172, 173). Currently used frameworks to analyse subtype of populism show some inconsistency and namely inclusionary/exclusionary or right-wing/left-wing typology. ‘Ideationalists’ generally dismiss the idea that populism is a type of political style or communication. There is a group of social scientists who focus more on form of populism rather than its content. They are usually divided to school that defines it as communication style and other that see populism as a way of organizing or strategy. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) understand it as a “political communication style that politician use when reffering to people” (p.3). The strategy is to refer to ‘the people’, use colloquial language close to majority of voters and by some populist actors to pursue non-formal dressing style. In Mudde’s (2004) opinion these are features that can be found in populists but among all other political actors and do not embody the core of populism. According to authors that embraced ‘ideational’ approach some of characteristics usually associated with populism are not expression of populism. It is very important to differ populism and “style that aims to be popular” (Taggart, 2000, p.5). Often political actors try to appeal to variety of voters and thus appropriate their communication and overall looks and behaviours but that does not mean that they belong to ‘populist’ camp. Ideologically, they can advocate political pluralism or express more authoritarian character and these concepts are distinct from the concept of populism. As Rooduijin (2014) argues
“a populist set of ideas will not always lead to a specific type of organization and style” (p.594).

4.3. Post-Marxist discursive approach

Laclau (1977, 2005a, 2005b) is one of the first of authors that studied the phenomena of populism grounded in post-Marxist theory. His initial interest in populism in contextualized in mainly Latin American experience, although the theory he develops could be applied universally. Laclau (1977) draws from functionalist conception of populism (Germani, 1965, Di Tella 1970) as the most comprehensible theorization of populism at that moment only to later criticize them of being confined to specific developmental phase. This work is now mostly known as “modernization theory” (Laclau, 1977, p.147-158) that tries to explain causes of populism. They argue that “the environment in which populism emerges is the moment of transition to industrial society where different processes on economic and social level occur. Due to ‘asynchronism’ in modernization, so called losers of modernization will be prone to populism” (Laclau, 1977, p.153-157). Such understanding of populism will lead to conclusion that populism is a specific movement that is a reaction to modernization, but Laclau argues that if by accepting this theory it would be impossible to explain all the exceptions of populism where this developmental phase is absent.

The important contribution to the study of populism is drawing focus on Gramscian “people' vs. power bloc contradiction and antagonism between those blocs” as a core characteristic of populism (Laclau, 1977, p.166). This element, especially the concept of antagonism is fully accepted by almost all theorists of contemporary populism, and almost exclusively by those that represent mainstream ‘ideational’ approach. Later Laclau elaborates on his understanding of populism with the concept of ‘logic of equivalence’ which is a state of “plurality of unsatisfied demands and an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them differentially”. This eventually leads to populist rupture
when “equivalential popular discourses divide, in this way, the social into two camps: power and the underdog” (Laclau, 2005b, p. 4).

Laclau devotes a considerable part of his work to argumentation why it is wrong to define populism as a specific movement that was favoured approach in the 1970s as well as ideology, rather marginal then, but dominant view nowadays. He refers to populism as “political logic” (Laclau, 2005a, p. 117), definition that can be easily dismissed as it equalizes populism with politics in general. He does not attempt to answer the question: what is populism?, but: what is it “expression” of populism? How is “articulated”? In what extent is present? (Laclau, 1977, p. 172) His answer to those that use ideological approach is that populism is not an expression of the ideological backwardness of a dominated class but … an expression of the moment when the articulating power of this class imposes itself hegemonomically on the rest of the society (p.196).

In ‘ideational’ approach problem of gradualism appears very often. Unlike those that analyse popular style and embrace gradualism per se (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007), this should not be an issue to those that view populism as an ideology. As they consider populism to be an ideology, they should not try to measure: how much populism? but to answer the question: Is this case of populism? However, empirical analyses of ‘ideational approach’ are often confronted with findings that suggest that populism can be present in considerably different amounts. This is dependent on methodological problems of ‘ideational’ approach, operationalization of the concept and deployment of quantitative analysis techniques (Rooduijn, Pauwels, 2001) that presumes gradualist results. How did ‘ideational’ approach tried to deal with the problem? First solution was that proposed by Mudde (2004) to deploy minimal definition. By deploying minimal definition, one should be able to come to final conclusion if a political actor is populist or not. However, minimal definition is not precise and it is not efficient in explaining all empirical cases. It is also not very productive just to label different political actors as populists without offering further consideration of the causes and implications of such politics. Two problems can occur within this approach. Firstly, some cases could be considered populism, but further analysis

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3 See in Grbeša, Šalaj (2018), p. 34-38.
would uncover their completely opposite nature, for example, technocracy. The other possibility could be that a political actors that are populist could be overlooked due to contextual peculiarities. Also, in ‘minimal definition’ approach it is possible to come to conclusion that some political actors are partially populist. The second plausible solution would be to accept some degree of gradualism and set the minimal limit when some case could be considered populism, but to accomplish such a task is highly problematic. Who decides and in which criteria what should be the limit. Hawkins (2010) is introduced the method of ‘holistic grading’ to the research of populism. Here he would take entire speeches of political actors labelled as populist and each speech would be labelled populist, mixed or non-populist. Even such approach accepts a dose of gradualism with a category of mixed. Therefore, Laclau (1977, 2005a) suggests that populism can be better understood if considered as a discourse. That is not to completely dismiss existence of ideas and ideological in populist discourse but to search “the meaning of the ideological elements identified with populism in the structure of which they are a moment, and not in ideal paradigms” (Laclau, 1977, p. 158). As Laclau (2005a) himself claims discourse or in narrower sense “rhetoric” is “the anatomy of the ideological world” (p. 13). Hawkins (2010) embraces such positioning and claims that it is impossible to separate ideas and discourse in populism. He accepts populism both as an ideology or a worldview and Manichean discourse. This view is not opposition with other ‘ideationalist’ that claim ‘empty hearth of populism’ (Taggart, 2000) and possibility of populism to combine with other ideologies.

Aslanidis (2015) is drawing on Laclau’s theoretical framework and proposes conceptualization of populism as a discursive frame. He starts by stating that there is populist discourse that can be regarded “as the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as problematic because ‘corrupt elites’ have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the ‘noble People’ and maintains that the solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization of the latter in order to regain power. This, therefore, can be labelled the ‘populist
frame’ – the ‘subatomic matter’ that constitutes populist discourse.” (Aslandis, 2015, p.12)

Laclau (2005a) criticizes approach to populism that see it as an ideology or mobilization strategy because as unit of analysis these approaches take established group and we have to think of “populism as a way of to constitute the unity of the group” (p.72,73) He suggest that as a minimal unit of analysis of populism one should take democratic demand, that could be any social or political demand expressed by the people. When there is multiplicity of demands, chain of equivalence is created.

Laclau’s (1977) critique to those that use ideological approach is also normative. Weather they except it or not if they think of populism as an ideology they view it as ”expression of the ideological backwardness of a dominated class” but Laclau takes an opposite normative stance when defining populism as “an expression of the moment when the articulating power of this class imposes itself hegemonically on the rest of the society” (p.196).

4.4. Towards main characteristics of populism

It is not a simple task to reduce the definition of populism to its constituent parts, mainly because of one element necessarily explains the other and vice versa. Only for analytical clarity detected main characteristics are explained separately, with consideration there will be inevitable aliasing and repetition.

‘the people’

The notion of ‘the people’ is a key notion in the concept of populism. Mudde (2004) argues that the concept ‘the people’ is relatively vague and its meaning varies from case to case. The elusive character of ‘the people’ in populism has to do with problematic of defining the populism as such. Therefore, to understand ‘the people’ is to approximate to the nature of populism. This observation comes intuitively to all of those concerned with the research of populism. When defining a concept etymology does not have to always point us in the right direction but it suggests the core of investigation. We can also use analogical argument to come to conclusion of importance of ‘the people’ in the concept of

But to simply realize the essence of the notion ‘the people’ is just to begin ongoing discussion with still numerous open questions. Firstly, should we use term ‘the people’ as here, or we should refer to people without the article, without parenthesis or as some authors (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014) suggest to use the term People, with capital P. Not to mention that maybe some other word or phrase, i.e. ‘the heartland’ (Taggart, 2000) would be more useful to explain ‘the people’ in populism. Even when the issues of using the term ‘the people’ is resolved other issues arise: How is ‘the people’ perceived in populism? How is ‘the people’ interpreted by populists? The answer partially relies on the one’s own understanding of populism or affiliation with certain theoretical tradition as discussed above. Nevertheless, there is some overlapping and common agreement by authors on populism.

There is general accordance that ‘the people’ is never given, it differs in each case of populism and to understand the meaning of ‘the people’ can only be through empirical and comparative research (Pappas, 2016a). Empirical research usually produced variety of answers to the question how populist actors imagine ‘the people’ but do not necessarily lead to clarity of the notion.

For Laclau ‘the people’ in populism is necessarily constructed category. Constructional nature of ‘the people’ is also implied in liberal theory. Laclau writes about the formation of ‘the people’ that happens as a “symbolic unification of the group around an individuality” (Laclau, 2005a, p.100). Formation of ‘the people’ is synonym for creation of ‘equivalent chain and it starts with specific demands of the people, that Laclau names democratic demand, at one point there are numerous demands that operate on the equivalent basis or as “equivalent links” (p.77) When they unite and specific demands are turned into popular demand thus creating popular identity we talk about consolidation of ‘equivalent chain’ which is “something qualitatively more than the simple summation of the equivalent links” (p.77).

There are two components very important in this process. First one is affective component. For most of ‘outsiders’ watching populist actors and their followers
level of strong feelings present in their speeches, rallies etc. is usually dismissed as angry, irrational, sentimental, manipulating and completely disconnected from reality and common sense. However, emotional component in populism is not to be discarded as such. Lately, some authors accepted that such feelings are grounded on an actual reason, weather voters of populist actors are aware of those or not (Müller, 2016). For Laclau (2005a) “affect is required for signification” (p.111) and it is by no means irrational and emotional.

Social context for populists is heterogeneous, so their language is “highly fluctuating and imprecise” (Laclau, 2005a, p.118). To overcome this populist actors are prone to use ‘empty signifiers’. In fact “‘empty signifier’ expresses and constitutes equivalent chain” (Laclau, 2005a, p.129). ‘Empty signifier’ is any phrase, word or symbol where it is not possible to determine what exactly constitutes it and what does it stand for. It is a mean to unite plurality of ‘the people’ (Laclau, 2005a, p.4,5). Use of ‘empty signifiers’ is not exclusive to populism and can be found in different discourses.

For example, most of contemporary research on populism deduce that by populist actors like one of Haider or Berlusconi ‘the people’ is consisted of hard-working, law abiding and moderate conservatives to whom they usually refer to as a ‘silent majority’ (Mudde, 2004). However, in some cases of left-wing populism conclusion was that ‘the people’ is constructed including different socio-economic groups. In the case of Syriza ‘the people’ includes immigrants and members of LGBT groups (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, 2014). Another way to construct ‘the people’ is not on the principle of inclusion, but exclusion or who do populist actors do not include in ‘the people’. When the limit is based on the ethnicity, internal ‘other’ we can say it is a case of ethno-populism (Laclau, 2005a). It is obvious that there can be more inclusionary and/or exclusionary perception of the people and this issue is also discussed in second characteristic of populism, rhetorical exclusion of political elites.

This leaves us to the question what is the core of ‘the people’? Most of them derive of definition of populism. Homogenous nature of the people was often (Mudde, 2004, Stanley, 2008, Rooduijn, 2014) emphasized as a characteristic of the populist perception of the people. Laclau (2005a) confront to the
homogeneity of ‘the people’ the notion of ‘equivalent chain’. Because equivalent chain is constituted of specific democratic demands there are necessary differences between them and everyone that constitutes the chain. However, question of homogenous people was not often questioned in theory of populism.

In politics, all parties and actors refer to people and claim they represent people. But what makes populist parties different is their claim that they represent the whole people. Most of traditional political parties present themselves as representing the interests of ‘part’ of part of people, for example, small businessmen, farmers etc. Populists claim that they are able to represent the interests of all people. The populist core claim also implies that “whoever does not really support populist parties might not be part of the proper people” (Müller, 2016, p.20). In this sense, populists are against political pluralism. But not all anti-pluralists are populist, as any authoritarian regime is also anti-pluralist. For Müller, the core of the populism is “the claim that a part of the people is the people—and that only the populist authentically identifies and represents this real or true people” (Müller, 2016, p.22).

The paradox of populism even though is anti-pluralist it operates in a pluralist regime, as liberal representative democracies present themselves to be. Taggart (2000) is referring to this paradox as ‘institutional dilemmas’ inherent to populism. Populist claim to be against all the institutions that do not represent ‘the people’ but at the same time use those same institutions. For instance, populists are claiming that all political parties (except them) do not work for the interest of people, but usually operate as a political party. One way to overcome this fact is focus on a party leader instead of party. Also, they prefer to advocate direct democracy instead of existing institutions and dismissing the power based on conspiracy theories (Taggart, 2000).

This leads to the issue of representation or How populists perceive ‘the people’ in politics? When claiming that elites are corrupt and illegitimate representatives of ‘the people’ and at the same time attributing legitimacy and moral to ‘the people’ the populists claim that the politics should be the expression of the “general will of the people” how Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Populist not only
criticize present politics but through this critic advocate change in the conduct of politics.

Taggart (2000) argues that populist favour politics that is simple and direct and that tries to avoid existing institutions and give primacy to direct democracy. Two existing institutions that come closest to representing the will of the people are elections and referendum and populist actors usually engage and advocate the merit of those democratic institutions. On the other hand, they contest institutions that constraint the will of majority, such as constitution, rule of the law, checks and balances and re-interpret protection of human rights (Müller, 2016). The meaning of referendum by populists is not “to start an open-ended process of deliberation among actual citizens to generate a range of well-considered popular judgments; rather, the referendum serves to ratify what the populist leader has already discerned to be the genuine popular interest” (Müller, 2016, p.29) However, what populist mean when they call for more direct democracy could be „a democratic element in today's representative democracies“ (Laclau, 2005a, p. 176).

Anti-elitism

One more element that constitutes populism is what is in literature often called anti-elitism and it is referring to political elites. First to emphasize this dimension in theory was Laclau (1977) and he refers to anti-elitism as antagonistic relationship between the power and ‘the people’ or as he names it underdog between whom is “internal frontier dividing society into two champs [power/people]” (Laclau, 2005a, p. 77). Most of theorist accepts this concept and explain it in the similar way as Laclau: “people against elites” (Müller, 2016, p.20), “the antagonistic relationship” (Stanley, 2008, p. 102), “society separated into two… antagonistic groups” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).

