6.1 A first basic subdivision
If we look at the RPCs in section 4.4 and take into account their deictic orientation, the mood of the verb and the sentence type (declarative, imperative, interrogative), we are able to make a first rough subdivision (cf. also Brown & Levinson 1978, 1987; Holmes 1984; Koch & Österreicher 1990: 51-72; Andersen 1996: 314, 1997: 147), which is summarized in the following table:

As can be seen from the table, some RPCs downgrade speaker commitment, i.e., they are mitigating RPCs, while others function as phatic or as reporting devices. There are three ways in which the downgrading of speaker commitment can be accomplished: by alleviating responsibility, by removing responsibility, and by sharing responsibility. The RPCs with verbs in the first person singular of the present indicative focus on the speaker. With respect to sentence types, they are all declaratives. With them the speaker directly reduces his or her burden of responsibility, that is, they are responsibility alleviating devices.

With the exception of the forms in the second person, most of the RPCs whose deictic centers lie outside the unmarked ego, hic, nunc center have the purpose of shifting the burden of responsibility away from the speaker, that is, they are responsibility removing devices. This is also true of the verbs in the first person singular of the conditional form (e.g., Fr. je dirais) because they make the
truth of the utterance (and the responsibility of the speaker) dependent on implicit external circumstances (*If q, I'd say p*). Some clauses are based on verbs that are in the first person plural of the imperative (e.g., Fr. *disons*). They remove responsibility, since the statement is presented as if it had been requested or called for, and at the same time they explicitly include the addressee and thus divide the responsibility between speaker and addressee, i.e., they are also responsibility dividing devices.

The deictic centers of reporting RPCs also lie outside the unmarked *ego, hic, nunc* center (e.g., It. *ho detto*). As I will point out in section 6.6, reported statements do not actually reflect the judgment of the speaker and hence are outside the realm of speaker commitment. That is why I prefer to treat reporting parentheticals as a separate group not connected to mitigation.

The RPCs with verbs in the second person are directed towards the addressee. They may be either declaratives (e.g., Fr. *dites-vous, vous savez*), imperatives (e.g., It. *figurati*35, Sp. *fijate*) or interrogatives (e.g., Fr. *voyez-vous, Fr. vous savez*36). The declaratives distribute responsibility to both speaker and addressee. The imperatives and interrogatives mostly have a phatic function, i.e., they are signals by which the speaker invites the addressee to cooperate and controls and maintains the effectiveness of communication (see Koch & Österreicher 1990: 57f.). They do not modify the speaker's responsibility.

The subdivision is, admittedly, approximative; however, the differentiation between these three ways of reducing speaker responsibility is useful and will represent an important reference point for the discussion of the pragmatic functions of RPCs in this chapter. The criteria in table 6.1 also permit me to isolate the RPCs with purely phatic function from those operating on the responsibility of the speaker, which constitute the main subject of this book.

I wish to draw attention to the fact that in my understanding, the phatic function is limited to invitations to cooperate and to the maintenance of the effectiveness of communication. However, there are researchers who prefer a broader definition of this function. E.g., Koch & Österreicher (1990: 57f.) and Bazzanella (2001: 236ff., 253ff.) do not distinguish between declarative and interrogative parenthetical Fr. *tu sais*, It. *sai*, and Sp. *sabes* and classify both as phatic signals (German *Kontaktignale* or It. *Fatismi*) that establish and maintain the communicative contact. Bazzanella (2001: 236) defines the phatic function as follows:

> Alcuni segnali discorsivi sottolineano l'aspetto fàtico, cioè di "coesione sociale", intesa come strumento per creare, consolidare o evidenziare l'appartenenza di un individuo ad

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35 In the case of It. *figurati*, the invitation to imagine a state of affairs may imply the conclusion that this state of affairs cannot possibly exist (see Devoto & Oli 2000: 814; Zingarelli 2000: 703).
36 In those corpora with punctuation marks, imperative RPCs are transcribed with or without exclamation marks, depending on the type of the host sentence:
   (i) `<H5>` Pareces humorista ¡qué bien lo haces esto, oye! (COREC.CLU/D025B)
   (ii) `<H2>` Se lo digo a Paula, oye. (COREC.ACON006C)

Interrogative RPCs are transcribed mostly with question marks. In tables 4.2-4.4, I did not punctuate the verbs. This means, of course, that some of them, e.g., Fr. *vous savez*, actually consist of two forms, a declarative and an interrogative.
un gruppo.

And regarding the function of It. capisci, sai, come sai, lo sapete, etc. she writes (2001: 237):

Fanno parte di questo gruppo anche i segnali discorsivi che sottolineano la "conoscenza condivisa", cioè l'insieme di conoscenze comuni al parlante in corso e agli interlocutori [...].

Aijmer (2002: 48) has an even broader understanding of the phatic function and defines Engl. I think as phatic connective with an evidential meaning. I prefer to treat declarative sai, and Fr. vous savez, etc., which underline shared knowledge, not as phatic but as responsibility dividing device, although I am aware of the fact that one side-effect of the use of declarative sai is to draw the addressee's attention to the utterance that follows (see section 6.5).

RPCs whose primary and exclusive function is phatic are not at the center of this book. I will discuss, however, several RPCs that occasionally, in addition or alternatively to reducing speaker responsibility, may serve as phatic devices (e.g., expressing hesitation, attracting attention). In the following sections, I will define the pragmatic function of each class of RPCs and also the component of the utterance to which it refers. It is obvious that in the case of the phatic parentheticals the distinction between phrastic, tropic, and neustic is not relevant.

