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Globalization and Plural Theologies
Challenges to a Shared Vision of Humanity

Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the trajectory of liberal democracy has been toward a shared vision of humanity, based on respect for individual dignity and human rights. The past thirty years of globalization have oscillated between greater uniformity and now, in the past decade, toward a breakdown of the consensus of a shared vision. This article explores the historical development of globalization and then focuses on three phases that have defined global developments in the past thirty years, including growing inequality and the response to associated dilemmas with nationalism and populism. Addressing this current challenge theologically requires a closer look at the relationships between the global and the local. One way forward in this matter from a theological perspective can be found in the discourses of catholicity that have been part of the Church’s tradition.

Globalization and Plural Theologies

theologische Auseinandersetzung mit diesen aktuellen Herausforderungen erfordert einen genauen Blick auf die Beziehung zwischen dem Globalen und dem Lokalen. Aus theologischer Sicht können hierbei Diskurse der Katholizität aus der kirchlichen Tradition weiterführend sein.

| BIOGRAPHY |

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Introduction: Challenges to a Shared Vision of Humanity

The world recently celebrated the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That Declaration was an attempt to help create a universal order of law that would counter the disasters peoples and nations suffered and that had just been overcome after the Second World War. The institutions of the United Nations, and efforts at forming other multilateral associations that followed, created a network that was intended to foster greater solidarity among peoples and nations, both to prevent global catastrophes such as the Second World War, and to advance the betterment of humankind as a whole.

Efforts to foster greater solidarity among peoples and nations are being replaced, in many areas, by harsh nationalism.

Seventy years on, many of those associations appear to be unraveling. Solidarity among nations is being replaced in many areas by harsh nationalism, driven by populist and demagogic impulses that diminish both those who embrace such approaches, and those whom they seek to demonize and exclude. Getting to the root of this inward turning and reasserting of borders and exclusion is particularly urgent as the world also experiences the consequences of climate change coming to a crucial tipping point. Addressing potential ecological disaster requires an even greater solidarity among peoples than perhaps anything humankind has ever experienced.

In search of responses to the challenges of greater fragmentation and exclusivity that continue to gain momentum, concerned people are seeking to identify the causes of such fissures in human interaction and, more importantly, identify resources that can address what feeds the legitimate fears and imagined phobias that fuel these impulses. Theologians have a special responsibility to bring the resources of Christian faith to this discussion, especially their experience in engaging diverse peoples and expressions of faith throughout a two-millennia history and in a worldwide Church today.

This article attempts to sketch in very broad lines some of the factors that have shaped this quest for a shared vision of a united humanity and contributions that Christian theology can make. As a preliminary sketch, its purpose is to demarcate in some measure the major features that a discourse of a shared humanity might have as an impulse toward a renewed effort, both to challenge and situate the acrimonious discourse now happening in
Europe and North America, as well as summon elements of current theology that might help us all move toward a greater shared vision.

To do so, this article is divided into three parts. The first part outlines some of the features of the vision of a shared humanity that has developed since the 1948 Universal Declaration. The view of what constitutes “universal” is examined as a prelude to looking more closely at the current breakdown of this discourse. The second part examines some of the dynamics of this breakdown within the context of globalization and its vagaries over the past thirty years. Then in a third part, Christian theological responses can be proposed that will bring the resources of the Christian tradition to the larger discourse of a shared humanity.

**The Quest for a Universal Vision of Humanity**

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights grew out of the trauma of the Second World War. It is important to remember that it was not drafted in an objective academic space, but was an attempt to not allow the racist and authoritarian horrors of Nazism ever to be repeated again. To make such a Declaration the potential basis for future international law, it needed a common, shared vision of the unity of humanity, against which such crimes as wholesale slaughter of peoples on the basis of “race” or other imputed qualities could be judged. The discourse of human rights, which had grown in Enlightenment Europe since the American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century, was seen as providing such a platform.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was an attempt to not allow the racist and authoritarian horrors of Nazism ever to be repeated again.

As students of human rights—especially from a postcolonial perspective (Cheah 2006)—have noted, the universal rights presented in the Declaration were political rights: freedom of conscience, of assembly, of public dissent, and so on. It was these rights that were deemed essential to preventing a recurrence of the catastrophe of autocratic and despotic rule that had happened in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. In subsequent years, two additional “generations” of human rights were debated as universal rights, beyond the political ones of the “first generation”. The first of these was economic rights (right to nutrition, housing, health, employment). These
were pressed by socialist nations as prior to any concern for political rights. The second of these was cultural rights (the right of indigenous peoples to cultural integrity), pressed by minority groups in decolonized nations. These two “generations” of rights did not gain universal approval in the United Nations Assembly. Particularly economic rights came to be championed by poor countries outside the Western ambit.

