Polyfunctionality, polysemy, and rhetorical strategy
The functional, semantic and pragmatic motivation of discourse functions

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Abstract. The terms polysemy and polyfunctionality are currently used in studies on discourse markers. However, the definitions suggested for polysemy (if indeed there are any) are not fully adequate and operational, and explicit definitions of polyfunctionality are completely missing. In addition, the semantics of discourse markers tends to be conflated into a single dimension that is described in terms of monosemy, polysemy and homonymy. This means that linguistic description is restricted to conceptual motivation by the underlying unit. In this paper, I show that the function of the underlying unit plays a motivating role as well. Furthermore, monosemy, polysemy and their original functions are subject to rhetorical strategies. Hence, the conceptual and functional motivation interacts with rhetorical intentions. As a consequence, lexicalized (conventional) implicatures may be raised. The paper outlines the shortcomings of prior approaches and suggests solutions based on fully explicit definitions which take into account the interplay of polyfunctionality and polysemy, as well as their interplay with rhetorical strategies.\(^1\)

1. Introduction

1.1. Polysemy

Polysemy is a traditional term that applies to many discourse markers, insofar as they develop from inherently motivated concepts, e.g. in the case of Sp. \textit{igual}. The following examples stem from Kluge’s data with spoken Chilean Spanish:\(^2\)

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\(^{2}\)This corpus has been partially published in Kluge (2005). Transcription conventions: \textit{una=palabra} (the equal sign indicates 'no separation'), \textit{palabra} (capital letters signal 'emphatic intonation', @ means 'laughs'). I have simplified the transcription for this paper. The pseudonyms are followed by the number of the line in the transcript (e.g. "Sandra, 1301"). The names of villages have been replaced by VILLAGE.
(1) *igual* ‘also’
J: [...] tengo, por ejemplo amigos hombres, que son, unos primos que viven acá pero su padre . los papás de mis tíos (es decir) eran del campo *igual* . o sea mis primos nacieron en Santiago pero; (Julia, 482)

J: [...] for instance, I have friends, men, who are cousins who live here but their parents . that is to say, my uncles’ and aunts’ parents were *also* from the country . I mean my cousins were born in Santiago but

(2) *igual* ‘perhaps’
J: ((divertida)) de casarme y vivir en VILLAGE sí , [...]
B: [...]
J: ((voz baja)) (pero) no sé . con veinticinco años *igual* a los, veintiocho, treinta años no sé, cuando me case te digo [...][Julia, 770]

J: ((amused)) to get married and to live in VILLAGE oh yes , [...]
B: [...]
J: ((in a low voice)) (but) I don’t know . at twenty-five years old, *perhaps* at twenty-eight, thirty, I don’t know, when I get married, I’ll let you know [...][Julia]

(3) *igual* ‘in spite of something’
J: ((riendo)) ‘cause we punished him (the father), @@ . he treated us very badly, so we punished him, no=no, basically, after all I care about him, and all that, I know that he, I’m here because of him, but I often do not understand a part of him [...]

J: ((laughing)) ‘cause we punished him (the father), @@ . he treated us very badly, so we punished him, no=no, basically, after all I care about him, and all that, I know that he, I’m here because of him, but I often do not understand a part of him [...]

In studies on discourse markers, polysemy has long been neglected, since the scientific interest was the onomasiological study of possibly universal (cf. Fraser 2006b) discourse functions, such as reformulation, introduction, elaboration, acceptance, closing, etc. From the late 1990s, research, instead, has been complemented by semasiological approaches which insist on polysemy (e.g. Fischer 2000; Travis 2005; the contributions in Fischer (ed.) 2006; Foolen 2006; Murillo Ornat 2010:263-266), with respect not only to the ‘horizontal’ interrelatedness of discourse functions, as in (1, 2, 3), but also to the ‘vertical’ transparency of the underlying unit. In the case of *igual*, at least discourse function (1) is clearly motivated by the basic meaning of the underlying adverb of manner ‘in the same way’, as in (4):

(4) *igual* ‘in the same way’
yo no lo nota porque ehtá hablando *igual* que ellos (Sandra, 1301)

he is not aware of it any more because he’s speaking *the same way* as they do
1.2. The terms polyfunctionality or multifunctionality

The terms polyfunctionality or multifunctionality are commonplace in studies on discourse markers. However, unlike polysemy, no explicit definitions have yet been provided for them. Polyfunctionality is intuitively used as a self-evident term, in order to refer to the series of functions realized by a single discourse marker. This is not only problematic in terms of explicitness. The data in Table 1 show that there is a specific relation between polysemy and polyfunctionality, as the development of a new meaning tends to go hand in hand with that of discourse functions:

Table 1: Polysemy and polyfunctionality of Sp. igual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual meaning</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>igual₁ 'equal'</td>
<td>adjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igual₂ 'in the same way'</td>
<td>adverb of manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igual₃ 'also'</td>
<td>adverb with inclusive function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igual₄ 'perhaps'</td>
<td>epistemic adverb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igual₅ 'in spite of something'</td>
<td>adversative-concessive connector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above examples, Table 1 includes the basic adjectival function of igual₁. From a semasiological point of view, the adverb igual₂ appears to be formed by a direct conversion from igual₁. Table 1 includes these two traditional grammatical functions, as well as three discourse functions which have been developed from this basis. Table 1 further suggests a motivated relation between polyfunctionality and polysemy, insofar as each meaning corresponds to a specific function. I thus hypothesize that new polysemic concepts tend to appear in specific syntactic positions of phrases, sentences, or discourse. This also matches with theoretical insights from grammaticalization studies, since grammaticalization is considered to be a process that emerges from 'local' contexts (Meillet 1982:134-136, and, more recently, e.g., Fischer 2010). Thus, the adversative function of Sp. igual tends to appear in the initial position of discourse units, such as in (3), where "yo siento cariño por él" is the relevant discourse unit which is referred to by igual.

To give another example, Spanish premodifying adnominal adjectives have a systematic subjectivating function. In some cases, this 'local' function goes hand in

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1The term function would require a detailed analysis and definition. For the purposes of this paper, it may be roughly defined as the contribution of a unit to communication. In this sense, specific functions derive from the general function of language as an instrument of communication. For details, see Hummel (forthc.).

2For reasons of simplicity, I use the traditional term direct conversion here, but I have argued elsewhere (e.g. Hummel 2013) that this term is not adequate in the case of adjective-adverbs because it inappropriately assumes a change of word class. As in German or Dutch, popular American Spanish simply uses the same word class for the functions of adjective and manner adverb, that is, the distinction of adjective and adverb is made by syntax, not by word class (e.g. un problema igual (adj.), hablar igual (adv.)). See also Hengeveld et al. (2004), for typological aspects, and Salazar García (draft).

1I understand syntax as not being limited to the structure of well-formed sentences but also applying to positions and functions in utterances and oral discourse.
hand with the development of a new concept, e.g. Sp. *una mujer grande* 'a tall woman' vs. *una gran mujer* 'an important woman (whom I / all appreciate)'. This shows that the emergence of new meanings from local functions in syntax is not limited to discourse functions but involves syntax in general. In fact, meaning has to be adapted to function, e.g. when moving from VP to NP, as in *hablar igual* 'to speak in the same way' vs. *una casa igual* 'an identical house', even if the change in meaning is sometimes very subtle, like in this case. In other cases, the effect is evident: *un chico tonto* 'a stupid boy' vs. *el chico murió tontamente* 'the boy died stupidly (= by a stupid coincidence of circumstances)*. The same conceptual change driven by function occurs with intensifying tertiary adverbs such as *tremendo* 'tremendous' (adj.) → *tremendamente importante* 'tremendously important' (adv.), where the basic meaning is still metaphorically transparent but dominated by the new intensifying function. The conceptual adaptation to function is systematic, that is, units like Engls. *incredibly* will be affected in the same rule-guided way. The only possibility to explain these phenomena is to assume that the local functions favor or trigger the process of metaphorical adaptation, even from a cross-linguistic perspective (cf. Traugott 1982:251). In this sense, Engls. *terribly big*, Frs. *terriblement grand*, Ger. *furchtbar groß*, etc. are functionally and conceptually equivalent to Sp. *tremendamente grande*. Both pre-modifying adjectives and intensifying adverbs play an important role in the development of a subjective perspective on the facts referred to by discourse. In fact, subjectivation, epistemic evaluation (*igual*), and structuring of argumentation (*igual*, *igual*) are key elements of discourse analysis.