6.2 Mitigating the phrastic

The main RPC operating on the propositional content by affecting the appropriateness or precision of the referring term or the predicate in its scope is the imperative Fr. disons (cf. Hölker 1988: 120ff.; Authier-Revuz 1995: 183ff., 650ff.; Morel & Danon-Boileau 1998):

(1) L1 [...] ça faisait partie de ces - disons données culturelles [...] (CHOIX.19.111)

[That was part of these, let's say, cultural data]

It is neither an epistemic verb nor is it in the first or third person singular of the present indicative. For this reason, traditional works on RPCs did not take into account Engl. let's say or comparable Romance expressions.

The function of Fr. disons corresponds closely to those Bazzanella (1994: 162, 2001: 250ff.) and Caffi (2001: 280, 293, 449) found for the Italian equivalent diciamo. Hölker's (2003) detailed analysis dedicated specifically to this verb form in the Italian CLIP corpus confirms their findings. In addition to the uses I mention here, he cites examples where diciamo introduces paraphrases or additional information about a referent. Its Spanish counterpart digamos has a similar function (see Fuentes Rodríguez 1990a; Guillén Sutil 2001: 110; Schneider 2004: 41f.).

Caffi (2001: 448ff.) classifies It. diciamo as a bush operating on predicates, seemingly excluding the possibility that it also operates on referring

terms. However, according to my findings, It. *diciamo* and its French and Spanish equivalents operate very often on referring terms.

With respect to form, Fr. *disons*, It. *diciamo*, and Sp. *digamos* are imperatives in the first person plural. That is, they should have the illocutionary force of proposals, which could be accepted or rejected by the interlocutor. However, their form does not exactly correspond to their function, because in reality the speaker does not propose to say something together with the interlocutor, and the interlocutor cannot accept or reject the speaker's proposal. Yet, by presenting an expression as a proposal, the speaker is able to distance him- or herself from it and to reduce the communicative responsibility that arises from his or her utterance.

With Fr. *disons* and its Italian and Spanish equivalents, the speaker presents a predicate or a referring term as if it were a proposal that is not wholly satisfying neither to him- or herself nor to the interlocutor and that could therefore be improved. They are primarily bushes, but indirectly also hedges (see Hölker 2003: 150), because the speaker, by using a referring expression that is explicitly inappropriate, reduces his or her commitment. They remove responsibility, since the statement is presented as if it were a proposal. Furthermore, they include the addressee and expand the deictic center of the utterance (actantial shield), i.e., they share responsibility with the addressee. Morel & Danon-Boileau (1998) observe that Fr. *disons*, notwithstanding its first person plural form, underlines that it is the speaker who proposes an imperfect formulation. The two authors add:

On peut gloser ainsi sa valeur 'je propose une formulation de compromis pour faire simple'. Le renoncement à une formulation plus appropriée est lié, nous semble-t-il, à l'anticipation d'une incompréhension: 'je pourrais mieux dire, mais en disant mieux je crains de vous perdre, donc je dis moins bien de façon à ce que nous continuions à garder une consensualité'. (Morel & Danon-Boileau 1998: 104)

Occasionally, the referent itself, rather than the referring term in the scope of Fr. *disons*, It. *diciamo*, and Sp. *digamos*, may be deemed vague:

(2) Inf. - [...] eso ha sido durante muchos años … V … el … el modo que el … se ha planteado el matrimonio en España, en Italia, en Francia, en todos los países … desde … hace unos treinta años, *digamos* (HCM.4.69)

[This has been during many years the way how people conceived of marriage in Spain, in Italy, in France, in all countries since about thirty years ago, let's say] In the utterance above (see also Hölker 2003: 138f. for Italian examples), not the relation between the referent and its referring term is deemed inappropriate but the referent itself is vague; this is marked by *unos*. The referring expression hence corresponds to 'some thirty years'. The vagueness of the referent is also marked by *digamos*. It might also happen, although rarely, that Fr. *disons*, It. *diciamo* and Sp. *digamos* by themselves act as markers of vagueness. In example (49), in the preceding chapter, Fr. *disons* has nearly the same meaning as Fr.

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38 See Bazzanella (2002: 244-249) for an analysis of the different meanings of 'we' in relation to its context.
**environ** oder Engl. *about*. In fact, Fuentes Rodríguez (1990a: 105) clearly states that Sp. *digamos* may mean 'approximately':

Su posición puede variar. Intercalado, sirve para precisar un elemento, o una idea. A veces equivale a 'aproximadamente' [...] A veces puede ir al final, como un apoyo también, con valor de 'aproximadamente esto es lo que quiero decir, pero no es lo justo'.

Fr. *disons* may also serve to indicate that the expression in its scope is intended as a hypothesis or an example. The same is true for Sp. *digamos* (see Hölker 2003: 138 for an Italian example of this use):

(3) Inf. - [...] una persona, *digamos* más, más o menos culta ¿eh?, entonces [...] que le guste el arte de la lectura, entonces va a, por ejemplo, una traducción de "Archipiélago Gulag" y ve que es muy mala ¿no? [...] (HCM.17.296)
[A, let's say, more or less educated person, well, who likes reading, well, he sees, for example, a translation of the "Gulag Archipelago" and sees that it is very bad]

So far we have seen Fr. *disons* and its Italian and Spanish equivalents as mere signals of the inappropriateness of an expression. But by saying that an expression is imperfect, the speaker opens up the possibility of re-formulating, expanding or correcting it. In the following Spanish utterance, the referring adjective in the scope of *digamos* is re-formulated immediately afterwards:

(4) Inf. - [...] cuando se trata de obras clásicas, pero adaptadas *digamos*, remozadas. [...] (HCM.6.102)
[When we have to do with classic but adapted, let's say, refreshed pieces]

In the example above, the scope of Sp. *digamos* includes the inappropriate expression, not the reformulation.