One of the things that these debates about human rights reveal is that there was no shared vision of humanity from which instantiations of criteria could be deduced. The political rights of the 1948 Declaration reflected a democratic ideal which—laudable in itself—was really based on a European Enlightenment anthropology that posits individual human dignity and an attendant set of political rights. The basis for positing these rights was not articulated; it was simply assumed. To be sure, such a view had historical roots in Christian anthropology, with its assertion that humans have dignity because they were created in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26–27). This dignity was framed in a story of creation that said all humanity derived from a single source (Gen 1–2) but that human beings had then divided through their hubris and other failings. But in the philosophical debates with the Church in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, those Scriptural warrants were discounted by Enlightenment thinkers, who wished to posit their approach on the basis of Reason alone.

Postcolonial thinking has further undermined this Enlightenment discourse by pointing out how the cult of Reason was not carried through in a consistent manner. This was most evident in how “the Other” was being encountered in Europe’s colonial adventures. The lectures in geography of both Immanuel Kant and George Friedrich Hegel can only be read with a certain revulsion today as Africans and Asians were disparaged as being “primitive” and “without reason.” “Reason” obviously became a much more freighted term than the philosophers might have imagined. Explanations for Otherness were accounted for by using a temporal scheme, as Johannes Fabian already pointed out many years ago (Fabian 1983). The peoples outside Europe represented “earlier” stages of development than that of their colonizers. They needed to “develop” to reach the “advanced” stage of Europe through a “mission civilisatrice.” It is not surprising that a countercurrent developed that emphasized “space/place” over “time” as a
way of dealing with Otherness (e.g., Malpas [1999] 2018). At the same time, however, it must be admitted that temporality plays an important ordering role in any narrative, and the capacity to embrace a common narrative is important for unified thought and action.

**It has become increasingly difficult to define human universals which parties from different backgrounds can agree on.**

The pressures of the Postmodern put further strain on articulations of universality beyond those of Postcolonial argument. Indeed, the rejection of “master narratives” was one of the hallmarks of the postmodern discourse of the 1980s and 1990s (see Lyotard 1984). Yet the need to find a common realm of discourse about the human made the quest for such universals a continuing enterprise, even as it was acknowledged that such an articulation would fall short. The search for a “Global Ethic” by Hans Küng (Küng 1996) and parallel efforts by the Parliament of the World’s Religions in 1993 showed that universals could be articulated only at a very high level of abstraction, and needed “middle axioms” to be translated into different cultural contexts (Schreiter 2001).

What all of this quest for universals means is that it has become increasingly difficult to find genuine universals which parties from very different experiences and backgrounds can agree on. At the same time, some level of commonality is needed in order for common discourse and common action to take place. As will become apparent in the next section, it is often easier to find a common discourse developing around something everyone is against, albeit for slightly different reasons. The nature of the object against which all react need not be detailed in full or even in the same way. This partially explains the popularity of the category of “resistance” in postmodern and postcolonial circles as a basis for common discourse and action.

**Globalization as the Matrix of the Current Rise of Nationalism and Populism**

Globalization in its most general sense refers to the interconnection of peoples and cultures through patterns of exchange—the movements of ideas, goods, and people (Schreiter 1997, 1–27). Some measure of globalization has been going on since the early ages of humanity. The term is most often
used, however, to speak of such exchange during the last half millennium. It is now common to speak of three successive phases of globalization during this five–hundred–year period. At each phase, a wider network of interaction emerged, creating new systems of relations with often ambivalent outcomes.

**Three phases of globalization since the fifteenth century.**

The first phase begins with the Portuguese and Spanish voyages in the fifteenth century. These voyages led to the global navigation of the world and the beginnings of European colonialism. This was made possible by advances in maritime navigation and ship construction. The results led to new interactions as, on the one hand, the riches and products of the so-called “New World” were brought to Europe, and, on the other hand, populations (and communicable diseases) migrated from Europe to these newly discovered lands. This first phase continued into the eighteenth century.

A second distinctive phase of globalization began in the nineteenth century. What gave this impetus of globalization was the advent of steam power to accelerate long–distance sailing and the invention of the railroad to move goods and people over land. The appearance of telegraphy and telephony speeded up communication over long distances. Steamships promoted the movement of peoples, especially out of Europe to the other continents of the world. This movement of goods and peoples led to a highly connected world, whose networks were suddenly challenged by the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

The third phase of globalization gained momentum in the latter third of the twentieth century, after the recovery from the devastations of the Second World War. The technologies that moved this phase along were the new advances in air travel and, starting in the 1980s, the electronic revolution that changed both telecommunications and the accumulation of data. At this point, I want to look at this third phase of globalization in more detail, since we find ourselves in its still evolving forms.