I have chosen the example of Sp. *igual* because its different meanings and functions not only account for motivated polysemy and polyfunctionality, as in *igual*1,2,3, but also display tendencies for conceptual and functional homonymy. As a matter of fact, the motivated development of *igual* and *igual* in the history of Spanish is an interesting case, since it is not fully transparent from today’s synchrony. Further, the diachronic changes of *igual* involve epistemic and connecting functions which are supposed to belong to a general pattern of semantic change: the “adverbial cline VAdv > IPAdv > DP” (Traugott 1997; cf. Brinton 2010:299-300), where sentential adverbs IPAdv precede the functions of discourse markers or, in a broader sense, discourse particles (DP) (see Hummel 2012, for details). In sum, polysemy may evolve into homonymy.

1.3. Rhetorical strategy

In her introduction to the analysis of discourse markers in French, Hansen (1998a: 238-243, cf. Hansen 1998b; cf. Waltereit 2006a:9-12) pointed out three alternatives for the semantic description of discourse markers: monosemy, polysemy, and homonymy. These variants indeed match with the traditionally recognized types of conceptual meaning. While this theoretical basis is necessary, it is not sufficient for the semantic description of discourse markers. One reason is the above mentioned interrelatedness of semantic concepts and linguistic functions, which is not taken into account. But there is another reason that seems to be crucial for the development of discourse functions. In fact, discourse markers often use the conceptual and
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Functional features of a basic word for rhetorical strategies, as pointed out by Waltereit (2006c), Waltereit and Detges (2007), and Redeker (2006:353-355). In a certain sense, we could use the term pragmatic motivation as a complement to conceptual motivation in polysemy. As a result, discourse markers often have a "bicephalous" (Hummel 2012) or "Janus-faced" (Hansen 2009) nature where the basic properties of the underlying unit maintain a dialectical relation with discourse functions. This is the main reason, for instance, why Sp. bueno, similarly to Engl. well, apparently expresses acceptance, but obeys an opposed pragmatic strategy, insofar as the formal acceptance of a preceding argument is used as a rhetorical strategy to formulate a dissident view. In European Spanish, bueno is even used in sentence initial position as a "marcador de contraposición" (Serrano 1999; cf. "marker of disagreement" (Waltereit and Detges 2007:65), which is quite the opposite of its basic function of acceptance. This is neither strange nor contradictory since it responds to the rhetorical strategy for which bueno is used. Clearly, the description of bueno and well in terms of an inherent semantic motivation of the unit cannot account for this development, since acceptance cannot directly motivate refusal. Hence, the inherent aspects of motivation have to be combined with the pragmatic notion of rhetorical strategy, which is another type of (external) motivation.

In the case of discourse markers, pragmatic strategies prevail over the basic motivation, since they reflect the reasons why speakers use them for argumentation. Similarly, the intensifying function of tremendously important dominates the underlying metaphorical relation to the adjective tremendous. In our definition, discourse functions are rhetorical in nature if speakers use a twofold strategy which displays a contrast between the appearances of saying and its real intentions. Diachronically, the twofold strategy may give rise to lexicalized discourse markers which are bicephalous in nature, as in the case of Sp. bueno and its English equivalent well. In the same vein, the Spanish discourse marker total overtly expresses recapitulation, but may intentionally be used to introduce a conclusion. In both cases of bueno and total, the inherent semantic properties are anaphorically directed to previous argumentation, but the rhetorical strategy cataphorically aims at discourse progression. In cases like Sp. claro 'clearly', the rhetorical strategy lies in suggesting shared evidence (strategy of intersubjectivation).

In sum, the properties of the basic unit and rhetorical strategies provide complex interfaces that are crucial for the description and explanation of lexically coined discourse functions. In the following sections, I shall first outline some shortcomings of the traditional analysis of discourse functions (section 2). The remaining sections are dedicated to operational definitions of polysemy (section 3) and polyfunctionality (section 4). Since both terms should be compatible with the diachronic perspective as well, section 5 is dedicated to this aspect.

6Cf. Schiffrin (1987:102-127). I refer to Schiffrin's seminal study because she stands for the tradition of discourse analysis that focuses on discourse function and does not take into account its motivated genetic basis. This is of course due to the fact that she added an innovative perspective to traditional grammatical analysis. For recent analyses of Engl. well, see Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen (2003), Aijmer et al. (2006:110-111), Claridge and Arnovick (2010:168-169), Cuenca (2008), and Defour (2010), with additional references.
2. Shortcomings of the traditional analysis of discourse functions

Discourse markers are subject to exceptionally complex functional conditions, as speakers use preexisting categories, such as adjectives (bueno), adverbs (bien), verb forms (digamos), prepositional groups (o sea), etc., in order to realize new functions which emerge from specific local positions in syntax. These positions are crucial for argumentation and the construction of discourse. Consequently, the shortcomings essentially concern the complexity of the linguistic description and explanation.

The analysis of discourse markers in the tradition of Schiffrin (1987), for example, was right to focus on almost universal discourse functions, such as those of reformulation, ratification, elaboration, repair, response, turn taking, pre-closing, closing, connection, etc., since they correspond to the communicative goals which the units obey. Hence, they dominate all processes which are used for adapting the basic properties of the underlying word class or syntactic group to discourse functions. In extreme cases, a long series of units may express the same function in discourse. Thus, where Spaniards use vale to affirm, Argentines use dale. In both cases, an imperative word form is used, from the verb valer 'to hold, to be valid', in the first case, and from the verb dar 'to give', in the second. At least in the second case, it would be rather difficult to explain the affirmative properties with the semantic features of the underlying verb dar.

If we want to explain this phenomenon, we have to take into account that there are syntactic positions in discourse which are exceptionally well marked for affirmation or negation (e.g. the initial position of a turn following a question; cf. Detges and Waltereit 2011). Hence, the better a slot in discourse is marked for a specific function, the wider is the range of units allowed for being used. In Hummel (2012), I have documented the following affirmation particles based on adjectives or manner adverbs in Spanish (the glosses are not necessarily equivalent in functional terms):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>Adverb of manner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afirmativo</td>
<td>'affirmative'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbaro</td>
<td>'barbarous, great'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bueno</td>
<td>'good, ok'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cierro</td>
<td>'certain'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claro</td>
<td>'clear'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conforme</td>
<td>'accepted, I agree'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correcto</td>
<td>'correct'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elemental</td>
<td>'fundamental'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidente</td>
<td>'evident'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ciertamente 'certainly'
Claramente 'clearly'
Completamente 'completely'
Decididamente 'decidedly'
Definitivamente 'definitively'
Efectivamente 'effectively, indeed'
Evidentemente 'evidently'
The meanings of these words are at least locally affected by the fact that they actually mean something akin to ‘yes’. I therefore claim that the development of polysemy is driven, at least in numerous cases, by syntax. Consequently, polyfunctionality drives polysemy. This would also explain why "pragmatic strengthening" seems to parallel "semantic bleaching" in diachrony, given that bleaching refers to a preexisting source meaning and pragmatics refers to new functional goals, which have to be clearly determined for the communication to work (Hansen 2005; cf. Claridge and Arnovick 2010:165). In line with this, Fraser (2006a) observes that despite the fact that over 100 discourse markers exist in English, only four basic semantic relationships can be found: contrast, elaboration, inference, time. What he calls "semantic relationships" is usually named (discourse) functions. This would corroborate the hypothesis that the extensive variety of basic meanings which underlie discourse markers are constrained by a rather limited number of pragmatic functions (cf. Fischer 2000:16). The microcosm of affirmation in Table 2 exactly matches this situation. Obviously, function and meaning interplay, especially in the sense that the adaptation of a given concept to a pragmatic function implies the development of abstract, metaphorical or metonymical meanings. However, function and meaning have to be separated at the level of linguistic analysis.