However, besides being markers of imprecise or not completely appropriate referring expressions, Fr. *disons* and its Italian and Spanish equivalents may be markers of self-corrections. In the following French example, the reformulation is in the scope of *disons*:

(5) B: [...] on essaie d'élaborer ou ... *disons* d'adapter les enseignements de la Bible à leur niveau [...] (BEECH.15)
[We try to develop or, let's say, to adapt the lesson of the Bible to their level]

The utterance shows that *disons*, besides proposing imperfect terms, may also propose reformulations or self-corrections. It. *diciamo* (see Koch & Österreicher 1990: 62; Bazzanella 1994: 162; Hölker 2003: 141ff.) and Sp. *digamos* may be employed similarly. It is important to note, though, that the reformulation remains a proposal and involves a reduced commitment by the speaker.

Fr. *disons* and its Italian and Spanish equivalents are the phrastic parentheticals that are most frequent and that cover the broadest spectrum of functions. Other parentheticals operating on the phrastic are either less frequent or more
specialized. E.g., Fr. on va dire is limited to the marking of terms not completely appropriate:

(6) L1 [...] une société c'est on va dire sur le plan sociologique c'est une organisation [...] (CRFP.PCR-PRO001)  
[A society, that is, we'll say, on the sociological level, that is an organization]

As Fr. disons, the RPC on va dire removes responsibility in two ways: The statement is presented as if not (only) attributable to the speaker\(^{39}\) and as if only to be said in the near future. Based on Caffi (1999: 869, 2001: 315), we could say that it is a double deictic shield, namely an actantial shield involving the \textit{ego} and an \textit{anticipation} shield involving the \textit{nunc}. Fr. \textit{on dirait}, as an RPC operating on the phrastic or a reporting expression, also removes responsibility twice; by acting on the \textit{ego} and presenting the statement as if it were dependent on implicit external circumstances. Two Spanish parentheticals, diríamos and podríamos decir, may also mark terms not completely appropriate. They, too, are responsibility removing devices that make the truth of the utterance dependent on implicit external circumstances. Furthermore, they include the addressee and thus divide responsibility, i.e., they are actantial shields.

As I have said above, Fr. disons may also indicate that the expression in its scope is intended as an example or a hypothesis. In Italian, to mark an expression as an example, one may also use the second person singular imperative of \textit{porre}:

(7) B: cioè c'è poni lo scaffale di inglesi o scaffale di francesi lo scaffale di italiani _ letterature vocabolari _ così (CLIP.MB4)  
[That is, there's, suppose, the book-shelf for English or the book-shelf for French, the book-shelf for Italian, literature, dictionaries, so]  
\textit{Poni} is exceptional insofar as it is a second person imperative that is not employed as a phatic device. In French, examples or hypothetical terms may be introduced by parenthetical \textit{mettons} (see Dostie 2004: 160f., 178):\(^{40}\)

(8) L1 [...] dans un bateau qui faisait peut-être euh quinze seize mètres \textit{mettons} dix-sept mètres madame de long [...] (CHOIX.32.166)  
[In a boat that was maybe fifteen sixteen, suppose, seventeen meters, madam, long]  

In French conditional clauses introduced by \textit{si}, one may find an additional \textit{mettons} underlining the hypothetical character of the clause. In that case, since \textit{mettons} marks a whole proposition as a possible hypothesis, it becomes a device directly operating on speaker commitment, i.e., on the neustic.

6.3 Indicating the tropic and mitigating the phrastic or neustic

6.3.1 Plain performatives

\(^{39}\) In spoken French, \textit{on} has often the same meaning as \textit{nous} and hence includes the speaker.

\(^{40}\) Besides \textit{diciamo}, Bazzanella (1994: 163) cites the Italian "indicatori di esemplificazione" \textit{facciamo}, \textit{mettiamo} and \textit{prendiamo}. 
In section 5.2, I expressed doubts regarding the parenthetical status of the performatives in (31) - (37). In the corpora I examined, there are, however, some performatives occurring in parenthetical position. All of them meet the conditions outlined in section 4.3. Moreover, according to tests with native speakers, their intonation is like that of other RPCs. Hence, at least from a formal point of view, they are RPCs.

Sp. *insisto* and *repito* appear in only a few utterances. The first one indicates that something is being very firmly said a second time, the second, simply that an utterance is being repeated:

(9)  &lt;H1&gt; [...] va a continuar, *insisto*, en los próximos minutos [...] (COREC.ADEB003A)
[It will continue, I insist, in the next minutes]
(10)  &lt;H2&gt; [...] sobre eso, *repito*, en unos pocos minutos vamos a tener ... pues esta fotografía [...] (COREC.APUB007B)
[About this, I repeat, in a few minutes, we'll have this photo]

Contrary to the clauses cited by Urmson (1952), Engl. *I guarantee* and *I bet*, and Venier (1991), It. *scommetto* and *te lo garantisco*, the parentheticals in the passages above are *saying-and-doing* performatives, that is, they are IFIDs indicating, in combination with other linguistic means, the speech act that is being performed. Note, however, that statements as well as other speech acts can be performed firmly and can thus be marked by Sp. *insisto*, like, e.g., the questions in the following passage:

(11)  &lt;H3&gt; [...] pero *insisto*, ¿cómo serían? ¿tasadas en el tiempo? [...] (COREC.AJUR017A)
[But, I insist, how are they going to be? Taxed according to time?]