**Globalization Today and Its Social Impact.**

**A Study of Three Decades**

Globalization is most obviously an economic phenomenon, but it has deep cultural, political, and social effects as well. One can trace the current phase
of globalization over the past three decades by looking at distinctive features that emerged in each of the three decades.

Many authors see the current phase of globalization beginning with the development of information technology in the 1980s, reaching its crucial turning point in 1989, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall. A worldwide realignment in economic, social and political realities followed this event. Marxist-inspired socialism collapsed in the countries of the Soviet bloc and was severely challenged in China. The demise of economic socialism left neoliberal capitalism with an open playing field. Countries in Europe and in Central Asia rejected the Soviet hegemony and most moved toward embracing some form of democracy. There was a great deal of euphoria in the early 1990s, which lasted into the turn of the millennium. An international liberal social order, as had been envisioned by the founding of the United Nations, now seemed to be emerging. The European Union expanded to include most of the countries of Europe, fulfilling the dreams of its founders as an economic and social combine that would preclude war among the nations of that continent.

A new connectivity among people appeared to be laying the groundwork for the possibility of a united humanity.

Accelerating the momentum in all of this was the advance in electronic communications. Students used it to undermine autocracies in country after country, starting in Serbia, and spreading to Ukraine and Georgia, among others. Its impact on news reporting was such that those connected with the world in this new way could actually witness events around the world as they were taking place. A new connectivity among people appeared to be laying the groundwork for the possibility of a united humanity such as had never been possible before.

This new connectivity compressed both time and space through the speed of communication, and the extension of reach that was not possible before. In the decade of the 1990s, then, there was great hope of a genuinely new, united world (Fukuyama 1992). But even in the midst of this optimism, there were concerns about the shadow side of the increased connectivity and the sheer speed with which everything seemed to be moving. There was a real fear of greater cultural homogenization at the hands of those countries who controlled the levers of economic globalization (especially the United States); many were concerned that local cultures would be obliterated by the “McDonaldization” of the world, leaving everyone and every-
thing looking the same (Barber 1996). Moreover, that homogeneity could undermine democracy itself, as unchecked economic power in its neoliberal form could diminish the role of national governments and create an authoritarian form of rule by large transnational corporations (Martin/Schumann 1996). This led others to dream of a rebirth of utopian possibilities that had blossomed during the upheavals of decolonialization in the 1950s and the Western upheavals in culture in the 1960s.

On the other hand, however, there were those who lived in parts of the planet where the resources of the new connectivity of globalization were bringing disruption and exclusion rather than progress and inclusion. It was feared that globalization was but the new visage of an already well-known colonialism. Movements such as the World Social Forum were organized to combat the annual Global Economic Forum in Davos where the captains of industry were extending their reach into the poor and developing countries of the world.

By the second decade of globalization, beginning roughly with the turn of the third millennium, some of the contours of this worldwide phenomenon were coming into clearer view. The movements of connectivity were by no means a one-way street. Resistance and reaction to global economic and social hegemony were prompting energetic responses within local settings around the world. Rather than erasing local difference to create globalized new “McWorlds” of homogeneity (governed by the richest nations), pushback resulted in much more complicated responses. Two such phenomena stood out in a special way (Tomlinson 1999).

First, the outcome of the encounter of the global and the local turned out less likely to be an erasure of local identity to be replaced by a new homogeneity. Rather, *hybridity*, or mixing to create a new entity, was the more likely outcome. The term “hybrid” had originally been a negative term in racialized colonial discourse, indicating a weakening of the more powerful (i.e., the colonizers) by intermarriage with the weaker (i.e., the colonized) culture (Young 1995). In postcolonial thinking, however, hybridity was seen to be an expected outcome of intercultural encounter that could have either positive or negative outcomes. Positively, it could lead to a more robust creature who could traverse different worlds more effectively; negatively, it could mean the “colonizing of the imaginary,” whereby colonized peo-
peoples would remain forever subjugated to powerful outside sources by the way their very thinking about themselves was changed by the colonizers (Gruzinski 1988).

The encounter of the global and the local turned out to bring hybridity or hyperdifferentiation rather than a new homogeneity.

Second, the outcome of the global and the local encounter would not lead to uniformity, but rather greater plurality. This hyperdifferentiation of cultures—something first described most effectively by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann 1987)—resulted in the formation of homogeneous subcultures where, in the networks of social communication, people seek out like-minded others with whom to interact rather than interacting with those in their immediate physical vicinity. Today, this is most obvious in where people choose to get their news and opinions in the media. People are less likely to seek out a spectrum of opinion, but rather tend to converge on sources with whom they already agree. The result is not more widely shared opinion; what ensues in its stead are enclaves that do not communicate with each other.

Globalization indeniably brought some notable advances. But the fears expressed by its opponents also became ever more realized.