This notwithstanding, not all adjectives or adverbs that are available in the lexicon will be appropriate for affirmation. It is therefore not sufficient to explain them only in terms of the universal function of affirmation. From a cognitive semantic point of view, it would be interesting to provide cross-linguistic evidence for the type of semantic concepts that are used for a specific pragmatic function, e.g. the underlying concepts of the affirmation particles in Table 2.

Moreover, the units in use for the same discourse functions are not fully equivalent. Even in the case of affirmation, Sp. fantástico ‘fantastic’ and exacto ‘exactly’ do

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Adjective</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exacto</td>
<td>‘exact’</td>
<td>Exactamente</td>
<td>‘exactly’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fantástico</td>
<td>‘fantastic’</td>
<td>Indudablemente</td>
<td>‘undoubtedly’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijo</td>
<td>‘fixed, steady’</td>
<td>Indiscutiblemente</td>
<td>‘indisputably’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genial</td>
<td>‘great’</td>
<td>Incuestionablemente</td>
<td>‘unquestionably’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justo</td>
<td>‘right’</td>
<td>Justamente</td>
<td>‘exactly, precisely’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lógico</td>
<td>‘logical’</td>
<td>Lógicamente</td>
<td>‘logically’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnífico</td>
<td>‘magnificent’</td>
<td>Naturalmente</td>
<td>‘naturally’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>‘natural’</td>
<td>Obviamente</td>
<td>‘obviously’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obvio</td>
<td>‘obvious’</td>
<td>Precisamente</td>
<td>‘precisely’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfecto</td>
<td>‘perfect’</td>
<td>Perfectamente</td>
<td>‘perfectly’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seguro</td>
<td>‘sure’</td>
<td>Seguramente</td>
<td>‘surely’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textual</td>
<td>‘textual’</td>
<td>Totalmente</td>
<td>‘totally’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

etc.
not express precisely the same idea, but tend to convey affirmative nuances based on metaphorically transparent semantic features of the basic unit. For instance, *exacto* typically appears in the discourse of persons who possess expertise or specific knowledge, that is, they feel authorized to decide whether something is correct or not (Hummel 2012: 161-164). Another domain of differentiation is register, which strongly separates colloquial *bárbaro* from educated *obvio*. Finally, the reason why I have added the adverbs in the column on the right side is that they often parallel the adjectives, as in *justo / justamente*. In nearly all cases, the adverb is the alternative that speakers may prefer in formal oral discourse and written discourse (cf. Engl. *sure / surely, first / firstly*).

The examples show that the underlying motivation often plays an important role for discourse function. In the case of Sp. *bueno* or Engl. *well*, the motivated function of acceptance is only apparent and secondary with respect to the rhetorical goal in discourse, but it is decisive for the way the discourse function is realized. Hence, the linguistic analysis of discourse markers falls short if their description is reduced to general or universal functions. However, Schiffrin (1987:102, 127) states very clearly: "Like *oh*, use of *well* is not based on semantic meaning or grammatical status", and "has no inherent semantic meaning". As pointed out by Redeker (1991:1164-1165), this cannot be accepted since restrictions in use "can easily be explained if *well* is considered to have a nonempty core meaning". Sometimes the analysis turns out to be monotonous, when several discourse markers are repeatedly characterized as 'affirmation particles', 'reformulation devices', etc., because their specific properties are passed over, not to speak of the impossibility to give a descriptive explanation of their genesis and diachrony.

The reason why discourse markers do not behave in exactly the same way when they fulfill the same function is that they import specific properties from their lexical basis into the discourse functions. In the first place, this is true for the functional properties of the underlying word class or phrase. The adjectives *claro* and *bueno*, as well as the manner adverb *bien* are attributes that are used to modify nouns or predicates, whereas the syntactic head of *o sea* is a conjunction, and *entonces* is an adverb of time. This input is crucial for their discourse function as well. To give an example, *claro* conveys the idea that an argument 'is clear', that is, *claro* is a quality of the argument. On the contrary, *o sea* is based on the conjunction *o* 'or' and is therefore used to introduce alternative arguments. Consequently, if we analyze behavior in discourse in relation with underlying functional features of the discourse marker, such as word class, syntactic function, syntactic position, we find that the development of discourse functions is not only supported by the underlying concepts but also by the underlying syntactic functions and word class.

By contrast, if we chose the underlying function and the function in discourse as invariable features, that is, if we look at a series of units with the same basic and discourse function, we observe that they differ conceptually, as in the series of affirmation particles in Table 2. Thus, the conceptual differences between units which share the same grammatical basis are partially responsible for the conceptual differences that can be observed when they carry out the same discourse function. This is of course true for dissimilar concepts such as *bueno* and *igual*, but the more subtle
conceptual differences of *claro* and *bueno* seem to intervene as well. *Claro* is based on the evidential conceptual meaning of the adjective *claro* 'bright, clear, evident' and thus suggests shared evidence to the hearer. It may thus be used for a rhetorical strategy of intersubjectivation. The underlying adjective *bueno* generally refers to the human quality of 'being good'. In discourse, it often expresses a rather defensive type of acceptance that is more directed to the human acceptance of the interlocutor than to that of his/her arguments. Obviously, the underlying motivation may be bleached or disappear in cases of lexical polysemy or homonymy. In this sense, the communicative relevance of the underlying motivation needs an empirical answer for each marker. But no discourse marker should be analyzed without taking into account the underlying motivation, especially in synchrony, but also in synchrony.

I thus hypothesize that the interplay of basic functional and conceptual properties with discourse functions explains the specific polysemy and polyfunctionality of discourse markers. These may remain close to the basic features, as in the discourse function of acceptance for *claro* and *bueno*, but the dominant role of the final communicative function in discourse allows also for complementary strategies. Hence, I do not assume that basic features determine discourse function(s). The point is not determination, in both directions, but rather the interplay of basic features and discourse functions, which proves to be rather dialectic in nature, as their use is often characterized by rhetorical strategies. Many discourse markers turn out to be bi- or multitephalous, combining endocentric motivation with exocentric rhetorical functions. In studies on discourse markers, the network of motivated relations which link discourse functions to the categorial and syntactic properties of their basis is often underestimated and neglected, or only partially investigated.