Sp. *insisto* and probably also *repito* are IFIDs that are not specific to a macro-type of speech act (statement, question, directive); rather, they mark subtypes.

As I wrote in section 5.2, according to Urmson (1952) and Venier (1991), performatives in governing position are IFIDs; they lose this function and become mitigators in parenthetical position. Does the parenthetical position automatically turn Sp. *insisto* and *repito* into pure neustic mitigators, as hypothesized by Urmson (1952) and Venier (1991) in the case of the English and Italian performatives above? This is highly improbable. In (11), *insisto* cannot be substituted for a modal sentence adverb that reduces responsibility like, e.g., Sp. *seguramente*. In (9) and (10), such a substitution, though grammatically possible, would substantially alter the meanings of the utterances. An important meaning component, i.e., either firmness and repetition of the utterance or focus on a part of the utterance, would be lost. I thus have to conclude that in parenthetical position *insisto* and *repito* maintain their IFID function.

The most frequent performative RPCs are It. *dico* and Sp. *digo, digo PRO*, *ya digo* and *ya te digo*. Although they are performatives, they express very little or nothing about the type of speech act. Even more than Sp. *insisto* and *repito,*
they are focusing devices directing the addressee's attention to a part of the utterance. The type of speech act is made clear by other IFIDs. In fact, in a short remark, Fuentes Rodriguez confirms that Sp. *digo* in parenthetical position may express 'lo que está sujeto a mi punto de vista' (1990a: 113).

Are parenthetical It. *dico* and Sp. *digo, digo PRO, ya digo* and *ya te digo* responsibility reducing devices? Based on Urmson's (1952: 494) reasoning, Venier (1991: 66f) writes that in the following Italian (invented) sentence *dico* expresses speaker commitment not illocutionary force:

(12) È proprio così, *dico*.
[It's just like this, I say]

In fact, this possibility cannot be totally excluded (cf. also Spitzer 1922: 35f.). In the following utterance, *dico* could be substituted for a modal sentence adverb or an RPC like *credo*:

(13) A: [...] <?> perché a questo punto bisognerebbe riuscire a partire secondo me_ *dico* o comunque [...] (CLIP.FB5)
[Because, at this point, we should manage to leave, in my opinion, I say, or anyway]

(14) A questo punto bisognerebbe riuscire a partire secondo me *credo*.
[At this point, we should manage to leave, in my opinion, I think]

Likewise, pointing to the use of parenthetical *digo PRO* (mostly final *digo yo*) in spoken Spanish, Fuentes Rodriguez (1990a: 112, cf. also Fuentes 1998: 154; Garrido Medina 1999: 3894) says:

Aquí *digo* se usa generalmente como apéndice al final de un enunciado, en la fórmula *digo yo* que pretende atenuar lo anteriormente dicho y reducirlo al ámbito de lo opinable por el hablante. Equivale a 'eso es lo que pienso', 'en mi opinión'.

In fact, in the Spanish corpora I examined, there are such utterances with parenthetical *digo PRO*:

(15) <H2> [...] cirujano de ovejas o cirujano de ... de mujeres. Porque si ha mata<(d)>o a una mujer será cirujano de mujeres, *digo yo*. (COREC.PENT007D)
[Surgeon for sheep or surgeon for women. Because if he has killed a woman he must be a surgeon for women, I say]

In the example, *digo yo* may be substituted for a responsibility reducing RPC (e.g., *creo, pienso*) without substantially changing the utterance's meaning.

The other parentheticals (It. *dico* and Sp. *digo, ya digo and ya te digo*), however, are mostly used as focusing or highlighting expressions acting on the phrasic. For example, Sp. *digo* represents a typical device for highlighting self-corrections (cf. Martín Zorraquino & Portolés Lázaro 1999: 4128):

(16) Inf. B. - [...] Como Marga, que se ha metido en Literatura italiana, bueno,
en Filología italiana, digo (HCM.20.392)
[Like Marga, who began Italian literature, well, Italian philology, I say]

With Sp. digo the speaker may also signal an increase in the precision of a term and thus focus on an aspect of it. Nilsson-Ehle (1947: 20) mentions this use also in relation to It. dico.41

Occasionally, Sp. digo and ya digo do not indicate a correction or an expansion but the mere repetition of a part of the proposition:

(17) <H2> <fático=duda> Me va a costar, dame, ya te digo, dame unos días para ... para llegar a alguna conclusión. (COREC.BENT026F)
[It will cost me, give me, I say, give me some days in order in order to arrive to a conclusion]

It. dico and Sp. digo, ya digo and ya te digo may even be used to mark a term that is neither a correction nor an explanation or repetition of a preceding term, but which occurs for the first time within the proposition.