This second decade of globalization saw the outworking of some of the consequences of the first decade described above. Advocates of a new fuller human order continued to look for further opportunity even as opponents of globalization saw it as the new face of a familiar colonization. The hopes of the advocates for greater unity were met by the pluralization and complication of society. But it also saw some notable advances. Within just three decades, some four hundred million people were lifted out of poverty in China alone. The number of people living in absolute poverty decreased. And some of the United Nations Millennium Goals to end poverty and illiteracy were met in some measure. But the fears expressed by globalization’s opponents also became ever more realized. While significant percentages of people were lifted out of dire poverty, those left behind drifted even further away from any improvement in their circumstances. Growing inequality belied the promise of universal prosperity. The lower edges of the middle ranks of society in industrialized countries experienced economic stagnation and diminishment of their status.
The Great Recession of 2008 around the world revealed once again the paradoxes (or contradictions) of the economic model upon which globalization was based. Capitalism has historically moved in “booms” and “busts.” The 2008–2009 recession was evidence of this. The experience of the recession reminded everyone that ever increasing globalization was neither inevitable nor inexorable. It could be stopped.

**The experience of the 2008–2009 recession reminded everyone that globalization was not inevitable. It could be stopped.**

Historians of globalization largely agree that the second round of globalization, which had begun in the nineteenth century, had ground to a halt with the First World War, and it would take more than forty years to restore trade relationships. The economic underpinning, a neoliberal creed, is posited on the free movement of ideas, goods, and peoples. The free movement of goods was at the heart of neoliberal thinking, based on the belief that the market creates its own logic and self-management. In the 2008–2009 Recession, the banking and finance world proved once again that this was not to be the case. What had to this point not been adequately reflected upon in the neoliberal creed was the third free movement: the movement of peoples. There had been an increase in migration in Europe during this second decade of globalization, especially as countries in the former Soviet Bloc were incorporated into the European Union. But the world was not entirely prepared for what became starkly evident in the third decade of globalization—massive movements of peoples.

**Globalization is posited on the free movement of ideas, goods, and people. But the third free movement had not been adequately reflected upon.**

The most recent decade of globalization, then, has been marked by a greater realization of the potential consequences of globalization. This combines in some fashion both the positive and negative evaluations of the previous two decades. It can be briefly outlined here as follows.

First, the sheer enormity of the scope of globalization—something that was feared already in the first decade to result in a formless homogenization of the world—was now increasingly experienced even by those who had benefited from globalization. The poor and excluded of the world had always seen increasing globalization as a loss of some measure of control over their lives. Now, people in countries benefitting from globalization...
were experiencing this as well, especially those in the lower middle class and the working classes. They found their incomes stagnating or even diminishing. The proposed rationality of the growing effects of globalization was being replaced by an awareness of the emotional consequences of losing control. Authors such as Francis Fukuyama, who had once lauded an era of unparalleled prosperity were now pointing to the social unraveling that was taking place (Fukuyama 2018). He, and others such as the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, pointed to the growing response to globalization in terms of the classical Greek sense of *thumos*—strong and powerful emotions of anger and fear (Sloterdijk 2006). Such strong emotions emerge at a time when a basic sense of security seems to be beyond one’s grasp or is even utterly unattainable. Ronald Inglehart, one of the major architects of the European Values and World Values Surveys, suggests that when people no longer have to fear for their physical survival every day, they develop what he has called Postmaterialist values, that make them more concerned about their own self-expression and more open to new information and relationships. But when this assurance of survival breaks down, people draw firmer boundaries around themselves, and become willing to gather behind strong authoritarian leaders, and want to exclude anyone considered foreign or “other” from their physical territory. Such efforts at self-protection and exclusion of others are attempts to regain control and a sense of security against what has been perceived to have been lost (Inglehart 2018).

A second factor, most evident in Europe, was the movement of peoples from Africa and the Middle East across the Mediterranean and into Europe. Pope Francis called attention to this phenomenon at the very beginning of his pontificate in 2013 by visiting the island of Lampedusa in the Mediterranean. The massive movement of peoples caused by wars in the Middle East, especially since 2015, drew even more attention to one of the consequences of globalization—the movement of peoples.

Europe had already experienced increased migration in the 1990s, as the expansion of the European Union into Central and Eastern Europe opened the way for the movement of workers into the wealthier EU countries in the West. Xenophobia was already evident in Europe, especially in former colonizing countries such as France and Great Britain. But the growing insecurity of significant parts of the population (especially in rural areas, among
people with less formal education, and youth) made the migration of Muslims from the Middle East and Africa, as well as sub-Saharan Africans, an incendiary issue. The result was a pulling back from embracing the vision of the European Union and a shared humanity, and a turning to nationalism and xenophobia. Economic insecurity and migration had similar effects in the United States and Australia, where nationalist and xenophobic movements gained popularity.