### 3. Polysemy

#### 3.1. What is polysemy?

At first glance, this question may appear as a provocation, as it refers to a well-known term in linguistics. The hypothesis that discourse functions are motivated by the conceptual properties of their original basis has been defended and explored by Travis (2005) for Spanish. According to Travis (2005:4), “items are considered polysemous if they have a demonstrable shared component of meaning7”. She thus retakes the definition based on common conceptual features that was suggested by structural linguistics. However, this definition involves three major shortcomings. First, it is not fully explicit since there may also be common features in cases of homonymy. Blank (1997:410) adduces the homonymy of Engl. *bank*<sub>1</sub> ‘ground along the edge of a river or lake’ and *bank*<sub>2</sub> ‘institution where people keep their money’. Both

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7 Many authors simply refer to *meaning* or *(semantic) features* of meaning. However, the content of linguistic signs includes also features belonging to what has been called *grammatical meaning, categorial meaning,* etc. Consequently, an exact definition of polysemy should refer to *conceptual meaning*, which is implicitly (and perhaps prototypically) intended when terms such as *meaning* or *shared semantic features* are used (see also 4.1).
words obviously share the semantic features 'physical object' and 'inanimate'. Hence, the shared feature has to be **relevant for the conceptual motivation** in order to exclude this type of examples from polysemy (see Ullmann 1962:164, 177). Second, metonymy would be ruled out by Travis’ definition since it is not based on a relevant common feature but on conceptual or extralinguistic contiguity. In examples like *to drink one glass a day*, there is no shared feature relevant for motivation. Consequently, metonymy is not included in Travis’ definition of polysemy. Now, despite of not sharing a relevant feature with its basic meaning, metonymical meanings are cognitively motivated by contiguity. In the example *to drink one glass a day*, metonymy is cognitively evident since it occurs as well in other languages (Ger. *ein Glas trinken*, Fr. *boire un verre*, etc.). It would thus be methodologically problematic to exclude metonymy from the empirical analysis of the motivating semantic relations which underlie discourse functions. Furthermore, in the following it will be shown that metonymy is a particularly important type of motivation in the genesis of discourse functions (Hansen 2006:28-29; cf. Traugott and König (1991) on general aspects of grammaticalization). Third, metaphor would be excluded as well, since there is no shared feature, but a basic feature that coexists with a similar inferential feature based on a transposition of the basic feature to a target domain. Logically motivated relations between metonymy and metaphor (see Barcelona 2000; cf. Benczes *et al.* 2011) would also be ruled out. In sum, the definition of polysemy has to refer to the complete network of motivated relations entailed by a linguistic unit.


The main function of *bueno* is a type of acceptance which is generally followed by an argument that expresses a different point of view or a reservation with respect to the former argument, like Engl. *well*:

(5)  
A: Sabes cómo le miden la edad a un árbol?  
B: Con .. el cárbono [sic] catorce?  
S: Bueno, también. No me acordaba de eso. (Travis 2005:97)  

A: Do you know how they measure the age of a tree?  
B: With .. carbon fourteen?  
S: Well, ok, that also. I didn’t remember that.  

In this example, S accepts the answer of B, but it is not the answer he expected. Serrano (1999:118, 121-124) holds that turn initial *bueno* introduces not only a different point of view but a clear contraposition:

(6)  
A: Es muy grato disfrutar del trabajo, ¿no?  
B: Bueno, el trabajo es solamente un medio de subsistencia desde un punto de vista físico ... nada más.  

A: It’s nice to enjoy the work you do, isn’t it?  
B: Well, work is only a means of subsistence from a physical point
If this is true, bueno would be excluded by Travis’ definition of polysemy because there is no common feature between “acceptance” and “contraposition”.

The problem is solved if we take into account that the motivation of the discourse marker bueno is metonymical in nature. In fact, many discourse markers display a bicephalous nature which consists of relating a first argument(ation) in discourse to a second argument(ation). In the case of bueno, the function of acceptance is anaphoric: it always refers to the previous argument. But despite this acceptance, bueno is cataphorically used to introduce another argument, which may conform more or less with the first one, but usually expresses some kind of reservation. To put it in other words, the semantic properties of acceptance are rhetorically used in order to facilitate the introduction of a divergent argument (cf. Waltereit 2004 for Fr. quand même). This means that only the anaphoric function of bueno is definitively related to the basic meaning of the underlying adjective bueno, whereas the cataphoric function is not directly motivated by acceptance. The metonymical motivation of Sp. bueno is illustrated by Figure 1:

**Fig. 1: Motivated semantic and functional relations of the discourse marker bueno**

ARGUMENT 1 + long pause  **bueno** + short pause + ARGUMENT 2

LEFT FACE  <--- CONTIGUITY IN DISCOURSE --- right face

--- (rhetorical) acceptation  introduces a (deviant) argument ---

--- anaphoric attribution

**Underlying relations:**

↑ functional basis (attribution = modification)
↑ conceptual basis (‘positive evaluation’)
both based on the adjective bueno ‘good’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monosemic-polysemic pole</th>
<th>Metonymical pole</th>
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If acceptance is only used as a hedge, the rhetorical strategy tends to develop an argument that is opposed to the alleged acceptance. This is the reason why the semantic alternatives pointed out by Hansen (see section 1.1) cannot account for the entirety of the semantics of this discourse marker. The same holds for Travis’ (2005:76-123) assumption that the polysemy of bueno is simply founded on acceptance. Both authors reduce the bicephalous, dialectic, and possibly contradictory semantics of discourse markers to a single faced meaning that could be described in terms of monosemy, polysemy or homonymy. Many discourse markers display a polar type of semantics where one semantic pole is based on relations that can indeed be described with these terms, but this pole interplays with a second pole loaded by the rhetorical goals the unit is used for in discourse. As the dialectic relation of both poles is crucial for the specific type of discourse progression, we cannot simply conflate them into a simple, non-dialectic meaning. As with Engl. well, Sp. bueno is not
simply monosemic, polysemic or homonymous. From the point of view of discourse function, only the anaphoric component can be directly related to the basic meaning of the adjective *bueno*. We might even argue that the acceptance-component is not really polysemic but monosemic, insofar as 'acceptance' is the direct transposition of 'good' to a specific function in discourse. This is the reason why in Figure 1 the "monosemic-polysemic" ambiguity of *bueno* is maintained.

The anaphoric meaning of *bueno* (left face) is related by syntactic contiguity to the second argument or 'right face' (cf. Kern 2010:11; Ferrari and Ricci 2011). Thus *bueno* is situated in a position in discourse that is highly sensitive for metonymy, especially because the contiguity is directly relevant for communication. In those cases where native speakers describe *bueno* as a 'marker of contraposition', the contiguity has apparently produced a metonymical meaning that stands in strong contrast to the basic function of acceptance. In this case, the second pole would have effectively contaminated the first pole, producing a situation of homonymy related to the underlying adjective *bueno*. This is, however, only one of a long series of functions that *bueno* realizes in discourse. Given that not only *bueno*, but almost all discourse markers are used in strategic discourse slots that place them in a situation of contiguity with preceding and following arguments, discourse metonymy should play a crucial role in the semantic and functional development of discourse functions. Schiffrin (1987:103) claims that "conversational coherence proceeds in a pairwise (local) fashion, such that one speaker’s utterance [...] gains coherence through its relation to the immediately prior utterance". She did not observe, however, that in the case of Engl. *well* the anaphoric relation is indeed motivated.

Interestingly, this type of metonymy does not exactly correspond to the classic type of lexical metonymy. In fact, the motivation is not only based on the contiguity of discourse elements, but on a *rhetorical intention* of the speaker. The speaker uses the apparent acceptance as a rhetorical starting point to sell her/his own different arguments. Thus, there is not only the cognitive insight stimulated by contiguity, as in *glasses*, 'objects made of a hard and transparent material called *glass* and *glasses*2 'two lenses in a frame that support sight', but also an intentional human behavior which uses acceptance to facilitate the own (contra)argumentation. In addition, the conceptual meanings of reservation, divergence or contraposition are not placed on the polysemic anaphoric side of the discourse function. In most cases, *bueno* is not reinterpreted (or 'contaminated') metonymically, but combines both the anaphoric function of acceptance and the cataphoric function of (deviant) elaboration. It is therefore not appropriate to conflate acceptance, reservation, divergence and contraposition in one concept and to thus conclude homonymy. In a certain sense, *bueno* is both anaphorically polysemic (or monosemic) and cataphorically homonymous. Hence, its discourse function is bicephalous in nature, and the relatedness of polysemy and homonymy is not only based on contiguity, but also on rhetorical strategies. This is the reason why Schiffrin, who focuses only on the cataphorical discursive objectives, assumes the complete loss of semantic and functional motivation in the analogous case of Engl. *well* (see quotation in section 2). By the end of her book, Schiffrin (1987:314) mitigates her point of view: "At the same time that this account was beginning to make sense to me, however, I realized that I
also had to account for the fact that many of the expressions being examined were not themselves void of their own linguistic properties. Except for *oh* and *well*, for example, all the markers I have described have meanings”.