In populism ‘the elite’ is same as ‘the people’ identified as a homogenous category (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Ideological affiliation does not play any role and the same is with credibility or incredibility of political actors. Being part of political establishment is immediate discrimination in the eyes of populists. ‘The elite’ is put in opposition to the pure and moral people so the elite has to be “immoral [and] corrupt (Müller, 2016, p. 20).
Anti-elitism is directed towards all political elites. It is important to stress that criticism of some political elites on the grounds of being corrupt is not considered anti-elitism, because it is employed frequently as a competition technique in a political arena. Also, there is a distinction between anti-establishment and anti-elitism. While anti-establishment is antagonism against all existing and established political elites, anti-elitism is a harsh critique against all elites, already established and future political elites (Barr, 2009 in Grbeša, Šalaj, 2018b).

By some theorists ‘the elite’ is also “illegitimate” representative of people and such as their position of power. In this case, ‘the people’ are presented as powerless, but holding legitimacy (Stavrakakis, De Cleen, 2017). This explanation goes further than simplistic explanation of nature of two opposite camps in populism, that is usually presented in Manichean terms of good and evil and it is core to the core of populism and that is the relation to politics, who and how should be represented. Since it states that ‘the people’ have the political legitimacy, then political power should in some way belong to the people. That is the third element of definition of populism, usually described as sovereignty.

Anti-pluralist nature of populism might instinctively lead us to conclusion that populist actors once in power tend to demonstrate authoritarian characteristics. But populists in power does not automatically turns into authoritarianism. It is possible for populist logic to operate in same environment of representative democracy. The fact that populists are governing and are can be considered part of political elite does not prevent them of criticizing political elite, they usually turn to former political elite or external political elite. For their inefficiency they can blame some internal or external elite that prevents them of representing the people truthfully. This rhetoric can also resemble to evoking conspiracy theories (Taggart, 2000, Müller, 2016). Also, their genuine representation of ‘the people’ is not questioned even when they are in power because they can always claim that there is no legitimate opposition (Müller, 2016). Also, they can still stay intact by their possible corrupt and immoral behaviour that can be justified as unavoidable side-effect in their quest of representing ‘the people’ (Müller, 2016).
Upon formulating two essential characteristics of populism as done in this chapter is only a step towards understanding of populism. Presence of both characteristics is necessary for claiming a case populist. In this chapter they were discussed separately but in empirical cases it is hard to make a definitive line between two, because they are usually expressed simultaneously. Before analysis one has to consider the appropriate methodological approach and this will be further discussed in the next chapter.

5. Methodology

5.1. Discursive theory as methodology

Viewing populism as discourse as explained in the theory chapter and designing the research question in that manner supposes that we consider different methods used for discourse analysis. Laclau and Mouffe along with their students most of their professional work devoted to developing one method of discourse analysis known as discursive theory (Jorgensen, Phillips, 2002) or more specific political discursive theory (PDT) sometimes also referred to as post-structural discursive theory. Considering strong ties of this theory with its founders and the University of Essex that continues their legacy it is also common to encounter the theory and methodology under the name Essex school (Glynos et al., 2009). In this work I used the name discursive theory for my methodological approach since that is the main method and there is no need to specify only when combined with other discourse analysis methods where I emphasized the distinction. Beside that my operationalization is heavily relying on the interpretation of Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) that designated the same name for methodology.

However, Laclau and Mouffe’s work is mainly theoretical, and they did not write instructions how to apply this on empirical research. While there has been
some work on how to analyse the language, analysis of material and practices is still underdeveloped. Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) offer general example, where in the discourse of democracy ballot box would be a materialization of the discourse. Social practices resemble actions in Wittgenstein’s ‘language-game theory’.

As critical theory discourse theory also focuses on explanation of a social problem, so it focuses on the context, especially its historical dimension (Glynos et al., 2009). This part of post-structuralism work has roots in Foucault’s idea of researching social reality as archaeology, where discourses are determined by context. Also, they discursive theory draws on the Foucault’s idea of power, that reflects on discourse as rules about social world and sees power as both restrictive and productive (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002).

According to Jorgensen, Phillips (2002) interpretation of discursive theory social world consists of competing discourses where usually in certain historical context some discourses dominates over the other (Graph 1.). Glynos et al. (2009) call this order of discourse, where discourse is “a way of making meaning” and order of discourse is “a particular social ordering of relationships amongst different ways of making meaning”. Some discourses are “mainstream”, while “others are marginal, or oppositional, or ‘alternative’” (p.124) To analyse orders of discourse Glynos et al. (2009) deploy the concept of ‘hegemony’. They argue that some discourses tend to become hegemonic that they “sustain the relations of domination”, but they will be challenged in “hegemonic struggle”. Order of discourse is therefore dynamic system.

The discourse is characterized by its nodal point or the central signifier. In discourse exist numerous other signifiers, called moments that are related to each other and to nodal point respectively. Outside discourses is the field of discursivity, any signifier can enter the discourse from this field by becoming a moment, that is by building the relation with other moments from that discourse. Processes of achieving relations among moments and nodal points are named articulation. Opposite process – closure – is also characteristic in discourse theory, that is when certain elements exit the discourse. Floating signifier is
signifier that pretends to become nodal point and challenge hegemonic discourse. Nodal signifier functions simultaneously as floating signifier.

Graph 1: Discursive theory by Mouffe and Laclau (based on Jorgensen, Phillips, 2002)

Analysis process

The initial analysis to identify key signifiers and nodal point(s) (Graph 2.) was conducted by the multiple reading of the sample. Identification is based on theory and two minimal criteria (articulations of ‘the people’ and articulations of ‘enemy of the people’). Consecutively, these signifiers were marked in the sentence to provide the context.

At the starting point I find it useful to introduce a basic quantitative technique to achieve a general sense of the centrality of the signifier in the discourse. All the articulations of the nodal point were counted in the sample using keywords but were presented visually and in discursive maps while numerical relations are mentioned in the text. The size of signifier depicts the quantitative ratio in which is signifier present in the text. Although discursive methodology is concerned with the ‘meaning and the centrality attributed to subjects’ it allows ‘qualitative, quantitative, or some combination of the two’ (Glynos, Horwath et al., 2009, p.6) methods or techniques. Providing some basic quantitative information adds
to the gravity of the argument that this signifier is central in the discourse. It is also an attempt to make the research systematic and the results reliable.

Upon identifying nodal point and moments relational connections are made visually in discursive maps (for Discursive map 1, see page 47) and explained further in a text. According to the context I assigned positive or negative attribution to the articulation and determined whether the reference is implicitly or explicitly positive (in the case of ‘the people’) or implicitly or explicitly negative (in the case of ‘the elites’). There is also possibility that there is ambiguous relation between signifiers, at some rhetoric points positive at others negative and that was also noted. Discursive maps depict the relation of nodal point(s) to other signifiers in the discursive context. Full line presents the positive relation of the nodal point with other signifiers and among signifiers. Crossed line presents that there is ambiguity in the relations. In the end, full bold line signals antagonism between signifiers.

During discursive map making I ask questions: “How are signifiers organized and combined?” as well as “Why they are not organized in some different order?” Based on the theory of populism I look for construction of subject or what Laclau is sometimes referring to as interpellation of subject (Laclau, 1977) and it’s enemy in a populist manner, which is by creating group ‘us’ versus ‘them’. ‘Us’ is the victim of the antagonist other and ‘us’ does not exist without ‘them’.

*Graph 2.* Operationalization of signifiers in discursive theory (based on Jorgensen, Phillips, 2002, elaborated by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY SIGNIFIERS</th>
<th>IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>HOW RELATIONALLY?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nodal point(s)</td>
<td>Inductive analysis</td>
<td>How are organized/combined with other signifiers in the discourse?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantitative Theory based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What are they not?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2. Conceptual Framework – characteristics of discourse

To examine the characteristics of populist discourse I take an established framework that uses categories of inclusivity vs. exclusivity. This conceptual framework was proposed by Filc (2010) that was analysing types of populism in Israel and applied to cases in Latin America and Western Europe by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012).

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser's (2012) model analyses nature of inclusivity/exclusivity on three dimensions – material, political and symbolical. Since, as claimed in theory, the concept of populism is centred about its political subject - ‘the people’ it is only plausible how range of ideas, acts and policies are put in relation to ‘the people’ instead to analyse it in traditional sense of political right or left, as these concepts are again very broad and dependent on the historical and geographical context. Thus, when we talk about inclusion and exclusion we talk about certain social groups that may or may not be part of ‘the people’.

Three dimensions of inclusion/exclusion allow array of issues to be analysed from economic policies to ethnicity which is important because populism as a thin concept in practice easily and almost always merges with other ideologies. On the other hand, these dimensions have analytical value because they provide a framework to categorize the phenomena.

Material dimension relates to “distribution of (state) resources, both monetary and non-monetary” (Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 158) to its subjects. Although this research, as most of populism researches is embedded in the empirical context of nation-state, the state was here put optionally because as theory suggests we can think of other articulations of populism that are not linked to a particular state but transnational organization such as European Union or where is this phenomena even more obvious in social movements that
transcendent any kind of institutional organization and may have their own ideas of distribution of general resources. However, since the predominant political frame in Western society and one could argue globally is nation-state features analysed in this dimension are those inherent to state, such as welfare, jobs in public services, public infrastructure, assets and natural resources etc. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) mention a problem of clientelism that is often discussed as one of the characteristics of populism. Clientelism in this framework we can explain as a material inclusion of some social groups against the others.

Political dimension of inclusion and exclusion is usually the one overly dominated in the discourse about populism. It deals with issue of participation of different social groups and individuals in political processes and their representation in public arena. Populist claims for more democracy in a form of participatory democracy, radical democracy, and real democracy are central in the populist discourse. It would seem that every populist is inclusive in this regard, but in practice populist target some groups to participate, what would be their politically inclusiveness, while some other groups are intentionally not represented, and their participation is obscured (Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Political participation goes beyond the issue of right to elect and be elected but also includes the question how electoral institutions are re-created and utilized to maximize the political participation of all social groups or limit those of some.

The last dimension, symbolic, is referring to “setting the boundaries of ‘the people’ and, ex negative ‘the elite’” in the populist discourse. This dimension is concerned mostly by rhetoric but also other symbolic deeds, such as dressing, visual symbols of the populist actors. Symbolic inclusion means that some social groups are implicitly and explicitly included in the construction of ‘the people’ or of ‘we’, if they are not they are immediately excluded. Also, if they are labelled as a part of ‘the elite’ or ‘them’ it is a feature of symbolic exclusion. Same as in political dimension there has to be certain level of political inclusion – claim to represent some social group that was previously excluded so to call a case a populist there has to be minimal dose of symbolical exclusion of ‘the elite’.
As it is obvious processes of inclusion and exclusion happen simultaneously. One minimal criterion of defining populism, i.e. ant elitism is in fact exclusion of a social group that represent a political and/or economic elite. This issue becomes even more complicated considering the volatility of political rhetoric in a longer period of time, from one election to other.

5.3. Sample choice
5.3.1. Populism and Social Media

The body of literature that explores the employment of new media in contemporary world of politics is growing. With increasing usage of Internet by political parties and election campaigns political communication is transforming. Digital media offers in comparison to traditional, three functions: to inform, to mobilize and to interact (Lilleker and Vedel, 2013). Some authors already researched how and why populist actors use social media. The first explanation for populist heavy use of social media is based on their novelty on political and public scene. As new actors populists are put in underprivileged position in mass media. Initially traditional media treats new populists unequally while at the same time neo-populist parties depend on media coverage and try to gain more media attention (Mazelloni, Stewart and Horsfield, 2003). Others claim that populist style, being extraordinary and provocative resonates with media’s criteria as ‘newsworthy’. While that brings them media attention it does not affect their popularity translated in votes (Bos, van der Brug, de Vreese, 2011).

Social media give the populists the freedom to articulate their ideology and spread their messages. Especially it gives more space to use stronger language when attacking the elites. Another characteristic of social media that features of populism manifest isolated across different posts and tweets (Engesser, Ernst

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4 To tackle this analytical weakness Stavrakakis (2017) proposes theoretical concept that inclusive or exclusive character based on the notion of verticality/horizontality (p.530). However, this concept was not empirically tested and we find it more appropriate when trying to determine nationalism vs. populism. For explanation see p. 530 in Stavrakakis (2017).
New media resonates with movements with populist demands on the right or on the left because it rejects hierarchical organization while promoting party as movement and experimentation in organization (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016).

Dittrich (2017) in his research on social media activity of populist parties from France, Spain Italy and Germany concludes that populist parties and movements are making heavy use of social networks” (Dittrich, 2017, p.3). They have higher rates of followers and interact more with them. Reasons include some very practical one as efficiency at almost zero cost, possibility to build a community, but also because social media offers political communication without institutional and moral constraints. Therefore, they communication style shows features of polarizing and exclusion (Dittrich, 2017).

5.3.2. Sample characteristics

Much of the criticism towards research in discourse analysis is towards unclear choice of the sample. While researchers can often have right interpretation they fail to argument representativeness of certain sample (Poblete, 2015). For methodological clarity, I describe my sample choice and it´s characteristics (Table 1.). Sample includes posts on party’s official Facebook pages of the two parties that are chose units of analysis – Workers’ Front and Human Blockade. Posts from Facebook pages are retrieved via Netvizz application⁵ that offers open access to restricted Facebook data. Period analysed is from 21th of October to 6th of November 2015, official time of the parliamentary election campaign. The choice of this time frame is based on presumption that election campaign is the time of the most intensive political mobilization when political actors are prone to emphasize their populist characteristics. Political actors do express

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⁵ The Netwizz application available at 4 https://apps.facebook.com/netvizz/ is developed by Bernhard Rieder, media researcher at the University of Amsterdam in 2009 but it is not affiliated with specific institution but made available online for public use. Netwizz collects data via API (application programming interface) service and organizes it into tabular categories to be downloaded. For Public Pages it can retrieve published post and audiovisual material, comments, number of likes etc. (Rieder, 2013). Around 300 scholarly articles that used the application for data gathering were published (Bernhard, 2018). There are several different applications that also retrieve data from social network, but Netvizz is currently the most reliable and independent sourceCocC used in social research.
populist characteristics before and after official election campaign period and in this regard the results of the analysis are limited only to the chosen period.

Although discourse is more than rhetoric, this research mainly focuses on textual analysis. Here it is analysed beside posts that is necessarily textual also posted visual material, i.e. photos and video if they are authored by the political actor. Such visual material usually contains a decent amount of text and this text is treated as textual material in qualitative analysis. However, it is not included in semantic analysis (discursive maps). For visual elements there was no thorough systematic analysis as this would require incorporation of completely new methodological tools. In future researches it would be interesting to analyse such material as well since initial observations suggest that there is strong expression of populistic characteristic only through visual tools by political actors.

For the purpose of this analysis, links to other material online are discarded for the analysis if they are not explicitly present in the sample as part of the rhetoric of the analysed actor. Reason for discarding of such secondary material is because it broadens the sample and thus potentially needs introduction of new analysis techniques and as secondary material it is not essential part of discourse of the analysed actor.