In the examples above, the speaker employs the RPC as a focusing device that directs the addressee's attention to a part of the utterance. As we have seen in section 6.2, Fr. disons and its Italian and Spanish equivalents partly have the same purpose, yet only It. dico and Sp. digo, ya digo and ya te digo may occasionally function as a pure focusing expression, i.e., without reformulation, self-correction, or explanation. In that case, it is questionable whether It. dico and Sp. digo, ya digo and ya te digo are still responsibility reducing expressions. Focusing parts of an utterance is not necessarily related to speaker commitment, that is, it does not alter the speaker's burden of responsibility. My doubt is confirmed by the fact that these parentheticals also appear in sentences other than statements. In (17), Sp. ya te digo occurs in a directive and marks a part of or the whole utterance. As shown by the following Italian example, parenthetical dico is possible also in a question:

(18) B: <??> c'arrivano tanti come lei perché non ci deve arriva' anche lei dico cosi (CLIP.FB16)
[Many like her make it. Why shouldn't she make it, I say]

As a sentence-initial performative, It. dico never introduces questions, in other words, it is not an IFID for questions. The examples suggest that It. dico and Sp. digo, ya digo and ya te digo, when in parenthetical position, tend to lose their illocutionary force indicating potential completely.

Occasionally, these forms, besides being focusing devices, are clearly hesitation forms by which the speaker holds the floor, i.e., keeps his or her turn and

41 An Italian example with the repetition and explanation of a preceding term may even be found in Dante, La Divina Commeda, Inferno, IV, 66:

(i) Non lasciavam l'andar perch'ei dicesi, ma passavam la selva tuttavia, la selva, dico, di spiriti spessi.
gains time to plan the utterance (see Koch & Österreicher 1990: 60f.).

6.3.2 Hedged performatives
Hedged performatives (see Lakoff 1972: 213; Fraser 1975) are more common than plain performatives as parentheticals. The hedge may either consist of a modal or auxiliary verb or be morphologically marked or both. All hedged performatives I found are based on Fr. *dire* and its Italian and Spanish counterparts. Frequently, the performative is hedged with 'want to', as in Sp. *quiero decir* (see Koch & Österreicher 1990: 63) or It. *voglio dire* (see Bazzanella 1994: 162):

(19) - ¿Cree que ha variado mucho el tipo de enseñanza actual de la antigua? Vamos, de la antigua, de la anterior *quiero decir*. (HUSNC.C3H1.252) [Do you think the contemporary type of teaching is very different from the antique one? Come on, from the antique one, from the previous one, I mean]

In the example, the hedged performative is used to mark a replacement repair and follows the expression in its scope. But hedged performatives with 'want to' may also mark further explanations (cf. Morel & Danon-Boileau 1998: 105). In the following example, Fr. *je veux dire* is positioned after the explaining term in its scope (*sur le plan oculaire*):

(20) À: [...] c'est le seul problème que vous avez, *sur le plan oculaire, je veux dire* (HOELK.I.6.267) [That's the only problem you have, regarding your eyes, I mean]

This hedged performative signals a further explanation or a specification of a term; it also implies, though, that the explanation or specification is not completely equivalent to the initial term (see Hölker 1988: 114). It intervenes on the phrasic level of the utterance. The 'want to' may be further hedged by moving it into the past, as in the Italian *volevo dire*.

According to Fraser (1975: 204), performatives with Engl. *want to* provide the hearer with the option of rejecting the implied force. While explanatory Fr. *je veux dire* in initial position may actually provide the option to reject the assertive force of the utterance, in postposed position it seems to have lost its illocutionary force indicating power. Otherwise we could not explain why it is quite common that the postposed parenthetical corrects or explains terms contained in questions, as in (19) and (20). This phenomenon brings to mind the discussion about It. *dico* and Sp. *digo* and *ya te digo* in the preceding subsection.

Regarding its function, initial Fr. *je veux dire* in part resembles the English expression *I mean*. Schiffrin (1987: 295-311), who cites only examples with initial *I mean*, treats it as discourse marker that signals the speaker's upcoming modification of the meaning of his or her prior talk. These modifications include both expansions of ideas and explanations of intentions. In addition to this, she

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42 In a footnote, Spitzer (1922: 37) mentions that the frequent use of *dico* in Italian, and especially of *digo* in the Venetian dialect, has been seen by foreigners as characteristic of the Italian way of speaking and adds that in Hungarian this word may even be used to refer to Italians.
writes that *I mean* introduces replacement repairs.

I also found a performative hedged by 'must', namely It. *devo dire*:

(21) A: [...] spessissimo a Napoli *devo dire* si incoraggiano quelli che dovrebbero essere non incoraggiati ma resi al silenzio [...] (CLIP.NE14) [Very often, in Naples, I must say, they encourage those that should not be encouraged but silenced]

By using 'must', the speaker says that he is obliged to perform a particular speech act and, at the same time, he implies that he wants to be partly relieved of the burden of its consequences (Fraser 1975: 196). In the case of a statement, this means that he wishes to reduce his claim to truth. Normally, It. *devo dire* occurs in statements expressing personal opinions or beliefs and mitigates the neustic.

The French RPC *il faut dire* only partly fits into this subsection. From a formal point of view, it is not a performative; in the following example, though, it is employed just as It. *devo dire*:

(22) A: [...] y avait pas beaucoup de monde au cours, *il faut dire*, [...] (ESCH.1.18) [There weren't many people in the course, I must say]

If still treated as a performative, it is double-hedged: by the 'must' and by the deictic displacement of the speaker.

A performative may also be hedged morphologically, e.g., by putting it into the conditional form. Fr. *je dirais*, It. *direi*, Sp. *diría* and *diría PRO* (yo *diría* and *diría yo*) are typical RPCs of this type. In the following Italian example43, the performative directly reduces the commitment of the speaker:

(23) AA [...] *Si può buttar via direi* (PIXI.BOF.130) [You can throw it away, I'd say]

Since conditional *direi* makes the truth of the statement (and the responsibility of the speaker) dependent on an implied condition, I treat it as a responsibility alleviating and removing device.