The fact that many discourse markers are used to connect arguments converts the contiguity of arguments in discourse into a major feature for discourse construction and a possible source for the development of metonymy. Without referring to discourse markers, Kern (2010) stresses the role of metonymy for discourse. She defines metonymy as ‘the simultaneous activation of two related concepts with one word’. Again, in the case of discourse markers like *bueno*, the relation is created in discourse by the speaker, since the contiguity of two contradictory arguments is not *conceptually* given by the meaning of *bueno*, as in the case of *glasses*, but rather created by the speaker through the inherent contiguity of discourse. The dialectic relation of a concept with its contrary is an extreme case of contiguity, insofar as antonymy concerns cognitively related concepts, but can hardly be used for direct conceptual motivation. The rhetorical nature of metonymy in discourse is also the reason why extreme cases like the coexistence of ‘acceptance’ and ‘contraposition’ in the polysemy of *bueno* are possible. Thus while *lexical metonymy* could hardly join antonymic concepts (see Barcelona 2011), *rhetorical metonymy* even favors it, since the strategy to use acceptance in order to express refusal, seems to be quite natural. Koch indeed defends a broad definition of *metonymy* that includes all relations in a *frame* or *script* (2008:171-172, 190; cf. the general considerations in Koch 2001, 2004; Nerlich 2010; Herrero Ruiz 2011 analyzes the role of conceptual metonymy in rhetorical constructions). Obviously, metonymy may develop diachronically to *homonymy*. However, in the case of discourse markers there seems to be a strong tendency to maintain the initial motivation, if it is rhetorically useful.


4. Polyfunctionality

4.1. What is polyfunctionality?

The words *polyfunctionality* and *multifunctionality* are widespread in studies on discourse markers (examples for Spanish are Casado Velarde (1993:38-41) and Landon (2009:99-108); see also Cuenca’s (2008) study of Eng. *well* and its equivalents in Catalan and Spanish). These words generally refer to the different functions of discourse markers, as shown in Table 1. This is the reason why Travis (2005:3) writes: “the multifunctionality of discourse markers has been widely discussed”, which
apparently provides her good arguments to concentrate her analysis on conceptual polysemy. Nevertheless, as far as I can see, no explicit and methodologically operational definition of the term *polyfunctionality* has yet been suggested. Its use is entirely based on intuitive evidence. Traugott (2010:104-105), for example, provides no definition in her chapter titled “Polyfunctionality”. Aijmer / Simon-Vandenbergen (eds.) (2006) announce in their introduction that they shall specify their position “with regard to multifunctionality, polysemy and core meaning”, but no definition of *multifunctionality* can be found. In a chapter named “The multifunctionality of discourse markers”, Hansen (1998a:238-243) reduces the phenomena to monosemy, polysemy, homonymy, as well as their inferential side-effects (see also Fischer (2006: 12-14), Cuenca (2008: 1381), Langacker (2011): cf. Radden and Panther’s (2004, 2011) typology of motivation). This means that the term *function* is interpreted in terms of conceptual semantics plus, in case, contextual inferences. Now, traditional grammar shows that it is useful to distinguish the conceptual meaning of a word like *woman* from its functional properties determined by its word class and its effective function in syntax, for instance as a subject. The fact that Sp. *claro* ‘clear’ is an adjective belongs to the motivated facets of its functions in discourse. Linguistic analysis of discourse should separate the conceptual motivation of *claro, bueno*, etc. from their functional motivation when analyzing their usage as discourse markers.

I propose to define the term *polyfunctionality* in exactly the same way as we define *polysemy*. In this sense, *polyfunctionality* refers to related functions that are vertically motivated by an underlying basic linguistic unit and/or horizontally motivated between derived functions, in analogy with *polysemy* which denotes a network of motivated semantic (conceptual) relations. The underlying basic functions are categorial in nature, since they emerge from properties of word classes, such as adjectives, or syntactic functions, like prepositional phrases or verb forms (e.g. the imperative Sp. *¡mira!* ‘look’, which is used as a parenthetical discourse marker).

In fact, functional categorial properties of the basic word class are as important as the conceptual properties. When we use *claro*, we say that an argument is clear. This means that the semantic properties of *claro* are directed to units of discourse, just as the adnominal adjective in *el agua clara* ‘the clear water’ directs its semantic features to the noun *agua*. In both cases, *claro* uses the modifying properties of its word class. Another frequent discourse marker in Spanish is *entonces*. *Entonces* does not display any features that can be related to modifying attributive functions. The clear reason for this is its provenance from an adverb of time which metaphorically transmits its temporal function ‘then, afterwards’, to the logical causal-consecutive discourse function ‘therefore, then’. Another highly frequent Spanish discourse marker is *o sea* (‘that is to say’; literally: ‘or may be’). This marker is not based on a word class but on the syntactic function of a (complementizer) phrase functionally dominated by its head, that is, the conjunction *o* ‘or’. The discourse functions of *o sea* are still motivated by the basic function of *o*, as this connector introduces an alternative. Other examples are parenthetically used verb forms like *vale* ‘ok’, *mira* ‘look’, *digamos* ‘let’s say’ (see Schneider 2007). Neither *entonces* nor *o sea* nor the verb forms display any discourse function that we might characterize as attributional modification, as it is instead the case for the adjective-based discourse markers *claro,*
Polyfunctionality, polysemy, and rhetorical strategy

bueno, cierto, fijo, etc. This means that the underlying functional relations motivate and restrict the discourse functions.

Interestingly, in contrast to current studies on polysemy in discourse, Schiffrin (1987) takes care to refer to both underlying conceptual and functional motivation. In the passages quoted above, she alludes to "linguistic properties" in general or to the underlying "semantic meaning or grammatical status" of the units. In her contribution to Fischer's volume dedicated to polysemy and polyfunctionality, Schiffrin (2006:317) is one of two authors who try to clearly separate meaning from function. The other author is Frank-Job (2006:360), who distinguishes lexical and propositional meaning from grammatical meaning and pragmatic meaning. This approach shows, however, that the basic terms of meaning and function are used with different intentions as well, since for Frank-Job meaning includes function insofar as grammatical meaning, and even pragmatic meaning, are often considered as functions (see also Fraser in section 2). The problem is that meaning is often intensionally understood as conceptual meaning, whereas it may also be interpreted as the entire content of a linguistic unit, which includes function (cf. Blakemore 2004:223). In order to avoid this ambiguity, I use the terms concept and conceptual for what is traditionally called lexical meaning, and function for the mechanisms of integration into discourse. In sum, there seems to be a need for a thorough discussion not only on polysemy and polyfunctionality, but also on still more basic terms like meaning and function in discourse analysis (see Hummel forthc.).