Also, including comments on social media in an analysis is usually common for the researchers that try to determine public opinion or characteristics of commentators which is not the case in this analysis. It would be useful to include comments of the actors analysed (users of the account) because the relatively high level of interaction with other commentators. In this case, when they answer on certain comment, it is part of their discourse. However, again for limiting the sample, comments are not included in the analysis. Also, including the comments would require consideration of many issues that arise in this case, for example comments as responds on comments other users has to be analysed together with those comments, possibility of bot comments etc.

Beside bot comments that are usually the biggest issue when analysing online material for researchers, there are some problems that derive from the nature of the material that have to be addressed. Firstly, sample is acquired via Netvizz application retroactively and there is possibility that posts are erased in the past,
action this application cannot detect because it retrieves only what is currently in database. So far, the most plausible solution offered was to collect the sample in the real time or collect the material via application periodically before the analysis to avoid the lose of data (Villegas, 2016). Choice of the timeframe for the analysis that dates approxiamatelly three years in the past does not allow such methods, so if post were erased during that period they were not available for the analysis.

Table 1 Sample characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Photo</th>
<th>Video</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ Front</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17</td>
<td>(including text)</td>
<td>(text only)</td>
<td>(including text)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>including text</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Blockade</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(59</td>
<td>(7 including text)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>including text</td>
<td>(including text)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Workers’ Front

In total, 47 posts for 17 days (from 21.10 to 6.11.2015) were retrieved. In average, that is 2, 7 posts per day. There were 27 posts that included text, with or without visual material, which is picture, photo or video. From total number of posts 20 were only visual without accompanying text. There was one video TV channel feature about the party with short description. The video is informative feature about the party focusing mostly on presenting their election program. It is produced by and external actor, i.e. TV channel and journalists. There were 37 photos with or without textual description, but there was only one
status post that was textual without any visual material. Also, there was 8 posts that included external link. Picture material includes mainly visual material produced by the party. The nature of such material is usually campaign posters or sometimes photos of those posters in public spaces that represent support for the party. Beside party posters another typical picture material is visually attractive extracts from the party program, so even though it was ascribed in their characteristics as visual material it is highly textual material, because it was screenshot of the text.

Average length of the post was 152 words and in total there was 4124 words. There is huge contrast among the posts according to their length, the shortest one consisting of just one word and longest of 1717 words.

Human Blockade

In total, 69 posts from 17-day period were retrieved. In average, that is approximately 4 posts per day. From 69 posts, 59 were textual posts and all posts included visual material. That is, 10 were only visual material. There were 7 videos uploaded, all included short and basic textual information of the video. Two videos were TV features about the party downloaded from TV channels and 5 videos depict activities of the party and its members, such as filming protest of gatherings. There was no external links.

In 59 posts there was in total 2602 words, shortest post consisting of only one word and longest of 274 words. Average length of the post is 44 words. Generally, most of the posts are short consisting of only one sentence and a few lengthy posts of couple of hundreds of words.

Conclusion

We can say, Human Blockade was more active in that period and published more posts. Also, Human Blockade used the opportunity to accompany every post with visual material. On the other hand, Worker’s Front in almost one third fewer posts, had twice as much textual content. The party also used heavily opportunity to publish visual material, because almost 20 posts are only pictures, usually pictures with some textual content. Both parties display vast differences
in the length of posts, where length varied from one word to couple of hundred. Therefore, they tend to publish either very condense or broad message.

Before the analysis it is important to note some observations about the sample and how it effects the analysis. Because of the nature of the media there are no long introductions (if at all) or diluted language. The message is often intense and actors tend to push the limits of publicly appropriate language that is often not present in traditional media. Therefore, we can expect that populist message would also be clearly expressed. Also, because lengthy post are not appropriate for Facebook, they are usually not that common and political message is usually fragmented in different posts. Also, when populism it empressed it is expressed in concise and sharp manner sometimes only in a single slogan.

5.4. Units of analysis choice

In this research two small political parties are chosen as two units of analysis and the reason for that is twofold. Firstly, as already partially mentioned in the introduction and research goals both parties share some similarities. They emerged at approximately in the sam period from relatively small movements and entered campaign as marginal anti-system parties. Also, as parties they did not hold power in political functions at any level, thus are not viewed as a part of political establishment. The same is also true for the most prominent members of the parties, relatively young and fresh faces in party politics.

On the other hand, there are considerably different ideological positions of two parties that was the main significange for such a units of analysis choice. Workers’ Front as a unit of analysis represents left political platform and they themselves also accept this characterisation. Human Blockade leans towards right on political spectre despite the claim that they represent neither left nor right. Taking right/left option is done for analytical purposes as intention is to explore articulation of populism that according to theory can merge with different ideologies (Taggart, 2000). Second research question is to determine the characteristics of (populist) discourse and this choice of units of analysis allows broader empirical exploration.
However, the research does not attempt to be comparative analysis as there is no separate analysis that compares characteristics of two political parties. One reason is that analysis is mainly qualitative and deeply contextualised. More importantly, comparison was implied both while researching because same framework for analysis is being applied in a same manner for both cases.

6. Analysis

6.1. Analysis Workers' Front

6.1.1. Populism in the discourse

‘the people’

Based on the theory of populism, first task was to determine how political subject is constructed in the discourse. This political subject is ‘the people’ political actor is referring to. Because different signifiers can be used to evoke ‘the people’ in the analysis firstly one needs to identify which signifier is used to positively appeal to the subject.

Semantic analysis of the discourse of Workers’ Front of the construction of ‘the people’ suggests that the party in their Facebook page is primarily evoking 'workers' as their subject (Discursive map 1). In the sample there was 13 instances when workers were evoked in singular or plural form, including ‘every worker’ and ‘working majority’, or as different forms of adjectives, such as ‘workers’ rights’ or ‘workers’ struggle’. Such evocation is predominant in the sample while other articulations of subject that were usually mentioned only few times or even once. In association to the work Workers’ Front also refers to the ‘unemployed and ‘underemployed’ as well as ‘labour force’ in general. Beside
‘workers’ in the sample there was also appeal to ‘small farmers’ and ‘small manufacturers’.

Discursive map 1 ‘the people’ construction in Workers’ Front discourse

There was one case of mentioning of each of this social groups – ‘students’, ‘pensioners’, ‘women’ and ‘immigrants’. The issue of immigrants was also mentioned in a harsh critique of treatment of refugees by European countries and its citizens, referred as simply ‘Europe’. Also, descriptive form was used when evoking ‘poor’, ‘disempowered’, ‘oppressed’. Only once neutral and all-encompassing version of ‘the people’ as ‘humans’ was used.

Only in the case of ‘union workers’ there is ambivalence: ‘... I dream about real and honest workers' struggle without long-lasting union workers with one hand in the pocket. I dream about union workers that will listen their workers and workers that will elect their unionists and have possibility to depose them if working contrary to their interests... Nowadays, labour unions in Croatia are in severe crisis and I believe that raising awareness about unionism importance as well as uniting proved fighter at the front of fierce unions with a lot of work and sacrifice we can progress can be made.” (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 6.11.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 2) On the one hand, they are evoked negatively as corrupt, described as ‘with one hand into the pocket’ or implying that they are inefficient and ‘long-lasting’. More important for the construction of the ‘us’ front, union workers can be part of ‘us’ and that is dependent on their individualistic characteristics. If ‘proven fighters’ or ‘feisty’ union workers are
presented highly positively in the discourse. The fact that the some of the most prominent members of the party are union leaders and as such they are speakers of the party confirms the positive stance towards unions.

Also, it is important to observe how, what Stanley (2008) names ‘the heartland’, was evoked in the discourse. Firstly, there is only few, in total three, mentioning of ‘the heartland’ and that were in two instances merely the name of the country - Croatia. In one case term ‘our land’ is mentioned and it is considered relatively neutral term in comparison to shared term ‘homeland’ that is most common in Croatian public discourse and it is usually characterized as patriotic and sometimes nationalist term.

The common expression ‘the people’ was never used in the discourse in semantically analysed textual sample. Same is the case with some evocation of ‘the people’ that would imply it as an ethnic or nationalist category such as Croats, Croat or any other nationality (e.g. German) that were not present. However, there was one positive reference to ‘the people’ (Croatian: narod) in the photo material. „Fall oh force and injustice, Cities we have erected for you, towers we have built. Ever slaves have we been, toiling for you. Our stolen right restore it back to us! Should you refuse, we’re not begging, the people will take it themselves “(Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 21.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 46). This quote is a part of older Croatian peasant struggle song that was reinterpreted by Yugoslav WWII partisans and was broadly accepted in socialist Yugoslavia. This is the only reference to Yugoslav socialist tradition. In their discourse Workers’ Front does not refer to past, only in some cases when it does explain historical emergence of capitalist production relations, but does not evoke neither antifascist or socialist cultural heritage or it does very indirectly and rarely, for example when suggesting workers organizing and direct organization of production (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 06.11.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 2) is clearly drawing on self-management experience in socialist Yugoslavia.

This song is posted along with picture of a castle near Zagreb, that Croatian businessman, evoked as tycoon by the Workers’ Front, uses for private purposes while there is legal process being prolonged that questions legality of his use of
the building. However, those that contest legality in the court are heiress of the representatives of pre-war bourgeois class. So in their rhetoric against ownership of this castle and its illegality Workers’ Front is that represents is also including these heiress, actually bourgeois. So, it seems that creating ‘chains of equivalence’, i.e. unifying different social interest is at the moment more important than their differences.

‘the elites’

Second characteristic of populism is construction of antagonistic frontiers between ‘the people’ and its enemies. Although these two processes happen simultaneously and are integral characteristics of populism, here for analytical purpose they are examined separately. While ascribing positive characteristic to ‘workers’ Workers’ Front is clearly expressing antagonistic, conflictual and exclusive character towards some social groups and issues (Discursive map 2).

Discursive map 2 Antagonistic ‘other’ in Workers’ Front discourse
The analysis of a sample suggests that Workers’ Front frame ‘them’ as political and economic elite in equal measure, at least quantitatively. When it comes to political elites, negative attitude is expressed towards ‘political oligarchy’ in four instances. This oligarchy is described as ‘contemporary’, ‘local’ and also ‘party’ oligarchy. Also, political elites were evoked in the form of ‘alleged leftists’, ‘clientelist network’ and in one occasion as ‘procapitalist parties’. In a few instances, political parties are mentioned by the name. The post “Down with procapitalist parties.” (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 31.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 15) illustrates the division between Workers’ Front as a political party and the otherness of other political parties. “Against the dictatorship of the capital and party oligarchies” (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 23.10.5, Appendix 1, Post No 44) is the campaign slogan and it clearly expresses animosity when dismissing political parties.

„While Istrian Democratic Assembly demands decentralization of budget financing to feed their ever pickier clientelist network of the eligible another
privatised company in Pula is decaying. Those who know local events very much know that for the situation in Puljanica is responsible tandem of profiteering capital, collaborative local media and local party oligarchies. “(Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 3.11.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 7) Analogous to Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage theory and the division of centre and periphery applied to political actors at the national and regional level the role of populist actors could be de-construct existing cleavages in an attempt to unify the people, creating the chain of the equivalence (Stavrakakis et al., 2014). It is also an example of homogenizing political elites, because they act the same as national political elites with creation of their clientelist networks.

However, Workers’ Front does not restrain from politics in general. They clearly position themselves on the left of the political spectrum, but readily attack other typically left political parties: „Amusing is the rhetoric about ‘uhljeb’ [public employees* pejoratively, a.n.] by alleged leftists, e.g. Labour Party, Social Democratic Party or Croatian Sustainable Development. They do not understand that authentic left is for everyone to be ‘uhljeb’, i.e. that everyone works for socially (publically) owned companies...“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 31.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 13) Here, they claim for themselves to be ‘authentic left’ unlike other leftist and they also subvert the term of public employees that is usually used to discredit political opponents by claiming they artificially produce more ‘public employees’ in an attempt to create a political network.

Beside internal political elites or political oligarchy Workers’ Front discourse is directed against ‘Europe’ in one post. Specifically, it is a critique European countries and their policies on the issue of refugees trying to reach borders of Central and Western Europe via so called Balkan routed that is going through Croatia: “And now it is 2015 and there are pictures and videos again and we share them and hope that Europe will stop the suffering but Europe is building wired fences and people are walking through mud with grocery bags and all their photos are left in their faraway homes and they are not welcome anywhere and I blame Europe.”(Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 24.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 40). It is dismissing an idea of Europe because its politicians on state level and especially jointly in some sort of common EU policy proved not able
to provide humanitarian solution for the refugees or in worst case, they behaved extremely hostile to refugees while stopping them to enter the country.

On the other hand, antagonism is also directed towards social group that embodies the capitalist system in Croatia. They were usually named as ‘capitalists’, ‘tycoons’, and ‘two hundred rich families’. Also, sometimes the enemy was not social group but the ‘capital’ or ‘big business’ itself, described as capital derived from ‘privatization’ or ‘tycoon behaviour’, or antagonism was directed against specific ‘investment fund’. Evoking tycoons is primarily because they embody ‘Croatian capitalism’, but it can be partially explained with the appealing to the voters that are more likely to condemn tycoons while it would be harder to find that strong anti-sentiment towards capitalism as such. Also, such critique of tycoons and proxy capitalism is typical in libertarian discourse. However, in the discourse of Workers’ Front by condemning tycoons it is not implied that tycoon or proxy capitalistic is unacceptable, while capitalism without tycoons would be acceptable.

Therefore, Workers’ Front does not restrain from antagonism towards capitalists the capitalists as social group, but the antagonism is equally directed against more abstract category, capitalism as such and society that capitalist system produces. In one instance they explain that the enemy is at the top of economy and political system and they are those holding power, while majority of society is harmed because of privileges they hold: „...large and radical changes that would benefit the majority of the society would not undergo without huge resistance – within and outside country – because those at the top of economy and political system that we live in will not give up their privileges without struggle“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 4).

That the social group or individuals are relatively lesser enemies suggest one instance where mention one of the capitalists by name but stating that Workers’ Front is not interested in him on a “personal level”, but as an “obvious symbol of capitalist reality in Croatia” (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 29.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 19). By abstracting the enemy in the discourse, Workers’ Front does not create deep social cleavages, because everyone is given the chance to join the majority.
Some social groups, such as union workers, have an ambiguous status and can be ‘us’ and ‘them’ at the same time, depending on their individual characteristics and if they are ‘on the right side’. This might suggest that the antagonism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not absolute and that some sort of transitivity is allowed. Also, we can note that Workers’ Front does not generally dismisses some social groups such as politicians and representatives of media, but it does antagonize them because of the collaboration with ‘the enemy’.