In the Italian example above, the RPC acts on the neustic. In medial position, the RPC tends to assume a function limited to the phrastic. That is, Fr. *je dirais*, It. *direi*, Sp. *diría* and *diría PRO* may also be employed to highlight expressions not deemed completely satisfying by the speaker:

(24) L1 [...] - la plupart du temps ils n'arrivent pas à faire le lien entre l'enseignement euh - *je dirais* théorique [...] (CRFP.LYO-PRO001) [Most of the time, they can't make the connection between the, I'd say, theoretical teaching]

43 For a Spanish example, see Vigara Tauste 1992: 398.
The two different pragmatic functions (and scopes) of this hedged performative can also be clearly seen in the following Spanish passage:

(25) Bueno, yo diría que se han estado quejando durante mucho tiempo de que ... en nuestros hospitales, realmente los medios de que se disponían eran unos medios, yo diría todavía muy precarios […] (COREC.CENT014A)

[Well, I'd say that they have been complaining for a long time that the resources actually at the disposal of our hospitals are, I'd say, still very precarious]

The governing yo diría que reduces the commitment of the speaker regarding the truth of the following object clause, while the parenthetical, noun phrase-medial yo diría marks todavía muy precarios as an expression not considered completely appropriate by the speaker.

6.4 Directly mitigating the neustic

6.4.1 Believing

RPCs with belief verbs directly operate on the neustic, that is, on the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition, and directly alleviate the speaker's burden of responsibility. Since they are limited to assertive tropics, they imply that the utterance is a statement.

The corpus analysis shows that the clauses used for this purpose constitute a relatively closed set of stereotyped forms derived from a few verbs. Fr. croire and its Italian and Spanish equivalents are the basic verbs, while forms deriving from Fr. penser, It. pensare, and especially Sp. pensar are less common. Sp. creer comes in three varieties, namely creo, yo creo and creo yo. The position of the personal pronoun is mainly dependent on the position of the RPC: Those with postposed pronouns are preferred in clause-final position, those with preverbal pronouns in clause-initial position; the same tendency can be noted regarding Sp. pienso PRO and It. penso PRO (for examples see section 8.2).

Two other important belief verbs that have parenthetically used forms are Fr. supposer and Sp. suponer as well as Fr. imaginer, It. immaginare and Sp. imaginar. For It. suppongo I did not find a sufficient number of cases that satisfied all the selection criteria defined in section 4.3.

In the Italian and French corpora, however, there are sufficient numbers of parenthetical spero and j'espère:

(26) D: [...] # la cosa su cui voglio intervenire su questo spero primo intervento è questo concetto di democrazia# […] (CLIP.RC3)

[The issue I'd like to address in this, I hope, first talk is this concept of democracy]

These are the few forms in my list of Romance RPCs with an evaluative as well as a doxastic meaning (see also section 7.1).

In Romance, as in German and English, the counterparts of Engl. find may acquire a doxastic meaning and govern noun clauses (see Ducrot 1980: 57-92).
Only in French, however, did I find the doxastic *je trouve* employed as a parenthetical:

(27) L1 [...] intellectuellement c'est quand même - plus enrichissant *je trouve* - d'échanger avec d'autres [...] (CRFP.PNO-PRI004)
[Intellectually, it is however more rewarding, I find, to exchange with others]

In contrast to Fr. *j'espère* and It. *spero*, Fr. *je trouve* is not an evaluative itself but an RPC specialized for evaluative statements.

6.4.2 Not knowing
Besides using a doxastic parenthetical, the speaker may employ another device in order to directly mitigate the neustic component and alleviate his or her burden of responsibility, namely saying that he or she does not know. There are two aspects making the Romance equivalents of *know* relevant for parenthetical clauses and mitigation: The absence of knowledge of the speaker is the subject of the present subsection, the knowledge attributed to the addressee will be discussed in subsection 6.5.2.

*Know* is a cognitive factive verb (see Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970; Norrick 1978); so is It. *sapere* (see Arbasi 1986; Schneider 1999: 153-158), and this is certainly also true for its Spanish and French equivalents. Factive predicates presuppose the truth of their dependent clause. That means that, if the predicate is negated, the truth of the dependent clause remains intact. Unlike in emotive and evaluative factives, the presupposition triggered by cognitives is merely a speaker presupposition; that is, it is not shared by the subject of the main clause. *X knows that p* asserts (not presupposes) that *X* has the belief *p* and presupposes that the speaker has the same belief. For that reason, in sentences where subject and speaker coincide, i.e., in the first person of the present indicative, the cognitive factive verb cannot be negated (see Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970: 148; Norrick 1978: 18). It would be a contradiction to negate that the speaker / subject has a certain belief and presuppose that the subject has this belief.