From a diachronic perspective, we can assume that the genesis of discourse functions is strongly shaped by the functional properties of the category from which they emerge. In synchrony, the underlying functional motivation may play a secondary role if compared to the main goals of rhetorical strategies, and it may bleach diachronically, as a possible consequence of such strategies. Yet, cases like entonces, o sea or digamos show that discourse markers do not behave in a random way in synchrony since they diachronically emerged from specific categorial functions (cf. Waltereit and Detges 2007:64). As in the case of polysemy, they may have suffered semantic or functional bleaching with regard to the underlying unit. Consequently, the existence or persistence of semantic and functional motivations in synchrony is an empirical issue that has to be answered with linguistic data.

4.2. Some reflections on the sources of polyfunctionality (and polysemy)

Following the general tendency in linguistics to explain less explicit constructions as reductions of (generatively) underlying fully explicit constructions, using terms like 'ellipsis', 'to drop', and 'to delete', discourse markers are sometimes analyzed as reduced constructions. I have elsewhere discussed the fundamental problem of explaining typically oral constructions by processes of reduction based on more explicit constructions that belong to normative literacy, as if literacy had diachronically preceded orality (cf. Hummel 2012). In this tradition, the paraphrase está claro que 'it is clear that' has sometimes been suggested as the genetic basis of the independently used discourse marker claro (e.g. Ocampo 2006, among other authors). However, this
analysis overlooks that *está claro que* can only account for the cataphorical scope. The parenthetical discourse marker *claro* allows for both anaphoric and cataphorical scope, as shown by the following example:

(7) G: [...] me están saluda: ndo, siempre andan preguntando como estoy cómo me ha ido, y así claro, se preocupan por mí, *claro* (Graciela, 152)

G: they always say hello to me, always ask how I am, how I’ve been doing, and *of course* that means they care about me, *clearly*

The fully explicit paraphrase *está claro que* cannot be the genetic basis of both functions. Also, there is not even a single example of its use in Kluge’s corpus of spoken Chilean Spanish, despite the fact that *claro* itself occurs 152 times.\(^8\) Given that *claro* is functionally motivated by an adjective that is a modifying unit, I do not see any necessity to invent a fully explicit copula construction in order to explain its functions in discourse. I would rather argue that *está claro que* is a fully explicit construction that we prefer in literacy, where parenthetical discourse markers are usually avoided. In general terms, the functional and conceptual basis of *claro*, *digamos*, *o sea*, etc. is a sufficient starting point for the development of discourse functions. Speakers are obviously free to reinforce the intended inferential effects by means of explicitation (e.g. *pero claro*). Constructions like *está claro que* or *está claro* are alternatives that may be used in some contexts, but their frequency in spontaneous oral communication lies far behind that of parenthetical *claro*. In contrast to informal orality, literacy goes hand in hand with the requirement of explicitation. Consequently, explicit constructions are generally preferred, since they usually provide communication between speakers who do not know each other and do not share the same context of situation, not to speak of the normative requirement to use complete sentences. It is misleading, however, to consider this type of construction as a genetic basis of independently used discourse markers.

But how can a single functional basis account for a polyfunctional linguistic reality in discourse? It is important to note that fully explicit constructions cannot account for polyfunctionality. Copula constructions are unambiguous and tend to activate the basic meaning of the adjective. *Está claro que* has a unique cataphorical scope and activates the evidential concept of the adjective *claro*. Unlike parenthetical *claro*, the explicit paraphrase is not open for contrargumentation. The case of *bueno* is even more striking. As with *Engl. good/well*, *bueno* tends to introduce a deviant argument, but the paraphrase *está bueno que* entails the activation of the basic meaning of acceptance (cf. *Engl. that’s good/ok*). As a matter of fact, syntactic integration and full semantic explicitness act against the development of polyfunctionality. Consequently, syntactic independence marked by parenthetical pauses and/or intonation has to be considered an important source for polyfunctionality. In fact, parenthetical constructions easily stimulate or trigger inferential interpretations. This is exactly what we observe with oral discourse markers. A second source is syntactic dislocation, that is, changes of position. As shown in section 2, syntactic slots for answers in discourse are strongly marked. A long series of units are automatically

\(^8\)Oral data of Catalan display a similar situation for *(és) clar (que)* (Cuenca / Marín 2012).
adapted to this function by the simple fact of their entering this ‘local’ position in the syntax of discourse. Similarly, in the Romance languages anteposition is a major feature for the development of subjectivity in discourse. Consequently, many discourse markers are located before an argument, even if they semantically refer to preceding arguments. Bueno as a marker of contraposition can only be found in first position. This does not exclude other positions, as the use of discourse markers displays a playful variety. To give an example, Sp. incluso usually occurs in first position, as in incluso me lo ha dicho ‘He / she has even told me’, but it may be emphatically used in final position, where it is marked by prosody (pause + emphatic intonation): Me lo ha dicho, INCLUSO. In addition, we have already seen in section 1 that syntactic dislocation may secondarily develop polysemy, as in una mujer grande vs. una gran mujer. Hence, I claim that polyfunctionality is an important source for polysemy.

In general terms, we can say that syntactic dislocation in discourse and parenthetical prosody are necessary to unblock the inferential potential which we need in order to explain the genesis of polysemy and polyfunctionality (cf. Martín Zorraquino 2010:172, and, for general aspects of parentheticals, Blakemore 2006). Está claro que va a venir ‘It is clear that he will come’ does not offer the slightest inferential potential, with the self-explanatory exception of irony. Hence functional features of syntax are responsible for the development of polysemy. In Romance, pre-modifying positions tend to be marked for subjectivity (subjective inferences), and parenthetical prosody is the starting point for contextual inference that may lead to lexicalized polyfunctionality and polysemy. According to Company Company’s pioneering reflections (2006:99), “there exists quite a transparent inverse correlation between the quantity of syntax a form needs and the degree of subjective meaning that the form conveys: more syntax = less subjectivity, and, on the contrary, less or even zero syntax = more subjectivity. [...] Subjectification and syntactic isolation go hand in hand”.

In contrast to the occasional inferential effects of non-intended syntactic ambiguity (cf. Waltereit 1999), anteposition and parenthetical prosody are overt marks that are intentionally used by the speaker, in order to invite the hearer to infer a subjective reading in a given context. This seems to be an important point, since language change is sometimes explained as a consequence of divergent reanalysis by the hearers. At least in the case we focus on here, the basic process in synchrony seems to be of the interactional type, that is, it involves both the speaker’s creativity to suggest, and the hearer’s creativity to choose his interpretation. The fact that polyfunctionality and polysemy are intimately related with syntactic dislocation, prosodic marks, etc. shows that we should not overlook the speaker’s creativity.

A second point is that diachronic studies often argue in terms of ‘gradient erosion’ (‘lessening’ / ‘weakening’) of underlying prior semantic and functional properties (cf. Company Company 2006:99). If we take a look at productive polyfunctional expansion, we see that, instead of displaying gradient sliding of function and meaning, we should instead assume the coexistence of discrete variants in synchrony. Thus parenthetical adjectives transmit subjective attitudes or even causal relations (Cansada, la chica se durmió ‘the girl fell asleep because she was tired’). There may
be a variety of subjective readings by the hearer, but the utterance clearly appeals to the hearer to infer such a reading. The following example reflects real usage of parenthetical adjectives in spoken Chilean Spanish:

(8) S: y:.. cuando me dieron el alta: -/ .. horrible .. porque ehataba tan débil dehpués de tanto tiempo hospitalizada .. porque me-, me (he hecho) una infección .. terrible (Sandra, 716)

S: and: .. when I was discharged: -/ .. it was horrible .. because I felt so weak after so much time in the hospital .. because I got an infection .. it was terrible