Conclusion

According to the theory of populism and moreover most of previous empirical analyses, only when there is reference to 'the people' or when this reference is central in the discourse the case is considered populism. This was often included in minimal definition (for example Mudde, 2004, Stavrakakis, 2014 and others). Some researchers include all the collective expressions under the notion of 'the people' (e.g. Grbeša and Šalaj, 2018 treat expressions such as citizen, public, society, voter etc. as the appeal to the 'the people'). It depends highly on coder or researcher to interpret what is expression of collective subject and it is possible that other researchers include also some other expressions. This also differ among different languages, because 'the people' and its meanings in English may be different words in other language. The more important segment in the definition of populism is not weather populist actors have the signifier 'the people' central in their discourse but if they use this (or any other) signifiers as a mean to collectivize the subject. Mudde (2007) is naming this process a homogenization of 'the people'.

Just a semantic analysis and construction of semantic map based on sample from Workers' Front 2015 parliamentary election campaign demonstrates that the main subject that Workers’ Front is referring to is 'workers' and not ‘the people’. There are three possible interpretations of these results. Firstly, we can conclude that Workers’ Front displays working class discourse typical for Marxist ideology. Gómez-Reino and Llamazares (2016) in the analysis of the discourse of the Spanish political party Podemos identify transition from typical far left-
wing ant capitalist discourse at the time when the party is founded to clearly populist discourse around the 2015 elections. So this first explanation dismiss that analysed sample demonstrates a case of populism and consider dynamic of the political discourse. In this case it would be interesting to make a longitudinal analysis and see if the discourse changed during observed period.

Here it might be helpful to refer to the theory and try to make some differentiation between the class in traditional Marxist theory and ‘the people’ in populism in post-structuralism theory. According to Laclau (1977) Marxist-Leninist have a reductionist view of class struggle when they explain it as contradiction in production relations and try to interpret every political or ideological element in class struggle by this logic. They would usually claim that social elements are part of propaganda or rhetoric deployed by capitalist class. Instead, Laclau (1977) is using the term ‘classes in struggle’ where these classes are dominated by some power represented by another class. Laclau claims that hegemonic relations exist above production relations, and therefore not all social contradictions are class contradictions. For Laclau populist element “lies …in a specific non-class contradiction articulated into that discourse” (p.164). To answer the question, “working class is …part of ‘the people’” (p.109) but ‘the people’ is broader social construct since it includes all dominated groups that identify themselves as underdog that is in conflict with power. Because working class is part of ‘the people’ and ‘the people’ can be constructed (interpellated) depending on different social formations and not necessary on class contradiction, the concept of class struggle can be integrated in different discourses. Nowadays it is being reproduced by right populists, when they ban on foreign workers as cheap labour, they actually raise class issue, that was traditionally been a task of political left (Žižek, 2006). Žižek (2006) suggests that instead of traditional left-right ideologies in today's political field there is only choice between post-political and populist polarization.

This leads us to the second possibility that Workers’ Front’s appeal to ‘workers’ is an attempt to construct the collective subject. It does that with simplification and homogenization of the subject they are appealing to. In their discourse workers in fact make the majority of the population. It is the best explained by a
quote from the bigger post: „Society must protect interests of workers (majority) and not private interests of capital (minority). “ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 26.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 32). This majority includes everyone but the capitalists and those collaborating in favour of capitalists. Workers could also be very heterogeneous group and have different social problems, but this is not acknowledged by Workers’ Front.

The third, most plausible interpretation would be the one in which we witness characteristics of populism in the manner of homogenization of the subject through ‘chains of equivalence’ with relevant reference to Marxist discourse. According to Laclau (1974) it is possible that Marxists discourse in exists in broader populist discourse when it includes class struggle within underdog/power struggle\(^6\). It would be interesting to analyse the case of Workers’ Front longitudinally to possibly note if the discourse changed through certain period and does the party expresses more or less populist characteristics in comparison to Marxist discourse.

Quantitatively, capital (or as capitalism, capitalist etc.) was mentioned twenty-six times in Workers’ Front’s in comparison of thirty-two evocations of work (workers, working etc. excluding mentioning of the party name). This might suggest some sort of centrality of term capital but juxtapositioned to ‘work’ (Discursive map 3\(^7\)). References to the capitalism, capital and capitalists are always explicitly or implicitly negative. This fits into two necessary criteria of minimal definition and suggest that logic of populism prevails.

\(^6\) We can find populist logic within other opposing discourses such as fascist, authoritarian, communist etc. (Laclau, 1977).

\(^7\) Discursive map 3 is the sum of the Discursive map 1 and 2.
Constructing the antagonistic frontier can be summarized in: “Against the dictatorship of the capital and party oligarchies” what was the slogan for the election campaign. Emphasizing the animosity towards the enemies of ‘the people’ in the discourse is one of the characteristics of populist actors. The critique of political elites in their discourse is due to their involvement of perpetrating the capitalist system and protecting and representing capitalists. Another group that is accomplice is ‘collaborative’ media or different advertisers that refused or conditioned involvement in the campaign of Workers’ Front.

6.1.2. Characteristics of discourse – inclusivity vs. exclusivity

Conceptual framework used for determining subtypes of populism is the one developed by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) that differs two subtypes of populism inclusionary and exclusionary based on material, political and symbolical dimension. To analyse inclusionary as well as exclusionary characteristics of a certain political actor above mentioned authors included wide variety of data, such as rhetoric, visual identity, implemented or planned policies, conduct under certain conditions etc.

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8 Unlike Mudde and Kaltwasser here we do not try to definitely classify analyzed units unto one subtype of populism because we consider their framework is not a sufficient tool for such a task. However, it is very useful tool to determine characteristics of political discourse among populist cases and adjoined ideology. Thus, using their framework we try to contribute to the understanding of plurality of populism.
In a case of analysis of small political parties that have not performed in power such data would be limited due to lack of public exposure in general and opportunities to react in comparison with more relevant political actors. Also, small sample as rhetoric during one political campaign may not be source sufficient enough to make determinate conclusions, however some observations could be made.

What does sample analysis tell us about the nature exclusion and exclusion of certain social groups – which social groups constitute of ‘the people’ and of ‘the elite’ in the discourse of Workers’ Front? Can we make a conclusion about inclusive and/or exclusive character of the party?

*Material dimension*

Material inclusion and exclusion usually in the discourse of Workers’ Front is usually based on monetary criteria, i.e. different compensations for certain social groups. Other possibility includes material inclusion upon providing different services that one usually has to pay at its own expense.

In one of the points of the party programme of Workers’ Front is a demands to „confiscate all the earnings and property of political and economic elites if same are gained in criminal manner... those assets redirect in boosting the production and projects of vital interest for workers and poor“, „disable inheritance of capital assets during privatisation process“(Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 3.11.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 8). This is the example of material exclusion and inclusion in the same process. Sometimes it is even more emphasized who is going to be materially excluded with markers 'at the expense of', e.g. „automatic pay off of all the remaining salaries (at the expense of capitalists, banks etc.)“(Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 26.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 32).

Their promise „for entirely free education and health services for all“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 2.11.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 10) marks broad social inclusion with offering services usually more affordable to those with more material means. Thus, Workers’ Front in their programme presents initiative that would enhance even deeper inclusion by „increase of allowances for unemployed, social allowances, child care benefits and student scholarships.“
Unlike in a second case free education and health care

Beside capitalists Workers’ Front there is a conditional material exclusion of some parts of the society. This is not complete exclusion but attempt to balance the material status of these groups with the rest of society, when promoting that „salaries of politicians [should be] same as average wages of a workers.“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 27.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No28). It is not clear who occupies the category of a politician or is there some hierarchy among politician according to position they hold. It is also not obvious how to calculate average workers' salary. It is not material exclusions of politicians from the society because it allows the category of politician to continue and have fair material status in a society, but not privileged in comparison to the rest of society, that is workers.

When Workers’ Front suggest to „stop financing religious communities, privileged pensions and falsified disability allowances“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 29.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 23) it is again example of partial material exclusion of these social groups. Firstly, in cases of privileged pensioners and those with falsified disabilities it is a way to exclude those that benefited from corrupted system - primarily during the 1990s but also continuing with all successive governments. It is implied that such false pensioners and persons with disabilities are in a way symbol of that period and unjust policies. Most of occupants of this groups are war veterans and politically sensitive social group. It is difficult to determine with time distance falsified and real disabilities also, they are relatively cohesive social group organized centrally and locally and unified around the official Homeland War discourse. Therefore, negative rhetoric as in this example about those with falsified pensions is usually considered as an attack on all war veteran pensioners and Homeland War so consequentially the homeland itself. It is partial because it does only imply that they should be retained from the material rights acquired in an 'unjust' manner and equalize them with the rest of society that attained those rights fairly. It does not provide for some measures that would materially harm false pensioners.
As for decision to material exclude religious communities it does show strictly secular character of the party. Religious communities should not be financially privileged in expense to another organisation. However, there is no provision that denies their existing material status or that would make such communities renounce some of their material assets which is only partial exclusion in the rhetoric of Workers’ Front.

**Political dimension**

Workers’ Front demand „for direct democracy in economy and politics“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 2.11.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 10) implies intention of a broad societal political inclusion but does not refer to who and how would exercise direct democracy. Direct democracy can mean a range of political practices, but it can be only 'empty signifier'. However, it does indicate new political institutions that would encompass active political involvement of a larger amount of population. The only domain where principles of direct democracies were incorporated in more concrete policies was in working environment. Here Workers’ Front suggests „organising the bodies of workers' control in companies in the manner that includes all the workers. Workers have right to examine the books, veto right when dismissing the workers, right to decide of work organisation and possibility to decide when hiring“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 27.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 28). Workers’ Front stands for stronger political inclusion of workers. This is inclusion in a broad sense of political, how relations in a community are organized, not in political power structures, but decision making on a workplace.

**Symbolic dimension**

Finally, symbolical dimension includes all the social groups included and/or excluded from the discourse of the Workers’ Front. One can argue that above described examples of material and political inclusion/exclusion are in fact only examples of symbolical dimension because they are only part of rhetoric that is analysed in this research. However, since these examples are specific and concrete plans in the party programme that refer to material and political conditions of a certain social group, they are included separately in these two dimensions – material and political. Here, only references to social groups that are in in direct relation with some predicted act that would be a material or
political inclusion/exclusion or implementation of which would not have direct result on material or social state but more general are described.

Typical example of symbolical inclusion is an excerpt about hypothetical situation: „...after 4 years of Workers’ Front in power [Croatia] would be a country where workers, poor today disempowered and oppressed, student, pensioners and small farmers would live somewhat better than today and would have much more rights and possibility to decide about their destiny“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 4). Here social groups such as workers or students are only symbolically included in the rhetoric. Formulations such as 'live better' and 'decide about destiny' are vague and do not translate into reality but they imply that benefit of these social groups is valued highly by the Workers’ Front. Also, usually social groups that are included are economic categories, something that is attribute of the totality of analysed rhetoric of Workers’ Front.

As depicted in Discursive map 1, social groups that were referred implicitly or explicitly positive and explained as constituting the people by homogenization of populist subject are the ones that are also symbolically included. Those include beside overwhelmingly dominant group of 'workers' in the rhetoric there were also positive references to the ‘students’, ‘pensioners’, the ‘unemployed’, ‘small farmers’ ‘small manufacturers’, ‘women’, and ‘immigrants’. Also, symbolical inclusion is present in programme, for example when Workers’ Front promises to „decrease age limit for retirement“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 29.10.2015 , Appendix 1, Post No 23) they are mainly referring to workers but also implying that those that are already retired are not forgotten as retirement issue is being discussed in a socially sensitive manner that would guarantee deserved and dignified retirement for once workers.

Also, plan to „increase the number of kindergartens, which have to be completely free. If possible, opening kindergartens at workplaces“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 27.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 28) is a symbolical inclusion of women, especially of women that are employed. It is also an indication that female identity is also as a worker or an employee. For example, another possibility to include women could be that of prolonging
maternity/paternity leave or promoting paid domestic care take. Since those are traditionally women jobs such measures would most probably benefit and be exploited by women. However, although socially sensitive such these policies would promote more traditional role of the women and would not fit into picture of traditional understanding of a worker – man or women as individual employed typically in a large production company.

When talking about explicit symbolic exclusion of certain social groups analysis produces result similar to the one in material dimension. Here, the focus ion animosity towards some occupations and holders of those as a social group, that is showed in Discursive map 2 - 'enemy' of the people. However, animosity does not have to mean complete exclusion. For example 'media' is clearly in their rhetoric negatively described, but it can be redeemed from „tool of capital to control public opinion” if „put to the use of the whole society“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 29.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 23)

The only social group that is symbolically completely excluded is again economic category and they are capitalists. Workers’ Front refers with unreserved hostility to some of the wealthiest Croatian with such as here: „After famous article about Todorić ... and odes about murderer Horvatinčić Bljutarnji strikes again – this time with praise to tycoon Emil Tedeschi. It is interesting that during the Harvard lecture no one mentioned privatisation plunder...“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 31.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 12). Another example is more general and shows Workers’ Front stance towards capitalists: „They say that capitalism is good because there are also honest capitalists – does that mean that slavery was also good because there were also good slave owners?“ (Workers’ Front Facebook Page, 23.10.2015, Appendix 1, Post No 42). This is not an attack on individual person of a capitalists but system they represent. As such capitalists are automatically excluded as long as they are capitalist.

9 Author’s comment: It is word game: Bljutarnji presents Croatian daily journal Jutarnji, in this way described pejoratively.
Conclusion

In general, strong economic characterisation of social groups typical for Marxist discourse. This was obvious from both analysis of populist discourse and inclusion/exclusion dimension (*Table 2*). This is in accordance with overall discourse that views political and social reality in economic categories while other identity categories are considered secondary. It is also an example of the 'logic of equivalence' when differences between and within social groups are intentionally disregarded in an attempt to homogenize the group of the people.

*Table 2 Inclusion/exclusion in the discourse of Workers’ Front*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers’ Front</th>
<th>Inclusion</th>
<th>Exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>workers, students, poor</td>
<td>capitalists, politicians (partially), religious communities (partially), false pensioners (partially)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>workers</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolical</td>
<td>workers, students, pensioners, women, immigrants, poor, unemployed, small farmers and manufacturers</td>
<td>capitalists, political oligarchy, media (partially)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the end, most of the previous analysis is about social groups that are referred to in the discourse of Workers’ Front. It is also important to indicate social groups that were not mentioned. Typically, in the rhetoric of political actors, referring to ethnic, racial or religious social groups is common. Ethnic category is absent from the rhetoric of Workers’ Front. Due to historical reasons it is slippery to refer to Croatian people, Croatians because it usually means exclusion of other ethnic minorities. Such rhetoric has controversial connotations because it was present during the 90's and is in relation with nationalism. Nowadays due to historical weight ethnic category is more often considered divisive category than unifying. Also, category of people without determinant describing which people was avoided, probably because its
association with Croatian people and ethnicity. Similar case is with religious category which is in Croatia strongly connected with ethnic – Croatian equals Catholic tradition.