Borillo’s (1982) polar question test, which I will explain in detail in section 7.3, groups evidentials like Fr. *noter, observer, voir* and *se souvenir* together with epistemics like *savoir* and *être au courant*. Both evidentials (= semi-factives) and epistemics (= cognitive factives) are acceptable answers only if negated. Vet (1994: 60) adds that *savoir* is not capable of governing an affirmative or negative particle:44

(28) Est-ce que Pierre est partie?
*Je sais que oui / non.
[Has Pierre left?
I know that yes / no]

44 Vet (1994: 60) also notes that *savoir* may be in the scope of *croire*, but not vice versa:
(i) Je crois savoir que Pierre est divorcé.
(ii) *Je sais croire que Pierre est divorcé.
Borillo's test plays down, though, the profound differences between evidentials and epistemics. If she had tested the governing behavior of negated savoir she would have noted that, contrary to je n'ai pas noté (see subsection 6.5.1), the only possible option after je ne sais pas is an interrogative clause:

\[(29)\]  
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Est-ce que les prix ont baissé?} \\
\hspace{1cm} & \text{a) } *\text{Je ne sais pas qu'ils aient baissé.} \\
\hspace{1cm} & \text{b) Je ne sais pas s'ils ont baissé.}
\end{align*}
\]

Have the prices fallen?  
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a) I don't know that they have fallen.} \\
\hspace{1cm} & \text{b) I don't know if they have fallen}
\end{align*}
\]

Contrary to comparable evidentials, je ne sais pas is not ambiguous with respect to factivity, that is, it only allows a non-factive interpretation; je ne sais pas is not a semi-factive (see Karttunen 1971). This changes when the verb is in the third person, i.e., when speaker and subject of savoir do not coincide:

\[(30)\]  
\[\text{Jeanne ne sais pas que les prix aient baissé.} \]
\[\text{[Jeanne doesn't know that the prices have fallen]}\]
\[(31)\]  
\[\text{Jeanne ne sais pas si les prix ont baissé.} \]
\[\text{[Jeanne doesn't know if the prices have fallen]}\]

In the first example, the speaker knows that prices have fallen (factive interpretation), in the second one, he or she does not know (non-factive interpretation).

In most accounts (see Urmson 1952, 1988: 23; Hooper 1975; Borillo 1982; Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik 1985: 1114; Venier 1991; Ifantidou 2001), Engl. know or its Romance equivalents savoir, sapere, and saber are parenthetical verbs. A few authors, however, e.g., Bronzi (1977: 436), Cornulier (1978: 56, 62f.), Lleó (1979: 170), do not share this view. Vet (1994: 59ff.) compares the following two sentences:

\[(32)\]  
\[\text{Pierre n'est pas là, je crois.} \]
\[\text{[Pierre isn't there, I believe]}\]
\[(33)\]  
\[\text{Pierre n'est pas là, je sais.} \]
\[\text{[Pierre isn't there, I know]}\]

and states that, in the second one, je sais is pronounced with the intonation of an independent sentence. Hence, we don't have "une phrase suivie d'une assertion, mais deux assertions".

It has to be said that, unlike Vet (1994), most authors take into consideration the infinitive, without further pursuing the matter by analyzing specific forms (cf. Schneider 1997b, 1999: 67f.). In French and other Romance languages, it is necessary to distinguish between the perfective meaning of savoir ('come to know, learn') in the past tense (e.g., je sus) and past perfect tense (e.g., j'ai su), and its imperfective meaning ('know') in the present tense (e.g., je sais) and im-
perfect tense (e.g., *je savais*). According to Cornulier (1978: 62f.), the parentheticality of Fr. *savoir* depends on the aspect. In his eyes, only the perfective forms are acceptable in parenthesis. However, in the corpora, there is only one case where a perfective form, namely It. *ho saputo*, can be interpreted as a parenthetical:

(34) B: [...] per esempio **ho saputo** quando dici ad una persona vai vai ad ammazzarti fa morire [...] (CLIP.MA15)
[For example, I learned, when you say to a person go go to kill you, this causes her to die]

It. *ho saputo* could be classified as an evidential parenthetical, because it indicates that an information has been obtained (without saying exactly how).

On the other hand, in the analyzed corpora, the imperfective forms Fr. *je sais pas*, *je sais plus*, It. *non so* and Sp. *no sé* are frequent parenthetical expressions that fulfill the conditions defined in section 4.3.:

(35) A: [...] **Vous devez avoir, je sais pas**, un petit problème local [...] (HOELK.4.2.214)
[You must have, I don't know, a small local problem]
(36) I: [...] **la Feria era, no sé**, mucho más bonita en todos los aspectos [...] (HUSNP.348)
[The fair was, I don't know, much nicer in all aspects]

Their unnegated counterparts, though, are completely absent in Italian and Spanish, and very rarely used in French. In none of the few French cases does *je sais* interrupt the clause nucleus.

Negation sheds light on an important difference between Fr. *savoir*, It. *saper*, and Sp. *saber* and the other parenthetical verbs: It is the only verb which appears with a negative in parenthetical position. What is the meaning and function of Fr. *je sais pas*, *je sais plus* and its Romance equivalents? In (35) and (36), the clauses with the negative directly act on the commitment of the speaker and ease his or her responsibility (cf. Fuentes Rodríguez 1990b: 163). Rarely, though, do they indicate complete ignorance or unawareness (see Morel & Danon-Boileau 1998: 105). Rather, the RPCs may in these cases be substituted for other RPCs directly alleviating speaker responsibility, e.g., *je crois* or *creo*. In several other cases, the action of this RPC focuses on a specific referring expression. As

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45 *Je ne sais pas* is practically absent in the French corpora. Interestingly, the only occurrences I encountered are contained in the interviewer's (Kate Beeching herself) questions of BEECH.

46 In the Italian corpora, I found one utterance with the complete parenthetical *lo so*:

(i) H: devo fare tre file *lo so* (CLIP.RA06)
However, as is always the case with final complete parentheticals, in the example above *lo so* might as well be an independent utterance. I found no parenthetical example of Spanish *lo sé*.