The first case, horrible 'horrible', conveys a subjective evaluation of the circumstances of the related facts, with the scope being rather radial than simply anaphoric or cataphorical. The second case, terrible 'terrible', is slightly ambiguous with respect to its scope, since it probably expresses an emphatic evaluation of the noun infección, that is, it is an emphatically reinforced adnominal adjective, but it would also allow for an extended interpretation of its scope, as in the case of horrible. This means that parenthetical prosody is a rather clear formal mark that allows for either clear or ambiguous interpretations, according to the context. But is the possibility of ambiguous interpretation really a matter of gradience? Does the interpretation gradually move from an original one to a developed one? Neither ambiguity as such, nor disambiguation by context or by the hearer's choice of a single inference are gradient. From my point of view, gradience does not hold for the production and interpretation of utterances in synchrony, but must be relegated to the diachronic process of lexicalization. As a matter of fact, the Spanish discourse marker bueno discretely coexists with its adjectival functions, although the former prevails in terms of frequency in oral discourse. In cases like Sp. curiosamente 'curiously', the basic meaning 'with curiosity' has become so marginal in terms of frequency that probability induces us to try first the lexicalized meaning 'it seems strange to me that', even in postverbal position that is not marked for this interpretation. This is indeed a gradient phenomenon, since probability depends on the hearer's experience, that is, the sum of all the occurrences of curiosamente he / she has heard. Hence, we suggest to argue in terms of competing variants in synchrony that are discrete rather than gradient, and in terms of gradient lexicalization when diachrony prefers and finally selects a variant. Obviously, lexicalization goes hand in hand with further semantic or functional specification.

5. Synchrony, diachrony, and the role of conversational implicatures

The synchronically interrelated concepts of polysemy, polyfunctionality, and rhetorical strategy have to be related to diachrony. Waltereit (2006b:149) explains a type of semantic change, by which the original meaning of discourse markers is 'contaminated' by the final function in discourse, in terms of conversational implicatures. Later, Waltereit relates this analysis to Levinson's general hypothesis of
local “particularized conversational implicatures”, which are subsequently developed
to “generalized conversational implicatures” and converted to inherent semantic
meaning (Levinson 2000; Hansen and Waltereit 2006, 2009; cf. Blakemore 2004:222-
227; Company Company 2006:101). This would clearly be the case for Sp. bueno as a
marker of contraposition. In contrast to classic examples of implicatures that
productively implicate whole speech acts in specific contexts, in the case of discourse
markers implicatures turn out to be a lexicalized property of a single unit, entering its
conceptual semantics. This force cannot be subordinated to the ’cooperative’ general
maxims suggested by Grice (1975), since conflict, contradiction, incoherence, and
tentative formulations play an important role. Instead of reformulating these maxims
(cf. Traugott 2010:101), I simply suggest that the functions or goals of a unit in dis-
course be considered. Furthermore, once lexicalized, determination by context plays a
secondary role. Context is subordinated to the strategic force conveyed by the unit
itself, which is used to construct discourse.

Inference certainly is an important point for the semantics and pragmatics of
discourse markers, especially in informal spoken language. To give an example for
metonymical inference, recapitulating discourse markers such as in sum may be used
with conclusive-consecutive finality (cf. Ferrari and Ricci 2011). This is so because
recapitulation and conclusion entail an intimate metonymical relation. In ‘good’
written texts, the contiguous parts of this relation are explicitly separated, as in (9),
where both to sum up and consequently are used:

(9) To sum up, PCIs are foregrounded elements of the message and GCI are
backgrounded ones. Consequently, GCI status as such seems to be an
obstacle to semanticization, rather than leading to it (Hansen and
Waltereit 2006:5; my italics)

Typical oral discourse markers like Sp. total tend to play with both parts of the meto-
nyrical relation, up to the point that it is almost impossible to decide what it exactly
means in a given context:

(10) S: si tienen loh medioh .. como para trabajar aunque sea para vivIR/ ..
vestirsE: .. y total, de a poquito aunque sea dificil de ahorrar algo como
para tener algo .. que se queden ... que no se vengan porque santiago
es una porqueria una- .. un un diría con ojo cerrado (Sandra, 1476)

S: if they manage .. to work there, even if it’s only just to get by / .. to
put clothes on their backs .. and so little by little save some money, even
if it’s difficult, just to have something .. they should stay there ... they
should not come to santiago, which is a dreadful place , a- ... I would say
this word with my eyes closed.

We might even say that the attempt to interpret the utterance meaning of total accor-
ding to the traditional model total ‘consequently’ is itself misleading, since we project
an idea of strongly specified meaning that holds for fully explicit, rationally
constructed texts, into tentative oral construction of discourse. By contrast, the oral
colloquial meaning seems to include the entire inferential frame:
This dialectic analysis of the semantics of *total* shows why linguists often disagree on the monosemic or polysemic nature of a discourse marker’s meaning. In fact, conflating the left and the right face, we would rather have to argue in favor of polysemy, especially because in this case the concepts of summary, conclusion and consequence are intimately related. However, the separation of the left face motivated by the underlying features of *total* from the right face ‘motivated’ by discourse function matches better with the usage of this unity. In this analysis, the left side can be described as monosemic without running the risk of simplification.

Inside its polyfunctionality, *total* has developed the variant *total que* ‘so that’ which exclusively highlights the conclusive part:

(11)  *Total que*, como tú bien decías, no pude conseguir el préstamo.
(Vázquez Veiga 1994-1995:360)
  So, as you were rightly saying, I wasn’t able to get the loan.

(12)  JOA: *total que* al final me tenga que acabar subiendo tu ordenador / hhh a mi casa (Cresti and Moneglia 2005, etelef08)
  JOA: so as it turns out, I will have to take your computer / hhh up to my house

(13)  Tú sabes que yo... trabajo, estudiaba en la Escuela, estaba embarazada...
  ... y atendía la casa... *total que* no... a mí no me quedaba tiempo de...
  de estudiar aquí [...] (Davies, habla culta, Caracas)
  You know .. I am working, I studied at school, I was pregnant ... and I took care of the house ... *up to the point that* ... I didn’t have any time left to study here [...]  

We may even say that it has developed into a subordinating conjunction that should better be written *total que*, if we wanted to reflect oral prosody. This variant coexists with the parenthetical variant in (10). In this case, discourse function, that is, the...
right face, has definitively ‘contaminated’ and changed the initial meaning and function of total, but only for one function inside its polysemic polyfunctionality.

An example for metaphorical inference is Sp. entonces, as the meanings of temporal sequence’ and ‘logic consequence’ are metaphorically related. In each of its occurrences in (14), it is impossible to disambiguate entonces to one meaning only:

(14) M: también de asesoría.. sí, ella=hacía(n) cuatro añoah que trabajaba acá y andaba de vacacioneh .. entonces jUstO se enfermó mi hermanito .. y; Ella, áh .. le faltaban diez para (entrar) su, vacacione/ .. pero, dijo no importa yo me voy ante .. para; .. y-, traerme a mi con; .. con mi hermanito ... y se vino, y llegamo a la casa .. a todo ehto internamoh a mi hermano .. en-en; el hospital de neurocirugía .. lo dejamo ahi .. y; noh fuimo a la ca:sa .. de: su trabajo ... y; la señora se alegró mucho y entonces, le dijo a ella y: .. que YO venía también para trabajar y le contamos que, todo=el- .. áh_; lo que habiamoh=hecho ante .. de, llevar a ehte niño al hospital y=todo .. y; que yo, me quedaba para trabajar .. entonces ella se alegró porque: ..ah, un Hijo de=Ella, necesitaba una: .. niñera, y lo llamaron al tiro .. entonces me fueron a ver al tiro en la tarde .. y; y yo ehtaba contenta porque ((más rápido)) ya: iba=a empezar a trabajar al tiro=p + ...(l) y me iba=a quedAR ... en una parte segura .. para ver a mi hermano .. y; .. y; para ir lo ver (y le hacer co:sa) y todo=eso .. y juhto=el-, áh, mi patrón era pediatra .. (Marta, 411)