**Nationalism and Populism**

Nationalism first appeared in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as an effort to bring diverse cultures (called “nations” at the time) into larger political units (states), so that the diverse nations would react together as a single social and political unit (nation-states). At the time of the French revolution, it is estimated that only about twenty percent of France’s population spoke standard French. Bismarck formed Germany out of a host of several smaller principalities. In other words, nationalism—seen positively—provided a way of bringing diverse peoples together under new forms of social unity. This has been most evident in so-called “countries of migration” such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, where new common identities were formed out of groups hailing from very different origins elsewhere.

Nationalism brought diverse peoples together under new forms of social unity. But, at the same time, it became an engine of exclusion. At the same time, nationalism also always had a deep shadow side. The very forces that allowed people to come together could also become engines of exclusion for those deemed not to belong. This was most painfully evident with the rise of National Socialism in Germany in the 1930s, and the subsequent expulsion of German-speaking peoples from Eastern Europe after the Second World War. What is now widely called “populism” might be seen as the flip side of this attempt to create a greater, transcultural social unit. Rather than embracing a kind of hybridity of cultures, it seeks to create a new purity that excludes any “other” that does not match a specific identity. Populism is a negative reaction growing out of this sense of loss of control over one’s life, and quite frequently, carries racial overtones (Müller 2016).
It posits one specific group as “the people” with the exclusion of others. Pushing back against the hybridity of globalized populations, it insists that only the “pure” (by culture, language, or race) have the right to supremacy. “Race” is a very controverted social construct, and the twenty-first century is still not free of the pseudo-scientific theories of racial hierarchy that were commonplace in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Concerns about the loss of “white” domination in society and culture underlie many of the attitudes toward those who are “other” and entering wealthy societies. “Otherness” is seen as attenuating and even dissolving the powers of a socially dominant group in a given national setting. The response to such a perceived threat requires exclusion of these “impure” features that “contaminate” our societies.

Populism grows out of the sense of loss of control and often carries racial overtones. It insists that only the “pure” have the right to supremacy.

Seen together, then, the negative sides of economic globalization—a growing sense of insecurity and inequality of being left behind or even excluded from its advantages—meet a “threat” coming from “outside” (the immigration of people deemed different or “other” from the host country), which creates the volatile social brew that is manifesting itself in Europe, the United States, and Australia. Issues of secure physical borders and concerns about cultural purity come to dominate political discussion, even in the face of empirical data that do not support the perceived level of threat. The *thumos* that keeps this brew at boiling point draws upon images of fragmentation, loss, exclusion, and dilution so as to make the hope for a more commonly shared humanity now seem like a distant dream of the past.

**Globalization and a Shared Vision of Humanity**

What does all of this mean for a vision of shared humanity? The proponents of globalization in the first two decades of its current instantiation spoke of creating a “cosmopolitanism”—people being “citizens of the world.” (Beck 2004) This usage of the term goes back to Kant’s vision of a Perpetual Peace. This was not intended to obliterate the local and the immediate surroundings and identities; rather, the intent was to say that one could be both a citizen of a given place and a citizen of the globalized world at the same time. Postcolonial critics, however, soon argued that such a grand
view of the cosmopolitan was largely the privileged position of a global elite, who could be at home anywhere. There was also another kind of cosmopolitanism which Paul Gilroy called a “vernacular cosmopolitanism,” which was the lot of the poor migrants who found themselves having to negotiate a precarious existence in new circumstances (2006). Particularly those people who felt unrecognized and left behind in wealthy countries rejected such a cosmopolitan view as articulated by the elites, and claimed their right to their own autonomy. This is one of the explanations given regarding the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom in 2016. Those voting for withdrawing from the European Union saw themselves as foregrounding the local and the concrete over the distant and abstract European Union. A British writer at the time spoke of them as the people of “somewhere” revolting against the elite people of “nowhere” (Goodhart 2017).

Inequality and exclusion experienced by so many people is well in line with the logic of globalization itself.

One thing about the anthropology of globalization that has been noted almost from the very beginning is that it is beholden to neoliberal capitalism. The human is seen principally as a consumer and producer. Those who cannot participate in consumption and production in an ever increasing capacity are viewed as less than human. Moreover, there is no teleology of the human or of globalization itself. The sole goal is self-replication and ever greater consumption and production (Robertson 1992; Schreiter 1997). Thus, the inequality and exclusion experienced by so many people is well in line with the logic of globalization itself. Seen from this perspective, it is no wonder that negative forms of nationalism and populism are such a likely or inevitable result.

Fragmentation or Resistance?

Relations between the Global and the Local

The plurality of identities that transpire from the processes of hyperdifferentiation, which are driven by globalization, are often experienced as a simple fragmentation or breakdown of the universal. This is certainly the perspective from a universalist point of view. But as some scholars of contemporary cosmopolitanism have pointed out, a vigorous embrace of the immediate, the concrete, the near-at-hand is an essential part of a healthy
cosmopolitanism as well (Appiah 2019). The “local” reasserts itself not in opposition to a more universal sense, but rather insists on a “both–and” approach instead of the “either–or” approach of a nationalistic populism.