Since we determined secular character of the party based on partial material exclusion of religious communities it is to expect that civic category would be emphasized. This is not the case, because there was not one evocation of the citizen or legal national of a country. This can be mainly explained with the tendency to homogenize 'the people' under the identity of the worker. Also, worker does not have to hold a citizenship of the country. So, in the rhetoric of Workers’ Front worker is a group broad enough to encompass the majority of a population since everyone is a worker, potential worker (student) or former worker (pensioner). Beside workers, students and pensioners are groups often positively included in the discourse of Workers’ Front.

Processes of inclusion and exclusion happen simultaneously and when one social group is included it is at the expense of some other. In this case, we cannot talk about ideal cases of inclusionarism or exclusionarism. However, we can conclude that political and/or economic elites are excluded and there is a tendency to include variety of other social groups.
6.2. Analysis Human Blockade

6.2.1. Populism in the discourse

'\textit{the people}'

Semantic analysis of the sample portrays the positive subject to which is political actor Human Blockade referring to in the analysed sample (\textit{Discursive map 4}). Human Blockade most often evoked 'the people' as 'humans' (in Croatian: 'ljudi') and other general terms that have no economic or identity characteristic. The centrality of the articulation 'humans' is concluded not only because it was preferred quantitatively, it was used in four instances, when other articulations of the subject were used only once or twice, but also because it was the main election campaign slogan: „Last on the list, first for the people [humans]!“ (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 4.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 18). It was published in this form on a Facebook page and presumably as part of election campaign billboards as self-explanatory phrase and it implies that the main goal of the part is to stand 'for the people' even though it is not evident who is 'the people' and what does it mean to be 'for people'.

\textit{Discursive map 4 'the people' construction in Human Blockade discourse}
Other general terms for 'the people' such as 'every man', 'common man' as well as 'us' describing them as a victim. Also, Human Blockade was also referring to the 'citizen' as a civic category that would encompass the majority of the population but only in two instances and in one it was indirectly, as claim that the party ‘fight for citizen’s rights’. Human Blockade is also evoking ‘the people’ in more descriptive terms, such as ‘poor’ and ‘disempowered’, they are in this situation not by their own fault but ‘unfairly’.

In one instance nation was evoked, as 'destiny of the nation' which is the term that is referring to Croatian nation as an exclusive ethnic category. The term that would determine 'the people' ethnic category as inhabitants of the particular country (in Croatian: 'narod') was used in only one instance, as 'our people'. This was used in a post of a picture of party president and Croatian war-time general.

Together with a picture of what looks like a random encounter of Ante Sinčić (party president) and Ante Gotovina (in the post text referred as general) following text was posted: „General: Mr. Sinčić, I congratulate to you and your Human Blockade. Sinčić: It is my honour Sir. General: No Ivan, it is my honour. ...we want to note that we will finish the job that our fathers started long ago and that everyone that was working in a traitorous manner against our country and our people, your turn for lustration will come.“ (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 22.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 66). Ante Gotovina, war-time general is considered a national hero, especially after vindication from International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. However, he stays somewhat controversial person because of crimes committed during war that are still unresolved issue. Also, he is considered a symbol of the nationalistic war time period. This short conversation clearly states highly positive stance and respect of the party president towards former general Gotovina. Also, words of congratulations can be interpreted as signs of sympathy of Gotovina towards the work of Sinčić and Human Blockade. The post ends in evoking ‘our country’ and ‘our people’ that would suggest national connotations. Also, there is a large amount of animosity towards all of those ‘working against’ the country, ‘traitors’ and even ‘lustration’ is mentioned. Lustration is usually readily evoked by far-right politicians and is directed towards high positioned representatives during the socialist period, especially if they committed crimes at that time. It is
not clear who does Human Blockade wants to punish for damaging the country, but in this context, it could be understood as using nationalist far-right rhetoric in Croatia and thus evoking the nationalist element in ‘the people’.

As for economic groups that were positively evoked there is clear focus of entrepreneurs and craftsmen: „CRAFTSMEN AND ENTERPRENEURS! To you that are the backbone of this society all the governments treated you as cash cows while not taking care about your fortune and the fortune of your employees. You are interesting to them while they can plunder you and when you are on your knees, they block your accounts, enforce your property, declare bankruptcy and destroy your and your children’s future. They put above you banks, insurance companies, phone companies and other 'legal subjects'...“ (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 05.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 8)

Describing this socio-economic category as 'the backbone of this society' implies the centrality of this subject in their discourse. However, they are not the only socio-economic category evoked and they do not make up the vast majority of the population and so Human Blockade does not only claim to represent them. Entrepreneurs and craftsmen are on the other hand highly victimized in this piece of rhetoric. This is especially true when they mention that with current policies governments are making a damage not only for entrepreneurs but also destinies of their children. In several instances Human Blockade is positively referring to families and how families are under danger or should be privileged. Human blockade acknowledges employees of entrepreneurs. They are also victims of the system same as entrepreneurs.

Another socio-economic category, workers, are also evoked by Human Blockade and always with their claim to increase the minimal salary. „Increase the minimal salary. Every worker employed full-time should be able to provide normal life to its family!“ (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 23.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 62). Again, in this case ‘the people’ was evoked as family and via worker.

The users of credits, or simply debtors are also positively evoked by Human Blockade. Issue of debtors received a lot of public and political interest during 2015 when due to financial measures interests for credits in CHF rose drastically
and many debtors couldn’t pay off their monthly rates which also resulted in some cases with loss of properties. Because of party connection with the eviction activism, party included this issue in their rhetoric. However, credit debtors are not typical socio-economic group and they can include wealthy millionaires as well as average workers that took credit for housing, so the debt issue might be a typical issue that would homogenise rather heterogeneous group.

*the elites*

The antagonistic frontier towards ‘the enemies of the people’ is relatively strongly expressed, but the enemy of ‘the people’ is often too abstract or dispersed among several main actors (*Discursive map 5*). It is clear that there is antagonism expressed towards banks, political elite and the media, all connected among as the part of the system. Actually, Human Blockade is often leading ‘the fight against’ the system, they also proclaim themselves as ‘fearless’ faced with the system and Human Blockade is calling for ‘unification’ to ‘win over’ the system. The core of the system is “politicians lie, and banks commit usury” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 26.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 43) while the task of the media is to ‘maintain the system’.

*Discursive map 5* Antagonistic ‘other’ in Human Blockade discourse
Quantitatively, Human Blockade is negatively referring the most to banks as they were mentioned in nine instances, while system is mentioned in seven instances. Banks are accused for taking ‘usury’ as well as ‘advantage over people’ and are together with banks, phone and insurance companies are also mentioned in similar negative context. System is presented very abstract – it is not clear to which system they are referring to and who constitutes it but it is described as ‘unjust’, ‘criminal’ and ‘imposed’. Describing the system as ‘imposed’ alludes that it is imposed from the outside the country and considering that the main enemies such as banks and phone and insurance companies in Croatia are foreign owned, externally imposed system upon ‘the people’ in Croatia seems like the possible explanation. Also, in one instance it is mentioned that Human Blockade wants to exit EU and NATO, so external antagonistic structures are also political and not only economic.

Further, Human Blockade expresses strong antagonism towards political elites in their rhetoric. Homogenizing political parties is clearly expressed when they write two biggest Croatian political parties as one – ‘CDUSDP structure’ or ‘CDUSDP members’. They imply that all the parties are the same, no matter differences in their names or eventually political programme. They also attack all Croatian previous and current governments, saying no matter who is in power they all worked against ‘the people’. Also, they mention regional party IDA (Istrian Democratic Assembly) as a local version of national level CDUSDP: „Social Democratic Party and Istrian Democratic Assembly rule in Istria in the same manner Croatian Democratic Union rules in Slavonia. We don't need ours, if they are thieves. “(Human Blockade Facebook Page, 29.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 37). This might again be the case of populist actors eliminating centre/periphery cleavages in an attempt to unify the people (Stavrakakis et al., 2014).

They describe that the goal of political parties is only to ‘stay in power and get the privileges of this power’ and that these established political parties are ‘creators of polities of impoverishment, corruption and nepotism’. This all is of course on the expense of ‘common man’. They also attack politicians that were
leading such politics damaging the country/its people as ‘alleged great Croats’. It is implied that those their patriotic or nationalist public image was only propaganda, as one cannot be a patriot and at the same time harming the country’s economy or the standard of its people.

However, they do not exclude politicians and politics in general. They present themselves as third political option and are described as ‘political option that should take the country forwards’ and their sympathizers ‘support their political vision’. They are also ready to make coalitions but not with established political actors: „It was our honour to make an election coalition list with people that we looked for all over the country and which are rare to find. They are people ready to fight against neoliberal CDUSDP politics no matter the cost.“ (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 26.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 44) In one instance they openly state that ‘politicians lie and steal’, but in other that only ‘certain politicians’ are manipulative’. In general, Human Blockade does not restrain in being involved in politics in spite of unreserved critique towards Croatian politicians and political parties.

What Human Blockade objects the most the political elite is that they work in the interest of the other, economic elites and meanwhile they get personal compensation, that they only attain power, so they could use the privileges. Human Blockade claims that economic elites in a current system are above power: „Why Croatia allows that banks and tycoons stand above the government and the parliament? Do you agree with such situation in the country? “ (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 26.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 49). They actually positively acclaim democratic institutions such as government and parliament in theory, but harshly attack practices in these institutions nowadays, therefore in another instance, they generally blame all members of parliament for receiving ‘unearned privileges’.

In the end, there is determined animosity towards media, i.e. traditional media like television and newspapers: „Polls are a lie. Front-runners are a lie. Their

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10 At that time Human Blockade did not have any MP in parliament, it would be interesting to analyse their rhetoric on this issue after the elections when the situation changed an they had political representatives.
truth is a lie. Television is a lie. Media is a lie. Advertisement is a lie. Their only role is to get inside your head. Their only goal is to maintain the current system...“ (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 23.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 65)

Media are accused as collaborating with the system and being paid to manipulate. Human Blockade especially condemns the media for fixing the pre-election or generally political polls in favour of established political actors and at the expense of Human Blockade to influence the voters. They also attack close connections of banks and media on several occasions, since almost the main task of the media is to advertise the banks. Human Blockade does not leave any space for media to be objective or independent but is also not refraining of using media for their promotion, so they do publish what other media wrote about the party even only to claim that is not true and the cooperate with media, giving statements. However, they express strong scepticism towards everything coming from media but “luckily internet exists” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 13) so they can address the public fairly and without censorship.

Conclusion

Human Blockade in their discourse shows characteristics of the populist actors by constructing ‘the people’ as unified ‘us’ subject against those that work against ‘the people’ by creating strong antagonistic frontier between the two blocks (Discursive map 6\textsuperscript{11}). Their appeal to ‘the people’ is expressed by very general terms, such as ‘humans’, that is Croatian neutral version of ‘the people’ that does not imply ethnicity and others such as ‘every man’ or ‘common man’. This term is used as an empty signifier that is only filled with meaning when juxtaposed to ‘them’, those that work against ‘the people’.

\textsuperscript{11} Discursive map 6 is the sum of the Discursive map 4 and 5
Instruments used for unifying the subject are abstraction by using already mentioned broad and generic terms for ‘the people’. On the other side, for antagonistic ‘other’ homogenization was achieved by connecting them all as being complicit by their involvement in the system. It is never implied that ‘the people’ could be part of that system, but they are the ones that are fighting against the system.

It is difficult to arrive at any conclusions with regard to some other broader political discourse, because the essence of the discourse of Human Blockade is animosity of ‘the people’ towards ‘elites’. Some researches tend to characterize such empirical cases as examples of ‘centrists populism’ as it was already suggested for Human Blockade by Grbeša and Šalaj (2018b). Interpretation of one post where Human Blockade evocated ‘our land’ and ‘our people’ indicates more state-focused discourse of Human Blockade. To further explore this question in the following section dimensions of inclusivity and exclusivity will be examined.

6.2.2. Characteristics of discourse – inclusivity vs. exclusivity

Material dimension

As a part of pre-election programme Human Blockade claims it wants to decrease ‘quasi-taxation’ for entrepreneurship. They also plan to “decrease
necessary bureaucracy so entrepreneurs could devote their time to their business” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 8) are all examples that Human Blockade aims that entrepreneurs are a socio-economic category in Croatia that deserves more inclusion in the society. Another measure that is benefiting entrepreneurs is “decreasing taxation for domestic producers and increasing taxation for import” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 8). Here we see that the party supports domestic entrepreneurs but at the expense of foreign production. Not so extensive is also inclusion of employees of those producers for which Human Blockade aims to “increase of minimal salary to workers … not so much about amount increase but the real increase where workers would have more buying power” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 23.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 62). It is not clear if they actually mean to increase minimal salary because it the next sentence, they question it, however they clearly try to refer positively to workers, as a social group whose social status is not being ignored.

Rather heterogeneous social group that Human Blockade is clearly trying to include in their rhetoric are debtors by “abolishment of currency clause and conversion of all credits to HRK [Croatian currency]” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 8). They also offer to credit users “return of overpaid credits in total and punishing those responsible” and more generally “debt relief for most of debts” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 23.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 62). However, they do not deal with this issue in socially sensitive manner, because debtors can be of different social status and it is more legal category than social, and this could be partially be explained by the fact these measures are aimed against. As already stated, the main antagonism of Human Blockade is toward banks and usually banks profited most from present measures and would be most affected by above proposed measures. his is also an example of the exclusion of banks as “punishing those responsible” suggests. Because they don’t state explicitly who might be responsible, another suggestion beside banks as legal subject could be the responsibility of policy and lawmakers that allowed banks such conduct of business at the first place.
Other socially sensitive groups that are materially included are pensioners, for whom concrete measures are promised: „Pay the 13th pension money… raise the minimal pension” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 3.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 23) as well as “programs that would facilitate housing young families” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 23.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 62). Focusing on young families, and not for example on young professionals, is an indication of slightly conservative vision of the society that sees the family as an important element of the society that needs to be particularly protected. It is not clear what their apprehension of the family is, only on one occasion they mention ‘entrepreneurs and their children’ that are in underprivileged position (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 8). so we can presume that their vision of a family includes children. Family is evoked in another instance when stating that “every worker … should be able to provide normal life to its family” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 23.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 62). This also suggests tradition vision where one person is bread-provider for the family, but that necessarily does not have to be man, because with this post picture of woman working in shoe factory is attached.

Not only they promise all these compensation and material benefits but also suggest a manner how it is to be done, namely “from stolen money made during privatisation and that is now at foreign bank accounts” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 3.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 23). This suggest material exclusion of privatisation tycoons that are again connected with banks, in this case particularly foreign banks.