M: also as a consultant .. yes, she had been working there for four years and was about to go on vacation .. and this was exactly the moment when my little brother got sick .. and; she still had to work ten days before she could take her vacation / .. but she said it doesn’t matter, I’ll leave before .. with my little brother .. and she came, and we arrived at home .. meanwhile we took my brother to the neurosurgery hospital .. we left him there .. and went home .. where she was working .. and the señora felt very happy, and then said to her .. that I could work there too and we told her all we had done before .. that we had taken the child to the hospital and all that .. and that I wanted to stay for work .. then she was glad to hear it because one of her sons needed a babysitter, and they called him right away .. then they came to see me the same evening .. and, and I was happy because ((faster)) I could start working right then, ..(1) and I could stay ... in a safe place .. could see my brother .. and: ... and: go to see him, (do things for him), and all that .. and, precisely, my boss was a pediatrician

Again, informal orality conserves the ambiguity, which may even be considered economic in spontaneously constructed discourse. Furthermore, entonces could eventually be considered a case of Generalized Conversational Implicatures, since the meaning of ‘logic consequence’ prevails in oral conversation (see section 6). The fact that speakers often use the marked variant ‘en ese / aquel entonces ‘at that time’ in order to express the traditional meaning of the time adverb demonstrates that the GCI interpretation is the default in oral communication (cf. Hansen and Waltereit
Similar cases in other languages suggest a widespread or even universal cognitive evidence of this type of temporal-logical polysemy. Similar examples can easily be found, for example Ger. *nachdem* 'afterwards' / 'since (cause)', Engl. *since* 'from that time on' / 'because' (cf. Sweetser 1990:76-86), Sp. *pues* and Port. *pois* 'afterwards' / 'because' (cf. de Lima 2002), etc. Although Schiffrin (1987:228-266) dedicates her effort to a clear separation of the adverbial functions of Engl. *now* and *then* from their functions in discourse, she recognizes in these cases the relevance of their basic time-deictic meaning for the discourse functions.

6. Theoretical simplification

As we have seen in 3.1. and 4.1, studies on discourse markers display a rather vague or undifferentiated usage of linguistic terms like meaning, function and polysemy, although differentiated analyses and definitions are available in semantic and grammatical theory. In the following, I show that specialized studies often use simplified visions of other domains of linguistics in order to solve their own problems. This means that these problems are not adequately solved. As a consequence, the explanatory value of specialized research may be seriously compromised.

6.1. Polysemy and word class

Lipka (1986:130-131) suggests that Engl. *can* 'jug, pot' and *to can* 'to put into a can' be considered as homonyms because the first is a noun and the second a verb. He implicitly assumes that verbs and nouns are clearly different, that is, he uses a simplified analysis or idea of grammar, in order to solve the problem he finds while trying to get a differentiated account of the words' semantic properties. Authors specializing in the analysis of word classes would not subscribe to this. Croft (1990:13) stipulates that "[t]he main problematic categories for cross-linguistic identification are the fundamental grammatical categories: noun, verb and adjective, subject and object, head and modifier [...]". Lipka is only interested in solving his semantic-conceptual problems, and therefore recurs to a common-place view of word classes. This could be avoided by a systematic analysis of the interfaces. Lipka disregards that the relation of verb and noun belongs to polyfunctionality. Changes in word-class may indeed affect conceptual polysemy. Yet, polysemy itself has to be formulated in conceptual terms, not in terms of polyfunctionality, since the polyfunctionality may or not develop polysemy. To give an example, if we assume that nouns denote objects while verbs denote events, the transposition $N \rightarrow V$ presents the basic concept of $N$ in terms of an event. This affects in a grammatical, that is, rule-guided way, the relation between the two concepts. If the transposition does not affect the concept, as it is often the case for $\text{ADJ} \rightarrow \text{ADV}$, we cannot say, in a simplistic manner, that the alleged change of word-class automatically provides evidence for polysemy. Hence, we need a differentiated analysis of the interfaces between polysemy and polyfunctionality, or, in more general terms, between meaning and function. In this sense, the terms polysemy and polyfunctionality offer clear methodological advantages over one-sided types of analysis.
6.2. Polyfunctionality and syntactic homonymy

The theoretical and methodological advantages of the polyfunctionality-polysemy distinction exceed the domain of discourse functions. Polyfunctionality and polysemy should indeed also be considered together for basic syntactic phenomena like word order in phrases. Dislocating *grande* from its basic post-modifying position in *una mujer grande* 'a tall woman' to the pre-modifying position in *una gran mujer* 'a woman (I consider) important', we do not only create polyfunctionality but stimulate polysemy. In this case, pre-modifying Spanish adjectives systematically mark a subjective point of view, that is, create polyfunctionality, and produce, in some cases, polysemy. The fact that lexicalized polysemy only occurs in some cases provides further evidence for the fact that polysemy follows polyfunctionality.

Many authors assume functional homonymy in syntax.⁹ According to this assumption, both positions of Sp. *grande* would be syntactically homonymous, that is, functionally unrelated and unmotivated. In other terms, their function is believed to be fully determined by syntax. Consequently, syntactic analysis turns out to be independent from other types of relation. The inclusion of the concept of polyfunctionality into traditional syntax defies the assumption of functional homonymy.

To my knowledge, in the theories of syntax, syntactic homonymy has never been explicitly anchored and empirically supported. I thus suppose that this is so simply because this term permits the reduction of the analysis to syntax only, which is the focus of interest. As a result, the interrelatedness of syntactic functions and semantic concepts in the series of slots occupied by the same unit is ignored. In our example, the markedness of the pre-modifying position is related to the unmarked post-modifying one; the modifying properties of *grande* belong to its word class (ADJ); and the conceptual meaning is shared by both positions, being adapted to them. Relegating word class and conceptual meaning to "the lexicon" would not be a solution since this assumption cannot account for the development of the polysemy of *grande* which is marked by the pre- or post-modifying position. Finally, simplistic visions of word classes are also called into question. We can indeed ask ourselves if the traditional analysis of *bastante grande* (an adjective-modifying adverb), *bastante bien* (adverb-modifying adverb), *bastantes casas* (noun-modifying adjective), *hablar bastante* (verb-modifying adverb) in terms of word classes (*bastante* is said to be either an adjective or an adverb) should not be replaced by a polyfunctional view that is more flexible either with regard to both word class and syntactic function.

7. Conclusion

This paper has modified preexisting definitions of *polysemy* that have been used for the analysis of discourse functions, and an analogous definition of *polyfunctionality* has been suggested. While *polysemy* aims at motivated conceptual networks, *poly-
functionality does the same for functional relations. As the occupation of a new slot in the syntax of discourse often generates new functions and new meanings, I have argued that polyfunctionality tends to drive polysemy. Subsequent research could theoretically and empirically relate polyfunctionality to the term procedural meaning suggested by Blakemore (1987:144, 2002:89-148). As we have seen, the procedural meaning of discourse markers can be better described and understood, if its possible relation to underlying grammatical functions of the basic unit is taken into account and combined with the rhetorical goals it is used for. The specific procedural meaning of bueno depends not only on the rhetorical goals but also on its motivation. In this case, the motivation structure is responsible for the fact that bueno is a rather defensive rhetorical device to introduce a dissident view, since this view is previously mitigated by the (alleged) acceptance of what has been argued before. The clear distinction of polysemy and polyfunctionality could be useful for the discussion of conceptual and procedural features of discourse markers. In more general terms, it would allow for a differentiated analysis of syntax, since the tacit assumption of syntactic homonymy does not seem to be an accurate base for cases in which the same unit is used with different functions. Hence, the theoretical and methodological interest of this paper exceeds the domain of discourse markers.

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