The immediate, the concrete, the near–at–hand is an essential part of cosmopolitanism.

This development of new understandings of the local tries to bring a level of concreteness and relatedness to these groups who did not find expressions of themselves in more universalizing, abstract proposals of identity. “Local” in the sense in which it is being proposed here is not univocal in the same way “global” may be construed. “Global” can be understood as something overarching, whose horizons stretch far beyond those within immediate purview. “Local” is not to be understood as the dialectical opposite of the “global.” Like other postcolonial thinking, it finds an emphasis on place rather than the pervasive paradigm of time that pervades colonial thinking. “Local” here can denote a series of sites:

- Sites of resistance, where concrete communities are bound together;
- Sites of resilience, or places a beleaguered community returns to in order to regain the strength it needs to endure continuing states of dehumanization;
- Sites in the diaspora, where immigrant and displaced communities recover a sense of place even as they are being denied a place where they now find themselves;
- Sites of refuge from the alien gaze, where communities recreate their emic centers in the face of a hostile etic imposition by outside hegemonic forces.

These senses of the local in contrast to the global give a clue to how people form identities that give expression to who they are in a positive fashion, and not simply in reaction to feelings of insecurity, fear, and threat of annihilation. To give a bit more concreteness to this, a Carnegie Institute study of how immigrant communities maintain their humanity in the maelstrom of conurbations that throw together people of all different cultures and languages provides interesting insights. Canadian philosopher Michael Ignatieff explored how immigrant groups in seven megacities around the world practiced what was referred to above as a “vernacular cosmopolitanism,”
that is, a way of being a “citizen of the world” in very local and confusing circumstances. He called these features "ordinary virtues," in the sense of a simple moral order for living in a multicultural setting over which no group can exercise control (Ignatieff 2017). The “ordinary virtues” he singled out were: tolerance, forgiveness, trust, and resilience. These are virtues that do not find their roots in fear and insecurity, but a deeper sense of dignity of each human person and the value of a shared community.

Being a “citizen of the world” in very local and confusing circumstances calls for specific virtues: tolerance, forgiveness, trust, and resilience.

With regard to polarizing features of society that grow out of a response to globalization there is, at this stage of globalization processes in the world, a single factor that threatens all forms that society takes: the peril of climate change. More than anything else, this is a reality that impinges upon everyone and everywhere on the planet. Solutions to this challenge cannot succeed solely along national boundaries or cultural configurations. It requires a sense of a common humanity that respects difference and particularity, but finds solid footing for justice and solidarity among peoples. How will Christian theology respond to this fact, in the midst of the complexities of globalization and its disparate effects?

Plurality in Theologies as a Basis for Addressing Globalization

Christian theology understandably seeks a certain unity or universality in that its object is the study of God. Theology is aware of its limits in speaking a finite language about an infinite reality. Yet it tries to comprehend and include as much as it can its reflections upon God and God’s action in the world.

The twentieth century saw a distinctive pluralization of theologies related to the processes of globalization, yet arrived at by a somewhat different route. With Roman Catholicism, it first became evident in Africa in the 1940s and 1950s, where philosophers and theologians felt that the Neo-Scholasticism they had inherited from Europe did not begin to illuminate African Christian experience in identity. In 1944, the Flemish missionary Placide Tempels published La Philosophie bantoue which was an attempt to develop a philosophy out of the vitalist understanding of reality common among Bantu peoples (Tempels 1944). In 1956, a group of Congolese doc-
toral students in Paris published a kind of manifesto, calling for a theology that reflected more closely African values (Des Prêtres noirs s’interrogent 1956). There were thus stirrings, especially in colonized areas, to develop a distinctive theological voice that did not reject the received Western theology, but expressed a local voice attuned to a different cultural experience.

The Second Vatican Council allowed the beginnings of a plurality of theologies to find ground.

The Second Vatican Council proved to be a decisive turning point that allowed the beginnings of a plurality of theologies to find ground. The Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes addressed the Church “in” the modern world, not the Church “and” or “over against” the modern world. Pope Paul VI affirmed this direction for theology in his 1969 visit to Uganda, where he urged the Church there to be “truly Christian and truly African.” By the 1970s this pluralization of theology came to be known as a process of “inculturation,” paralleling the doctrine of the Incarnation, where the Second Person of the Trinity took on human nature in its very particular form. The term was first used in the General Congregation of the Jesuits in 1973 and appeared in Pope John Paul II’s Apostolic Exhortation Catechesi Tradendae in 1979 (Shorter 1988). This became a way to describe the “identity theologies” of many countries in the immediate post-colonial era.