**Political dimension**

Political inclusion of individuals or groups in the rhetoric of Human Blockade is example of inclusion through representative politics. Even when they publish in a post for entrepreneurs and craftsmen to “join them” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 8) it is implied that their task would be to help to promote the party or “actively” as a member of a party. Also, this call is directed towards entrepreneurs and craftsmen that make very small percentage in the population and not towards all the party sympathizers or broader public.
However, broader but still representative inclusion is directed towards all the public in their claim to be a “third option” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 5.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 9) in Croatian political parties system. That means simply to vote for the party is the way to change the social and political reality for majority of citizens. Human Blockade sees the domain for contesting current political establishment through existing institutions, mainly elections in the analysis of the sample. They even play with words, when they publish “Fight for!” (Croatian: “Izbori se!”) (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 2.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 27) they imply to do it via elections (Croatia: izbori). The activist past of party leadership, mainly stopping evictions by sit-ins is not recommended path of political struggle, but is used for promotion of the party, so in one picture party president Sinčić is posted during an eviction with a post “Last on the list, first for the people” (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 4.11.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 18) and in another scene of eviction with an activists. This means that party does not stop with their activist work but in their rhetoric they move this fight to the established political arena of representative politics.

**Symbolic dimension**

In symbolic inclusion/exclusion one can again refer to *Discursive maps 4. and 5.* all social groups referred to positively and antagonistically in the rhetoric of the Human Blockade. However, here some instances and characteristics of the rhetoric that are examples of symbolic dimension will be explained in more detail.

During election campaign period HB published on their Facebook page posted a series of quotes of the common people, sympathizers and probably members of the party together with their picture. Quote contained praise of Human Blockade and short explanation why this person will vote for the party. These quotes are included in the analysis as they were published on the page as a part of the party's rhetoric.

Inclusion of the quotes of the 'common people' is a discursive practice that refers positively to 'common man', 'down dog' someone that is 'just like you' and a 'part
of us'. However, one must note that these 'common people' are not totally common because they are less famous musicians, TV presenters, designer etc. However, they are still struggling and have same problems (with the elite) as 'common man' but their somewhat noteworthy status brings more value to the 'common men'.

One example is following quote of one such party sympathizer: „[Human Blockade] propagate peace and tolerance and do not discriminate people based on their nationality, sex, religion, skin colour, sexual orientation etc.“ (Human Blockade Facebook Page, 26.10.2015, Appendix 2, Post No 43). This supporter of the party names above mentioned reasons her motivation for supporting the party. It must be noted that this is how ‘common man’ perceives the party and not part of directly their programme, at least not in the analysed sample, but Human Blockade is obviously accepting such characterization as it they publish it on their official party page. Here we can see broad and liberal symbolic inclusion or at least not exclusion of the people of all nationalities, religions, races, genders. However, this is only partial, because it is secondary rhetoric and is very abstract, and characteristic for like cliché politically correct rhetoric.

Also, in one post Human Blockade presents one of the candidates for the elections. As a sport trainer and a sportsman his current political struggle is analogous to a struggle on a sport field. Although it is not unusual that prominent sportsmen enter Croatian politics, Human Blockade is including sportsmen that are not typical sport stars-turned-politicians but a simple relatively unknown box trainer, to be noted box is not the most popular sport in Croatia, that is not afraid talking about corruption within Croatian sport. So, he is also another ‘common men’ that is disappointed in the current system that Human Blockade strands for.

Conclusion

When making conclusions about inclusive or exclusive character of the party Human Blockade one has to consider which social groups were not mentioned in their rhetoric. Beside already mentioned quote about non-discriminatory character of the party Human Blockade does not try to include minorities (such as woman, gender, ethnic or religious minorities) in their rhetoric. Their silence
in this regard might be intentional because broad inclusion of might cause a division and eventually loss of support of part of their electoral body or voters they are appealing to. In the analysed sample, they use the most neutral signifiers for evoking ‘the people’ such as humans, common men and apart from few mentioning of entrepreneurs and craftsmen it does not normally refer to other socio-economic groups (Table 3). Its appeal is undirected towards some specific social group and we can say that inclusivity in it’s narrow sense in not extensive. However, one may argue that with such rhetorical strategy of using the neutral and general terms they do not strive for exclusivity and therefore broaden their inclusive. In other words, by leaving the ‘people’ field vague and undefined they invite different social groups to be incorporated in that field.

Table 3 Inclusion/exclusion in the discourse of Human Blockade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Blockade</th>
<th>Inclusion</th>
<th>Exclusion</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>entrepreneurs, craftsmen, debtors, young families, pensioners, workers</td>
<td>foreign producers, tycoons, banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>entrepreneurs (partially), craftsmen (partially), voters (partially)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolical</td>
<td>entrepreneurs, craftsmen, debtors, pensioners, workers, poor, common man, sportsmen</td>
<td>bankers, political elite, tycoons, media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, there is clear exclusion of the enemies of the people, but they are also very abstract and cannot be reduced to some specific socio-economic group, except tycoons that were not mention that often or profession, except established politicians. Also, there is no exclusion on the basis of minority status, but again there is also no inclusion in that direction.
7. Conclusion

The main aim of the research was to analyse political discourse based on Laclau’s and Mouffes theoretical framework of populism. It would be presumptuous to give definitive and binary conclusion to questions posed at the beginning of the research. We start from open-ended question *How is populist discourse articulated?* In this formulation there is already a presumption that discourse is populist, that can later only be approved or possibly dismissed.

Theoretical position this research leads allows such an approach because it does consider a populism as a political discourse or what Laclau names ‘political logic’. Thus, populism is not some curious case among political actors but modus operandi of politics. In specific historical period we can observe ‘populism at work’ among different political actors. If we expanded this research to some other political actors, there is high probability we could trace populism in their political rhetoric, but surely with different characterisation. Populism does however its own logic and how it operates so it would be wrong to equate all politics as populism. For the analytical purpose there were two elements analysed almost separately – namely construction of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’.

Analysis of the discourse of Workers’ Front shows a rhetoric where work and labour are clearly juxtaposed against capital and its perpetuators. Obviously Marxist discourse follows the logic of populism. In this case ‘the people’ is constructed as ‘workers’ in such a manner that ‘workers’ can encompass majority of population and more importantly that can unify this majority because in their rhetoric there are no different and confrontings interest among workers. Moreover, all ‘workers’ have one interest and that is to fight against the capital. Both groups are seen as homogenous and in their discourse there is also no possibility for areas of intersection where one can exists on both levels as a worker and a capitalist.

In the case of Human Blockade, construction of the subject is vaguer, because they tend to use supposedly neutral terms, such as ‘humans’. This is a populist rhetoric where it is hard to determine accompanying ideology or ideologies just
on the fact how ´the people´ is constructed. Usually the second analytical category, ´enemies´ of ´the people´ can be helpful in this endeavour. Human Blockade does show a great animosity in intensity as well as broad pallete of the enemies, such as bankers, media, politicians, both domestic and foreign that all work to preserve ´the system´. Again, it is not clear to which system they are referring but this vagueness might again be intentional as Human Blockade claims its political position is neither right nor left. However, populist logic is strongly present in their discourse.

Articulation of populist discourse is only half of the effort, as we view that understanding of populism has to take in consideration multiple faces of populism. Every respectable theorist of populism noted that populism has an ability to combine with diverse political ideologies and this fact should not be overlooked. Populism can be right, left, authoritarian, libertarian etc. To evaluate these characteristics is not an easy and surely never a definitive task. For the purpose of this research we examined inclusivity vs. exclusivity of social groups present in the rhetoric of two political parties. As a first step we tried to evaluate processes of inclusion/exclusion on their own and following referring to concept of populism. This draw us to the main conclusion that processes of inclusion/exclusion happen simultaneously and it is in very definition of populism that some social groups will be included as part of constructing the populist subject, i.e. ´the people´. This construction happens negative, namely by constructing the frontier towards ´the enemies´ of ´the people´. In this process the ´the enemies´ are automatically excluded and there is implicity or explicity negative reference to this social group. In the rhetoric of Workers´ Front there was broad inclusion of social groups on a logic that these social groups are part of or have a potential to be workers. For example, students´ rights will be protected because they are in a rhetoric of the party future qualified workers, pensioner benefits have to be increased due to their contribution to the society during working years, child care should be introduced in companies, so women can be included in the world of work etc. Exclusion follows the same ´work´ logic. Those that take advantage of someone else's work or in their rhetoric capitalists, are excluded from Workers´ Front vision of society. There is no provison that allows dual socio-economic identity both as capitalist and worker,
but there is chance for redemption if one renounces its capitalist position. Exclusion of other social groups is on basis that they consciously support enemies of the people such as political elites and all Croatian established political parties.

In the case of Human Blockade inclusion of social groups on a horizontal level that do not have political or material power is directed toward socio-economic group of small and medium entrepreneurs and farmers as a pillar of Croatian society. Also, refer represent more conservative and patriotic political subject with referring to family life and Homeland War. Exclusion is thus directed mostly towards outside and namely Western European and USA based institutions such as banks that support ‘the system’ and inside towards political and economic elites that are just domestic version of that system. Again, process of inclusion and exclusion is happening at the same time and it is not possible to claim more inclusive or exclusive character of the party.

In the end, some questions were already opened during the research. If populism is a threat or a challenge, then let us clearly state what does it challenge or in the words of Laclau or Mouffe whose hegemony does it challenge. Populist discourse challenges the one of liberal democracy, currently dominant political discourse. When we talk about this process, it does not happen over night, maybe even not over decades. If it eventually succeedes and becomes dominant discourse, does that mean populism is all it is left. Certainly not, at least for a longer period, because populism as such is empty without its accompanying ideological substances. Most probably, that ideological characteristics will be political reality, weather is that right, left, authoritarian, libertarian etc.
8. Literature


**Web sources:**


### 9. Appendices

**Appendix 1. Workers’ Front Facebook Posts 6.11.-21.10.2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post No</th>
<th>Post link</th>
<th>Post message</th>
<th>Post published</th>
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<td>Pogledajte 5-minutna predstavljanja Radničke fronte na HRT-u NovaTV-u i RTL-u na našem youtube kanalu: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbAF363UvlAXbn8CWJ9Ig/videos">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbAF363UvlAXbn8CWJ9Ig/videos</a> (Miljenka Ćurković Morana Biljaković Marko Milošević i Mladen Momčinović za Radničku frontu)</td>
<td>6.11.20 15:23:53</td>
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ići u tom smjeru a znam da imamo i Vašu podršku. Hvala Vam na tome. Vjerujem da je sve pobrojano i u programu Radničke fronte te Vam ovom prigodom želim puno uspjeha na predstojećim izborima i u dalnjem radu. Živjeli! Predrag Sekulić

| 3 | https://www.facebook.com/770459529655521/posts/1079442228756942/ | Šminkanje statističkih pokazatelja ekonomskih trendova neizostavan je dio predizbornih kampanja. Tako se hrvatska vlada na isteku mandata hvali padom nezaposlenosti rastom izvoza i rastom proizvodnje. No podaci kojima se hvale plod su metodoloških manjkašnosti i namjernih zanemarivanja što u ukupnoj slici dovodi do banalnih proturječja. | 6.11.20 15 8:57 |

trenutnoj političkoj oligarhiji bi bilo puno gore nego danas. Bilo bi naивno i ili manipulatorski obećavati da se sve može srediti u 4 godine ali neki pomaci bi se sigurno mogli načiniti. U nastavku ćemo nabrojiti neke od njih s naglaskom na kratkoročnije ekonomske mjere koje bi se odmah mogle provesti (a ne opisujući nekakvo idealno buduće društvo kojem težimo) a uzimajući u obzir realna ograničenja i probleme koji bi pritom nedvojbeno nastajali.

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<td>8</td>
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<th>5</th>
<th>Punk! Internacionala! Radnička fronta neće prestat plesat! Pozdrav s Trga :)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Šibenik…</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dok IDS zahtjeva decentralizaciju proračunskih financija kako bi nahrano svoju sve probirljiviju klijentelističku mrežu podobnika još jedna pulska privatizirana firma propada. Poznavatelji lokalnih zbivanja jako dobro znaju kako je stanju u Puljanci kumovala sveprisutna sprega špekulantskog kapitala kolaboracionističkih lokalnih medija i lokalnih stranačkih oligarhija.</td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Opća zabrana prekovremenog rada kako bi se spriječilo dodatno izrbljivanje radnika, pritisći I zloupotrebe. Izuzeće je moguće samo u slučaju kada to glasanjem zatraži 2/3 većina radnika poduzeća te samo uz potpuno plaćanje prekovremenog rada.*</td>
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| 13 | https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1077031862331312/ | DRUŠTVO "UHLJEBA"  
Najsmješnije je kad o "uhljebima" pričaju navodni ljevičari, npr. iz Laburista, SDP-a ili Oraha, ne shvaćajući da je prava ljevića za to da svi budu "uhljebi", tj. da svi rade za poduzeća u društvenom (javnom) vlasništvu (tj. vlasništvu svih nas) umjesto da moraju prodavati radnu snagu kapitalistima. | 31.10.20 15:00       |
<p>| 14 | <a href="https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1077038856663973/">https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1077038856663973/</a> | Naš štand na Trgu Republike danas u Zagrebu :) | 31.10.20 15:01:17:34 |
| 15 | <a href="https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1076748765692955/">https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1076748765692955/</a> | Dolje s prokapitalističkim strankama! | 31.10.20 15:00       |</p>
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<th>URL</th>
<th>Napis</th>
<th>Datum i Vrijeme</th>
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<td>Kad Radničku frontu kritiziraju za populizam i radikalnost na ovakvim portalima onda znamo da smo na pravom tragu :)</td>
<td>30.10.2015 9:00</td>
</tr>
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<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1076135855754246/">https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1076135855754246/</a></td>
<td>Ponovo problemi s oglašivačima koji sada na dogovorenu i plaćenu ponudu traže da ublažimo retoriku ukoliko želimo da naš plakat bude objavljen na predviđenoj lokaciji u Zagrebu. Potom su objasnili gdje je problem s preoštrim retorikom: vlasnik zemljišta na kojem se nalazi dogovoreni oglasi prostor je Ivica Todorić. Ublažiti retoriku za RF bi značilo odustati od Programskih principa a to je nemoguće s naše pozicije ustrajnog naglašavanja kako je izvor problema (osiromašenja nejednakosti itd.) u (kapitalističkom) sistemu. Zato je nemoguće i zaobići najpoznatijeg predstavnika projekta 200 bogatih obitelji kako je Tuđman tepao restauraciju kapitalizma u Hrvatskoj. Iako moćni vlasnik Todorić Radničku frontu ne zanima na osobnoj razini njegovo ime je također i očit simbol kapitalističke stvarnosti u Hrvatskoj u kojoj se jedni divi i pokoravaju a drugi pribojavaju i pokoravaju njegovoj moći. Uostalom u jeku predizborne kampanije svi nešto obećavaju a RF se jedina odlučila poručiti jedino logično i društveno pravedno obećanje: Tko je jamio, jamio je. Oduzimanje imovine* i robija! Protiv tajkuna, protiv društva 200 bogatih obitelji. <em>ekproprijacija</em></td>
<td>29.10.2015 16:12</td>
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<td>Predsastanak LO Zagreb četvrtkom u 17 h. Pozivamo sve zainteresirane na redovne predstanke RF-a u organizacije lokalne organizacije Zagreb!*</td>
<td>29.10.2015 11:14</td>
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<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1075460472488451/">https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1075460472488451/</a></td>
<td>Članak Hrvoja Štefana inače člana RF-a o riječkom JGL-u: Kronika silazne ekonomske putanje grada Rijeke u tranzicijom periodu nastoji se zamagliti retorikom o “kreativnim industrijama” “društvu znanja” i propulzivnoj ulozi tamošnjeg sveučilišta u ekonomskom i socijalnom razvoju grada. Već i kratki uvid u trenutnu strukturu riječke ekonomije daje do znanja da je navedena retorika samo sredstvo održavanja vladavine lokalnih elita i depolitizacije tranzicijskog neuspjeha.</td>
<td>28.10.2015 10:00</td>
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<td>Einstein objasnio! This crippling of individuals I consider the worst evil of capitalism.*</td>
<td>27.10.2015 21:00</td>
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<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1075250009176164/">https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1075250009176164/</a></td>
<td>Kriza kapitalizma lagano ulazi u svoju osmu godinu i iako nas često putem masovnih medija uvjeravaju kako su u krizi samo zemlje poput Hrvatske u kojima je stranim investitorima teško poslovati, cijena rada je previsoka a poduzetnička klima nikakva. Potrebno je ipak obratiti pozornost na povijesni razvoj i odnose između kapitala i rada na svjetskoj razini te unutar najrazvijenijih kapitalističkih ekonomija.</td>
<td>27.10.2015 11:02</td>
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</table>
| 30 | https://www.facebook.com/7704595296555215/posts/1075039072530591/ | Iz obrazloženih programatskih Zahtjeva RF-a:

"Nakon četvrt stoljeća od početka restauracije kapitalizma ekonomija se Hrvatske nalazi u jako teškom položaju. Zbog privatizacijskih je malverzacij, korupcije, privatnih interesa i kasnije izloženosti otvorenom tržištu zemlja u velikoj mjeri deindustrializirana. Poljoprivređa je devastirana i trenutno se, unatoč golemim potencijalima, uvozi više od 50% hrane. Velik broj poljoprivrednih površina nije iskorišten, navodnjavanje je na vrlo niskim razinama, a strategija temeljena na malim proizvođačima, nakon razaranja „socijalističkih mastodonata“, nije se pokazala uspješnom. Uvoz se hrane još više povećao nakon ulaska u EU. U zemlji je također (računajući i umjetno „izbrisane“) realno oko pola milijuna nezaposlenih, a tome bi se moglo pridodati i velik broj prerano penzioniranih (bilo kao kolateralne žrtve prilikom privatizacijskih eliminacija pojedinih poduzeća ili u okviru populacije ratnih veterana), što dovodi do neodrživog odnosa broja penzionera i radnika. Turizam je jedina koliko-toliko svijetla ekonomska točka, no brojke ni tu po broju noćenja još nisu uspjele doseći one rekordne iz 1980-ih, a turizam kao takav nikako ne može biti nosilac čitave ekonomije. Čekanje stranih investicija se nije pokazala kao sreda „strategija“ – strani kapital jest pokupjavao ono što mu je isplativo (banke, telekomunikacije, velik dio lanca trgovina i sl.), ali nema interesa u (riskantnom) ulaganju u proizvodnju. Za to nisu zainteresirane ni banke, danas u 95%-nom stranom vlasništvu i tako nerijetko povezane s industrijom u matičnim zemljama, što onda povlači nezainteresiranost za financiranje proizvodnje u Hrvatskoj pa se onda radije financira puno sigurnija potrošnja (često uvozna) – | 26.10.2 015 20:59 |
npr. kupovina automobila, stanova i sl. Sve vlasti promoviraju strategiju „utrke prema dnu“ (promovirajući potrebu povećanja „konkurentnosti“ kroz snižavanje plaća i radničkih prava i sl.) iako se rezultati takvih poteza nisu pokazali kao uspješni u sličnim primjerima (recimo u Makedoniji), a i teško je zamisлитi kako bi ljudima moglo biti bolje s nižim plaćama i manje prava. Osim toga, istraživanja (npr. Jožeta Mencingera ili Gordana Družića) pokazuju da za zemlje poput Hrvatske direktna strana ulaganja, čak i kad bi bila moguća na način na koji to zamišljaju političke elite, ne bi mogla omogućiti pravi razvoj zemlje. Razvoj ekonomije Hrvatske ostaje potpuno iluzoran u uvjetima naše perifernje pozicije u okviru evropskog i svjetskog kapitalističkog ekonomskog sistema. Da bi se tu išta moglo promijeniti potreban je radikalni ekonomski zaokret i promjena ekonomske politike iz prokapitalističke u onu koja će služiti interesima (radne) većine."

Pozivamo sve koji su svjesni da ovako ne može dalje i koji imaju barem malo volje za borbu za bolje društvo da nam se pridruže!

Osiguravanje hitne isplate svih zaostalih plaća – oštre zakonske mjere protiv svih poslodavaca koji ne isplaćuju plaće na vrijeme. U zadnjih 25 godina su u Hrvatskoj česti bili slučajevi gdje su radnici mjesecima, katkad i godinama radili, a da nisu primali plaću (ili doprinose), koje su onda nerijetko na kraju nikad nisu ni dobili. Do toga je dolazilo jer su se katkad radnici bojali krenuti u štrajk ili proteste, nadajući se da će plaće na koncu ipak stići i da je dobro da imaju bilo kakav posao, a ponekad je to bila jednostavna posljedica komplikirane birokratske procedure oko pokretanje legalnog štrajka, koja je značila da se, ako su se poštovali svi propisi, komotno moglo dogoditi da se u štrajk krene tek nakon koja 3 i po mjesece što radnici već nisu primali plaću. Smatramo da je takva praksa apsolutno nedopustiva i da jasno ukazuje na to da se zakoni pišu u korist kapitala a na radnika. Smatramo da jedna od prvih mjera progresivne vlasti mora biti automatska isplata svih zaostalih plaća (na štetu kapitalista, banaka itd.), dok one koji zakon o isplati plaće krše treba strogo kažnjavati (automatskom nacionalizacijom privatnih poduzeća koje kasne s isplaćivanjem plaća, a u konačnici velikim novčanim kaznama)
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<td>Unikonzum nikada neće biti Konzum!!!</td>
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<td>Prenosimo jedan od boljih komentara (i ogroman kompliment) na našu predizbornu kampanju.</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1074055575962274/">https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1074055575962274/</a></td>
<td>Neki nam zamjeraju da smo zlonamjerni i preoštri prema Mostu Bože Petrova. Nismo ni jedno ni drugo - samo govorimo istinu i kritiziramo tu desničarsku opciju pod maskom trećeg puta i tobožne neideološke tehnokratske stranke isto kao što kritiziramo HDZ. Ružu Tomašić ili Glavaša. S tim da je kod Mosta najjasnije to što su uspjeli veći dio razočaranih ljudi (koji ne znaju za koga bi glasali) uvjeriti da nisu desničari za razliku od spomenutih. Pa da spomenemo još jednom zašto je Most desničarski (na temelju nedavnih Petrovljevih izjava u Nu2): 1) Petrovu ne smetaju Glavaševe fašističke postrojbe 2) nije za uklidanje financiranja crkve (s kojom je inače jako dobro slizan) 3) Oliver Frlić mu je prepovjedan (stav kao Karamarkov alii malo umiveniji) 4) zalaže se za mjere štednje što nije nimalo progresivno nego je riječ o neoliberalnim mjerama na snazi u čitavoj Evropi a koje UVJEK idu na štetu radne većine (a ne na štetu političke elite i kapitala). Osim toga možemo također dodati da je to čovjek koji se ne usudi javno osuditi notornog kriminalca i lopova Bandića (Petrov ne zna li kriv) i čovjek koji je mjesečima iz očito oportunističkih razloga pregovarao s Pernarovim Zidarima kao ozbiljnom političkom opcijom (a koji su također umiveni/prikriveni desničari prije četiri godine koalirali s HČSP-om itd. itd.). Zar prema takvima da budemo dobronamjerni? Što je to nego HDZ v.02?</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/107393698597974133/">https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/107393698597974133/</a></td>
<td>Uvijek kada se govori o suprotstavljenim materijalnim i klasnim interesima radnika i kapitalista pada se neki tajkunobran koji krene objašnjavati da i kapitalisti rade (organiziraju nabavljaju postove i sl.). Da neki kapitalisti rade ali kakve to veze ima? Na njihovom mjestu bi da je riječ o zadruzi/kooperativi a ne o kapitalistički organiziranom poduzeću (s vlasnikom i radnicima koji rade za njega) mogao raditi i radnik koji bi bio za to zadužen i koji bi dobivao sličnu plaću kao i ostali radnici (već ovisno o tome kako bi se oni demokratski dogovorili o svojim plaćama) umjesto da dobiva većinu profitu u jednoj firmi. Nitko ne spori to da poslovi organizacije itd. moraju biti obavljani i plaćeni - ali problem s kapitalistima je u tome što oni samo dio vrijednosti koju su većinski stvorili radnici (a samo manjinski i kapitalist koji usput i radi iako ne u svim poduzećima na poslovima organiziranja i sl.) daju radnicima (zapravo 24.10.2015 13:00</td>
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</table>
otimaju zaradu od radnika) dok ostalo zadržavaju sebi - ne za svoje poslove organiziranja nego na temelju toga što su vlasnici poduzeća (vrijednost koja se stvori unutar kapitalističke firme pripada kapitalistu - koji samo dio nje koristi za isplatu plaća radnicima). Osim toga i robolvasnici su često obavljali neke poslove a ne samo njihovi robovi - npr. robolvasnici su isto često organizirali proizvodnju kupovali i prodavali robe itd. Znači li to da je robolvasništvo u redu zato što su i robolvasnici nešto radili?

40 https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1073935649307600/

Pismo volonterke iz Hrvatske povodom izbjegličke krize: EVROPA JE RAT
When I was a kid and there was war in Croatia and there was this guy who sang this song Stop the war in Croatia and one of the verses was Europe you can stop the war... and the song was very popular and we all sang it and knew it by heart (Let Croatia be one of Europe s stars...) and I remember wondering I was still a kid how it must be impossible that Europe actually really doesn t know what s happening maybe it just doesn t know enough so we must keep saying saying it all about all the suffering and all the people fleeing their homes I kept thinking how they don t know for if they did they couldn t simply sit in their homes and pretend like it s not happening and have normal lives and I imagined this Europe as something so big and important and powerful and I remember asking my Dad but why don t they help when he would come home from his night shift in the hospital and would tell us about horrified children who walked for kilometers and kilometers through corn fields alone and who saw death and dying and I remember vividly how I had no capacity to understand. There was this kid s picture that was taken and she looked so much in distress and so sad and desperate and I remember thinking now you will see now Europe will stop the war and we all knew this picture and it was everywhere and Europe did not stop the war it continued and continued for years and then Bosnia was in war and the war still did not stop and at one point there was my Grandma who fled her home with one grocery bag with two pairs of underwear and some random stuff and for years she kept talking about all the photos that she had to leave behind and Europe still didn t stop the war and then it was 2008 and my cousin died with 43 he got psychoses and had PTSD after the war and one time when he lost it and he kept losing it more and more as the time went by he looked at me we were in my room I will never forget that he looked at me after he made
my bed. How it had to be done in the army and he was pissed off really pissed off and said do you know I could cut your throat now? and I froze. I froze and looked at him and my knees were shaking and I forced a horrified smile and said but you won t and he looked at me surprised and said why not? and I said with tears in my eyes because you love me and he started crying and then suddenly he was himself again and he hugged me and I was shaking that whole weekend that was years after Europe didn t stop the war but the war was still living inside of him. The war was still living inside of him when someone found him after he disappeared from his home and we couldn t find him for 2 days and then they called us from some hospital some 100 km away from Zagreb and told us he was there and I came there and me and my cousin were walking on foot towards the hospital. I will never forget that day as long as I live and I was afraid to see him he was very sick and lying with fever and then I entered the hospital and there he was lying there all tied up to his bed and saw us and cried and asked sheepishly tell them I will not hurt anybody let them set me free and two days later he was dead and I blame Europe. I fucking blame Europe still. And now it s 2015 and there are pictures and videos again and we share them and hope that Europe will stop the suffering but Europe is building wired fences and people are walking through mud with grocery bags and all their photos are left in their faraway homes and they are not welcome anywhere and I blame Europe. And then there are videos like this and the only difference is that these refugees are not speaking Croatian or Bosnian or any other at least somewhat acceptable language but they smile the same smiles and they laugh the same laughs and their children are in distress and so sad and desperate and so happy when you give them a cup of milk or a piece of chocolate but some people are calling them little talibans and Europe pretends to still be...to still Be. It s not and it never was. I remember when I was a kid and Mom and Dad showed me how to type window glass with duct tape so it doesn t break in case there is an explosion and for years I couldn t get that glue off my windows and for years I had that brown duct tape on the window glass and all of us kids collected shrapnels and I threw them away only two years ago because I didn t know what to do with them anymore. And I didn t even feel the war that much. If I had fled if my family had fled back then would we have been deported because we came from Zagreb? If I had
walked in these long lines and if I had thrown a cup on the floor would people in countries I would have passed through say how dirty and primitive people from the Balkans are if my Dad had thrown away a wet jacket that he didn't want to wear in order not to get sick or if my Dad had gotten sick on the journey would volunteers around us wear those masks and would the locals complain because we throw away everything we are being given? If my Mom had gotten a can of fish that she couldn't open and if my Mom had thrown it away would the world say how ungrateful we are and if some volunteer tried to put a glittery women's sweater on my Dad like I tried with so many men would my Dad put it on? He still doesn't want to wear hats in winter because he thinks he looks bad in them. If someone had kicked my family or me would I grow up thinking well of that country? If someone had called us migrants and concluded we had no reason to run away because the only good reason to run away is the one Europe and Europeans decide of as being acceptable decide in our name for us what would I think of them today? And now that Europe is so small pathetic and yet so powerful in its boastful semi-existence now who will stop the unproclaimed war that is happening along the route these people are walking? For what is a war? When does it stop? Does it suffice to cross the border of an imaginary paradise where you are not welcomed wanted nor helped to have that war behind you? Who steals your voice and gets to decide when you are allowed to move to find a better place to live? Who listens to their voices who asks them anything and for how long will this maddening maze of endless prejudices continue shaping their personalities without the majority of those having a chance to give them their voice back even taking time to really listen to anything their cough bodies eyes smiles tired steps are saying? You need no Arabic Pashto Dari or Farsi for that. Will we all suffer from PTSD after this is over are we already at that point and will the pictures we post and see live ever leave us even when we are toughed up and hardened and get used to seeing all this after a while so it becomes normal to stand in the dark and wait for 2000 approaching humans wrapped up in UNHCR blankets accompanied by the police scared shivering having no idea where they are going? I grew up and nothing has changed. Except for the one thing I now finally understand: Europe never could have stopped the war. Europe is war. And Europe is in war right now. Make no
mistake: all of us trying to help these people setting up tents like on some mental festival with no music waiting for them at the various borders to give them bread and cheese and water and power bars and scarves and shoes smuggling donations across borders fighting with bureaucracy connecting with people we have never met to send us money and food and clothes sending 10 reports a day from the hotspots we refuse to get away from receiving the beaten up the raped the exhausted the ones people spat on the ones people closed their homes bars and shops to following buses like in some crazy James Bond movie so we know at which border these people will end up and so we can drive drive there like crazy in the middle of the night to provide any small thing that could make their journey easier approaching people coming from the dark with a smile on our faces watching their faces change from distrustful to smiling - we are in war with Europe I was once hoping would stop some war that it never cared about and the only reason Europe doesn t realize it s in war is because we re mosquitos on its thick skin. We re a handful. We re a drop of water in the ocean fighting a Goliath. Wake the fuck up. What makes a war - war? Why should borders mean anything to me anymore? Borders of which countries? Borders of which Europe? Don t make me laugh. And fuck you and your migrant versus refugee distinction. Europe died for me this September and October and truth be told it never had a human heartbeat to begin with.