Parallel to the theologies of inculturation, the theologies of liberation began emerging in Latin America.

Parallel to the theologies of inculturation were the theologies of liberation that began emerging in Latin America in the 1960s. Rather than focusing on cultural identity, these theologies investigated the social realities of Christians who were suffering from poverty and political oppression. They first received legitimacy in the Second Plenary Assembly of the meeting of the Episcopal Conferences of Latin America (CELAM) in 1968 at Medellín in Colombia. The publication of Gustavo Gutierrez’s A Theology of Liberation in 1971 marked the beginning of a rich literature that theologically engaged the political reality of Latin America and quickly spread to other parts of what was then called the “Third World” (Gutierrez [1971] 1973). These theologies of inculturation and liberation have continued to grow since those times. A common feature is a desire to address the local, concrete situations of Christians in all their cultural, social, and political di-
dimensions, but also relate these identities so discerned to the Christian tradition and the enduring message of the salvation of God in Jesus Christ.

I posited some years ago that, in their interaction with the forces of globalization, they bring a kind of “universal” voice of a shared humanity to engaging globalization (Schreiter 1997, 15–21). While keenly aware of the potentially hegemonic character of Enlightenment universalisms, I proposed that one could see four “global flows” in theology. A global flow is constituted by sets of local discourses about given topics that are mutually intelligible to one another yet together provide a common network of addressing urgent issues facing large swaths of humankind. These four flows are: theologies of liberation, theologies of feminism, ecological theologies, and theologies of human rights. They engage enduring issues of poverty and oppression, of gender equity, of climate change, and the plight of those denied human rights. In engaging these issues, they bring a Christian voice to the larger struggles in these four areas as they join those of other faiths and those who are secular in tackling the thorny challenges the entire world faces.

Four global flows: theologies of liberation, theologies of feminism, ecological theologies, and theologies of human rights.

In this process, two things emerge. First, they sketch an alternative to abstract universals that are now under suspicion in a postmodern world. While the critiques of the postcolonial situation and of postmodernity have laid stress on the abstract and often hegemonic character of Enlightenment universals, there is nonetheless a need to find common ground upon which to act together. Second, while it does not give a firm definition of the human as a basis for a shared humanity, it operates in a kind of negative dialectic by addressing what is not human in such a way as to move dialectically toward a greater sense of the human. Edward Schillebeeckx tried to articulate something of this in his two volumes on Christology (Schillebeeckx 1974; 1977). In the fourth part of his first volume, he sees humanity as not able to define itself theoretically, but as moving toward a humanum which will be realized in an eschatological future (Schillebeeckx 1974, 488–501). In the second volume, he tried to take this a step further in articulating what he called “anthropological constants” that hold every expression of the human, but by themselves do not articulate a full depiction of humanity (Schillebeeckx 1977, 671–683). While he owed his formulation to the secu-
larized Marxism of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, one easily perceives the Christian eschatological background of sinful humanity moving toward a “new creation.” (2 Cor 5:17). Later scholars of his work have tried to articulate this more clearly into a Christian anthropology that meets the needs of this time (Minch 2018).

**Catholicity: A Way Forward in Globalization and Plural Theologies**

I have proposed elsewhere that the theological concept of catholicity might provide a way of making a theological contribution to the situation in which we now find ourselves (Schreiter 1997; 2015). Catholicity has long been considered one of the defining characteristics of the Church of Christ (Connor 1972). Historically, catholicity was manifested especially by two interconnected concepts of the Church: its extension throughout the world (Ignatius of Antioch) and the living in the fullness of faith (Cyril of Jerusalem).

Catholicity was manifested by two concepts of the Church: its extension throughout the world, and the living in the fullness of faith.

In other words, the Catholic Church’s universality (kat’ holou = throughout the whole) is to be found in each particular instantiation where the people are gathered around their bishop in the celebration of the Eucharist. At the same time, only those particular churches that profess the fullness of the faith handed down by the apostles can claim to be “Catholic.” Thus, those communities that are selective in their appropriation of tradition engage in hairesis. In the course of the early centuries in the West, “Catholic” came to be the name of those particular churches who shared communion with the See of Rome (although “Catholic” remains in the name of many of the Churches of the East to this day). I think that catholicity as a theological concept can illuminate the complexities of the global and the local, the universal and the particular, and the journey together toward a shared humanity.

The first discourse: extending throughout the whole world while embracing its diversity and particularity.

In trying to describe further the characteristics of this (Western) concept of catholicity as it pertains to the churches of the Latin West, I have suggest-
ed that one can discern two discourses of catholicity present in the world today (Schreiter 2015). The first discourse focuses upon the Church’s expansion throughout the whole world, and tries to embrace its diversity and particularity within a certain wholeness and unity. It starts from the particular, and journeys toward a vision of the whole. The points of emphasis and the practices that direct this journey are: inculturation, dialogue, and solidarity. These three elements are more than descriptions of practices. They point to the deeper theological commitments that, in turn, provide the basis for a vision of a shared humanity.

**Inculturation, dialogue, and solidarity.**

Inculturation is based on the mystery of the Incarnation, namely, how the divine Logos comes to dwell in all human particularity, yet is fully present in divinity in all of those indwellings. Such a bringing together of the universal and the particular gives prominence to the *semina Verbi*, the presence of the Incarnated Logos already at work in the world before evangelization takes place. As a result of this, inculturation is not merely a decorative nod to the diversity of human cultures. Rather, it suggests that the fullness of Christ’s incarnation will only become clear to us when these *semina* are allowed to mature and blossom in each setting of the human. Inculturation, then, is not an optional exercise. It is essential in grasping both the particularity and the universality of the Christ event for the world.

Dialogue is based in the mystery of the Trinity. The dialogue between the three Persons found in the immanent Trinity is given to us in the dialogue of the economic Trinity. In that dialogue we come to see God’s intention for the world. That intention is revealed as the *missio Dei*, the sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit into the world for its redemption and sanctification. That such sending is necessary gives the first insight into the dimensions of a universal, shared vision of humanity: that it is held dear to God, that it is in need of repair, and that it is not yet complete but is moving toward that eschatological point where “God will be all in all” (1 Cor 15:28). Dialogue, then, is not simply an intellectual exchange; it is essential as a practice that shows one’s respect for the other, that realizes that the fullness of God’s intentions has not yet been revealed to us, and that through dialogue we participate in the Trinity’s own being and its manner of engaging the created world.

Solidarity arises out of reflecting on the consequences of the mysteries of the Incarnation and of the Trinity for the practice of catholicity. Solidar-
ity requires engagement with all sectors of humanity, especially those not experiencing or deprived of the dignity they are due as God’s creatures. It also is a critique of a kind of monistic individualism that fails to recognize our profound interdependence. It reminds us, too, that catholicity is more than some ideal picture of a future; it is about action that puts a vision into action, much as the actions of the missio Dei. Struggles for dignity, for recognition, and for justice are constitutive of a genuine catholicity.

The second discourse: emphasizing the fullness of faith in contemplating beauty, and dwelling in Truth.

The second approach to catholicity emphasizes rather the fullness of faith as the starting point for effecting catholicity in a World Church. Here, the point of departure is an awareness of the Church as bearing the full revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The Church must bring that revelation to a world that, in its fallenness, cannot of itself find its true meaning and dignity. The Church engages this world by offering itself as a sacrament of the world, an alternate view of the world as a redeemed possibility in God’s reconciling plan for all creation. This discourse of catholicity starts with the whole (God’s revelation in Christ), embodied in the pilgrim Church, to engage each particular situation of a multi-faceted world. The Church does this in its practices of contemplating the beauty of Christ, of dwelling in the Truth revealed by Christ, and of celebrating the liturgy that focuses, in its beauty, on the transcendence of God as the way to the fullness of catholicity.

Contemplating beauty reveals the deepest meaning of creation. Dwelling in Truth reveals a spirituality of movement toward a reconciled wholeness. Celebrating the liturgy re-enacts the Paschal mystery that is key to embracing the meaning and destiny of the world within the transcendence of the Triune God.

Both discourses may provide a framework for dealing with the consequences of a globalized world.

The practices of the first discourse of extension throughout the world seek to engage the particularity of the world in respectful dialogue and engagement. The practices of the second discourse seek to assure a strong and faithful identity to a world that cannot find its true form on its own. The first discourse can become too optimistic about the world; the second discourse struggles with how deep pluralism can go without endanger-
ing wholeness. Both discourses have a long history in the Church; it is not a matter of choosing one over the other. But each provides a framework for dealing with the consequences of a globalized world from a theological point of view.

The reader may surmise that this author leans more toward a focus on the first discourse to engage the action of God in the world to bring about a shared vision of a common humanity redeemed and reconciled through Christ. At this point in human history, in meeting the challenge to overcome the nationalism and populism that divide rather than unite, to seek to include all peoples in a vision of the future, and to seek to find ways of solidarity that will allow humanity to unite to face the potential consequences of ecological catastrophe, the first discourse seems the most persuasive. I think it is reflected in the ministry of Pope Francis, who, while by no means discounting the second discourse, is casting his leadership along the lines of the first discourse. The second discourse will continue to play a role in deepening the heart of a renewed humanity that is necessary to maintain dialogue and solidarity. It also reminds us that all of this is the work of God in our world, a work in which we have been invited to participate. A common vision of a shared humanity remains an eschatological project that requires our commitment and our deep involvement to bring about that “new creation” to which we have been called.
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