41 https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1073587182675780/
42% radnika ima plaću do 3.500 kn 2,5% svih štediša u bankama drži 2/3 depozita Izvor: Ministarstvo financija Je li to društvo u kojem želimo živjeti?* 23.10.2015 17:00

42 https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1073586899342475/ Kažu da je kapitalizam dobar jer postoje i pošteni kapitalisti – znači li to i da je i robovlasništvo bilo dobro jer su postojali dobri robovlasnici?* 23.10.2015 15:01


44 https://www.facebook.com/770459529655215/posts/1073485192685979/ Protiv diktature kapitala i stranačkih oligarhija.* 23.10.2015 10:08
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<td>Padaj silo i nepravdo, gradove smo vam podigli, I palace gradili. Oduvijek smo robilje bili, I za vas smo radili… Pravo naše ugrabljeno, a’mo natrag, dajte nam! Ne date li – ne molimo, uzet će ga narod sam.*</td>
<td>21.10.2 015 20:00</td>
</tr>
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<td>“Niti mjesec dana nakon što je finalizirano BAT-ovo preuzimanje Tvornice duhana Rovinj nekadašnjeg core businessa rovinjske Adris grupe pojavili su se u hrvatskim medijima napis po kojima češko-slovački investicijski fond J&amp;T nastoji neprijateljski preuzeti više od 25% dionica kompanije i samim time si priskrbiti upravljačku ulogu. Prema izvorima Glasa Istre J&amp;T je već potpisao opcjski ugovor s drugim najvećim dioničarem Pliniom Cuccurinom koji u posjedu ima 8% dionica a navodno se odvijaju i pregovori s drugim malim dioničarima.”</td>
<td>21.10.2 015 17:48</td>
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*The text is partially of fully transcribed from picture material.

Appendix 2. Human Blockade Facebook Posts 6.11.-21.10.2015

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<td>†Živi zid updated their cover photo.</td>
<td>6.11. 2015 17:03</td>
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<td>Kad pitaš HRT gdje su ankete na temelju kojih su donijeli odluke koje se tiču sudbine nacije u iduće četiri godine onda se brane time da im se miješaš u uredničku autonomiju. A njihovo grubo miješanje u izborni proces je za njih normalna stvar. Igra koju gledamo zadnjih par dana a koje je dio i čudesni Most je pokušaj državnog udara i čin veleizdaje za koji moraju odgovarati Radman Alečković i Runjić. DORH će pretpostavljamo postupiti na uobičajeni način - tako da neće maknuti malim prstom.</td>
<td>6.11.2015 0:05</td>
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<td>OBRTNICI I PODUZETNICI! Prema vama koji ste s vašim djelatnicima kralježnica ovog društva sve vlasti odnosile su se kao prema kravama muzarama ne vodeći brigu o vašim i sudbinama vaših djelatnika. Zanimljivi ste im dok vas mogu pljačkati a kada vas bace na koljena blokiraju vam račune vrše ovrhe nad imovinom stečajeve i uništavaju vašu i budućnost vaših djelatnika. Vaša prava su nebitna jer vi za njih niste ljudi nego porezni brojevi! Pozivamo vas da se priključite Živom zidu jedinom pokretu koji se bori za život dostojan čovjeka za svakoga. Pridružite nam se jer Živi zid je jedini za: - drastično smanjenje parafiskalnih nameta koji</td>
<td>5.11.2015 23:02</td>
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<td>br.</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/734779186627116/">https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/734779186627116/</a></td>
<td>guše poduzetništvo; - vraćanje mogućnosti isplate plaće na ruke; - ukinjanje valutne klauzule i konverziju svih kredita u kunse; - sveobuhvatnu reformu sulude aktualne porezne politike; - ukinjanje sadašnjih mehanizama za naplatu potraživanja putem blokada i ovrha koje uništavaju firme i radnike šalju na ulicu; - zaštitu jedinog doma i prostora u kojem se obavlja djelatnost od ovrhe; - uvodenje stimulirajućih stopa PDV-a za domaće proizvođače (najviše 10%) kako bi se potaknula domaća proizvodnja a obeshrabrio masovni uvoz proizvoda koje sami možemo proizvesti a na koje ćemo uvesti PDV od najmanje 20%; - za drastično smanjenje “papirologije” kako bi se poduzetnici mogli posvetiti vlastitom poslu a ne rješavati birokraciju. Podržite nas na izborima - izborimo se napokon sami za svoja prava u svojoj zemlji! Priključite nam se aktivno ili kao simpatizeri svojim idejama znanjem i stručnošću. Obrtnici i poduzetnici Stanite uz Živi Zid, zaustavimo zajedno propast hrvatskog gospodarstva*</td>
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<td>Doček u Strošincima.</td>
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<td>Pogledajte čime se služe plaćenički mediji! Danas u 24sata ismijavaju Sinčića za program kojeg jedino Živi zid i ima! Podržan od stručnjaka i ekonomista! Primijetite da se niti jednom nisu našalili na račun</td>
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<td>Milanovića iako njegova vlada izbacuje ljude iz domova isključuje im vodu i struju! Tako misle diskreditirati Živi zid ali na sreću postoji internet nakon svake cenzure nakon svakog blaćenja mi smo samo sve jači. Recite ljudima istinu i da je došao dan kada ćemo prekinuti ovo ludilo!</td>
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<td>Zadnji na listi, prvi za ljude Živi Zid*</td>
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<td>Milanoviću Radmane Alečković Runjiću vaša protuustavna cenzura kula je od karata!</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>Hvala malom obrtniku iz Poreča koji je samonicijativno zakupio plakat za Živi zid. Dobit ćemo ovu bitku protiv bankarskih marioneta.</td>
<td>4.11.2015 13:46</td>
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| 23 | https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/733968386708196/ | Svakodnevno nam prilaze umirovljenici ljudi koji su svojim radom gradili ovu zemlju koji su naši glasači! Hvala vam što ste uz Živi Zid! <3 
Umirovljenici! Pogrešnom politikom u prethodnih 25 godina pretvoreni ste u nemoćnu I osiromašenu skupinu građana. Iako ste cijeli život vrijedno radili I uplaćivali novac u mirovinske fondove, današnja mjesečna umirovljenička novčana naknada najčešće nije dovoljna za samostalno uzdržavanje. Svaki potez koji su napravile političke vlasti učinjen je na vašu štetu, a sve pod parolom zaštite umirovljenika. Imali smo sustav u kojem je država brinula o starim, bolesnim i nemoćnim ljudima, a sada, umjesto uživanja u sigurnosti, današnji umirovljenici u oskudici novca, jedva preživljavaju, nisu u mogućnosti plaćati odlaske liječniku i prepušteni su sami sebi. Živi Zid će svim umirovljenicima: -Isplatiti trinaestu mirovinu od povrata opljačkanog novca u pretvorbi i privatizaciji, koji se nalazi na stranim računima; -Podići visinu minimalne mirovine na 75% mjesečne plaće; -Osigurati po principu solidarnosti besplatnu zdravstvenu zaštitu. Dragi umirovljenici, stanite uz nasi pokažite borbenost! Pokažite da više nećete trpjeti teror koji nad vama vrše političke marionete. Izadite na* | 3.11.2015 15:53 |
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<td>Jel sada jasno zašto Karamarko računa na post-izbornu koaliciju s MOST-om?</td>
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<td>2.11.2015 20:56</td>
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<td>8.11.2015 održat će se najveći prosvijed u zadnje četiri godine aŽivi Zid Naziv mu je izbori zato izadi i izbori se!*</td>
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<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/732718596833175/">https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/732718596833175/</a></td>
<td>Iako sam totalno nezainteresiran za politiku (pamtim samo izlazak na posljednje predsjedničke i jedne davne izbore za gradonačelnika) podržavam sve koji su se u stanju boriti za sudbine običnih ljudi a Živi zid je pokazao da mu je bitan svaki čovjek koji je žrtva bogatih. Marko Tomasović poznati hrvatski glazbeni autor</td>
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<td>Pozdrav iz Zagreba :) Potpora je sve jača i jača :)</td>
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<td>Danas smo u Labinu s građanima pridružite nam se! :)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/732067640231604/">https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/732067640231604/</a></td>
<td>IDS se u Istri predstavlja pod sloganom Pravo na naše pokušavajući u osiromašeni Istranima stvoriti osjećaj da se bore za našu stvar protiv zlog i centraliziranog Zagreba. Istina je takva da je vodstvo IDS-a zajedno s SDP-om i HDZ-om kreator politike osiromašivanja korupcije i nepotizma. Igra je završena svima osim njihovim uhljebima je jasno da ta maska regionalizma ili regionalnog nacionalizma služi jedino i isključivo u svrhu opstanka i jačanja vlasti na području Istre a samim time privilegija koje ta vlast nosi. Istrani 8. 11. imate priliku napraviti korak u pravom smjeru i izabrati zastupnike Živog zida!</td>
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<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/731662950272073">https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/731662950272073</a></td>
<td>ZAŠTO GLASAM ZA ŽIVI ZID Podržavam Živi Zid jer samo mladi ljudi svojim beskompromisnim stavom mogu našoj zemlji vratiti nadu u bolju budućnost. Treba im dati šansu jer sve drugo je tapkanje na mjestu ili povratak u neslavnu prošlost. Dražen Scholz bubnjar (Parni valjak)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/731626670275701">https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/731626670275701</a></td>
<td>Dajmo ljudima lijek, a ne farmaceutima profit Živi Zid*</td>
</tr>
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</table>
visokim kamatama i valutnom klauzulom ali nitko se od nas nije usudio suprostiti takvom nepravednom režimu. Mislimo da to tako mora biti i da se protiv sistema ne može boriti. Živi Zid je skupina mladih pametnih i nekorumpiranih ljudi koji su nam pokazali da možemo pobijediti nepravdeni sustav ako se svi ujedinimo. Prepoznali su ključne probleme u društvu i ponudili riješenje za iste. Bore se za ukidanje valutne klauzule i za konvertiranje svih kredita u kune za besplatno obrazovanje i zdravstvo te za pravo na dostojanstven život. Svojim tijelima nesebično spriječavaju deložacije za koje većina ljudi ne bi ni znala da se događaju da nema živog Zida. Žele ukinuti povlaštene saborske mirovine i ostale nezaslužene privilegije saborskih zastupnika smanjiti porez na dobit i rastjeriti nas poduzetnike beskončnih parafiskalnih nameta i tako nam omogućiti da u ovoj zemlji živimo pošteno i dostojanstveno od svoga rada. Propagiraju mir, tolerantiju i ne diskriminiraju ljude po nacionalnosti, spolu, vjeri, boji, kože i seksualnom opredjeljenju itd. Protive se uvođenju GMO hrane i zalažu se za izlazak iz EU i Nato saveza od kojih imamo više štete nego koristi. Ja ne mogu biti sretna i uspješna ako su ljudi oko mene nesretni i neuspješni i zato ću svoj glas dati ŽIVOM ZIDU jer vjerujem da mladi neiskvareni ljudi koji nisu samo jaki na riječima nego i na djelima mogu donijeti promjene na bolje. Vidjeli smo kako izgleda 25 godina pljačke i nema potrebe da to gledamo i dalje.

https://www.facebook.com/Jasminka-Škalić-192992414056391/

U srijedu 28. 10. 2015. od 9 30 na Trgu Ante Starčevića u Osijeku družit ćemo se sa građanima dijeliti mandarine, promo materijale, Pernarovu knjigu Kako je nastao novac i još štošta. Dođite vidimo se! :)  

https://www.facebook.com/291638950941144/posts/731306966974338/

Sustav je baziran na manipulaciji u 2. izbornoj jedinici RTL nam je davao 4 7% taman nedovoljno za prolaz. Igrom slučaja u ruke mi je došao Podravski list i anketa koju je radila slovenska agencija Medijana također na uzroku od 1000 ispitanika. Rezultati se značajno razlikuju RTL je MOST-u davao duplo više nego nama (9% nasuprot 4 7%) dok nam Medijana daje 7 3% - tek neznatno manje nego MOST-
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<td>Predstavljanje liste za devetu izbornu jedinicu Živog zida i Akcije mladih. Čast nam je bilo sastaviti listu sa ljudima kakve smo tražili širom zemlje i kakvih nema mnogo. To su ljudi koji su spremni na borbu protiv neoliberalne hdzsdp politike bez obzira na cijenu.</td>
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<td>4. slunce</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. slunce</td>
<td>Živi zid se zalaže za očuvanje prirodnih resursa i zdravlja ljudi ali i otvaranje novih radnih mjesta kroz ekološku proizvodnju i izvoz.</td>
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<td>Izliječimo hrvatsko društvo!</td>
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<td>4. slunce</td>
<td>MIRNA BEREND - ZAŠTO ŽIVI ZID IMA MOJ GLAS Ako itko zna koliko je televizijska laž i iluzija... mišim da si smijem dati za pravo da sam taj dio apsolvirala i doktorirala... kako vijest postoje vijest koju svi ponavljaju kao papige... a u stvari je čista namještaljka i nikada ne nije dogodila... Mogu vam svjedočiti koliko god hoćete... zato i pšem... i molim vas da samo malo razmislite o tome kako vijestima vladaju vašim umovima i konstatno vam nude dezinformacije... poluinformacije i laži... u kampanjama to samo podebljaju na stotu... Molim vas ne vjerujte doista baš ničemu što vam serviraju. Svjedočim vam o tome poslov kojim sam radila... vjerujte samo svojoj svijesti i srcu. Vjerujte samo hrabrim ljudima...onima koji to rade... srcem...brinući za bližnjega i daljnjega... vrijeme je da se okrenemo jedni drugima... ispruženih ruku za davanje. Kad to učinimo političari više neće postojati... imat ćemo jedni druge. Šaljem vam ljubav. Vaša Mirna Berend</td>
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*The text is partially of fully transcribed from picture material.