47 Already Lerch (1919: 65f.) and Tobler (1921: 122f.) pointed to the parenthetical use of French *que je sache*, which means *as far as I know*. This expression is absent in my French and Italian corpora, in the Spanish ones, though, the equivalent *que yo sepa* occurs frequently:

(i) <H3> [...] Bueno, ¿qué pasa con la actuación de Israel en esa zona? Es decir, de eso no se ha escrito nada que yo sepa todavía. [...] (COREC.CDEB033A)
with the RPCs mitigating the phrastic, it may affect the precision of a term. In
the following French example, the meaning of je sais plus is 'approximately':

(37) L1 - [...] j'ai bossé avec lui pendant je sais plus trois semaines un mois [...] (CRFP.LIL-PRO001)
[I worked with him for, I don't know anymore, three weeks, a month]

That is, this RPC may be employed, in Caffi's (1999, 2001) terms, either as a
hedge or as a bush. In the Italian corpora, the bush function of non so predomi-
nates. The RPC often indicates that the expression in its scope is intended as a
hypothesis or an example, as does Sp. digamos in example (3) cited in section
6.2:

(38) A: [...] supponete non so il presidente della camera dei deputati _ eh as-
segna il progetto di legge a una commissione [...] (CLIP.FD2)
[Suppose, I don't know, the president of the chamber of deputies assigns the bill
to a commission]

In the example above, instead of non so, one could also use per esempio or the
RPC diciamo. I also found Sp. no sé being sometimes used in this way.

In addition to alleviating responsibility and highlighting examples, Koch &
Österreicher (1990: 61) propose hesitation as a function of Sp. no sé and its
French and Italian counterparts (cf. also Fuentes Rodríguez 1990b: 163).

6.5 Indirectly mitigating the neustic

6.5.1 Evidentials

In the spoken corpora, several parenthetical forms can be found by means of
which the speaker refers to the circumstances that may confirm or disprove his
or her statement, e.g., by saying that the addressee can see a state of affairs or by
describing the source of information. These forms may derive from verbs ex-
pressing sensory perception or the obtaining of knowledge, which can be inter-
preted as mental perception, or from utterance verbs.

Forms deriving from verbs expressing the semblance or appearance of a state
of affairs also belong to this group. Those in the first person singular of the pre-
sent indicative ease the speaker's responsibility. The other forms can be sub-
sumed under Caffi's (1999: 896, 2001: 315) class of actantial shields, insofar as
they are based on the deictic ego and either divide responsibility between speaker
and addressee or remove it entirely from the speaker. All RPCs in this subsection
are evidential expressions, because they specify the evidence the asserted prop-
osition relies on. Since they do not directly refer to the speaker's belief or absence
of knowledge but to the evidential circumstances of his or her statement, I say
that they indirectly mitigate the neustic (cf. Prince, Frader, & Bosk 1982: 89).

Examples of divided responsibility between speaker (who affirms) and ad-
dressee (who sees) can be seen in the following examples:

(39) L1 [...] ils sont plus ou moins tu vois débiles [...] (CRFP.PSO-PRO001)
[They are more or less, you see, weak]

(40)  I: […] para mí los tíos, **ya ves**, son todos amigos míos […] (HUSNP.9.212)
[For me the guys, you see, are all my friends]

Depending on their intonation, Fr. **tu vois** and It. **vedi** may either be declaratives, as in the French example above, or interrogatives and, therefore, phatic devices. Sp. **ya ves** is only possible as declarative. Even as declaratives, however, the three RPCs are borderline cases between phatics and evidentials (cf. also Spitzer 1922: 90). In the examples given above, they are probably used as rhetoric devices. The respective addressees probably do not actually see but, rather, should see (see also subsection 6.5.2, regarding 'you know').

Responsibility may be either divided between speaker and addressee or removed from both. A Spanish example of the second strategy is the following:

(41)  Inf. A. - […] Es que es un veneno, **dicen**, la montaña; […] (HCM.19.352)
[It's a poison, they say, the mountain]

In the example above, **dicen** describes, though in an unspecific way, the source and thus the reliability of a statement. It does not report a statement made by a particular person (it is even possible that such a statement has never actually been made), that is, in this particular case it is not a device for reported speech.

The primary source of the evidence on which a statement is based is direct observation. Other possible sources are what somebody else had told the speaker, that is, hearsay, and the speaker's inferences (see Chafe & Nichols 1986; Willett 1988; Frawley 1992; Ifantidou 2001: 5ff.; Squartini 2001). Although not normally treated as such, expressions that indicate (one's own) memory as a source of information of a statement should also be classified as evidentials (see Ifantidou 2001: 6f.). Fr. **je me rappelle** and Sp. **me acuerdo** are evidential parentheticals of this type that one may find, albeit rarely, in the spoken corpora analyzed in this study:

(42)  FA 13 - […] c'était euh **je me rappelle** / dans les années après guerre / […] (CREDIF.FA13.351)
[That was, I remember, in the years after the war]

(43)  I: […] hubo uno, **me acuerdo**, que tenía necesidad, por cuestiones familiares, de ir a su pueblo, […] (HUSNP.19.421)
[There was one, I remember, who had to go, due to family problems, to his village]

Since these expressions are in the first person singular of the present indicative,

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48 See Guillén Sutil (2001: 103): "Más que significar 'enunciar' o 'expresar el pensamiento con palabras' parece ser que el verbo toma aquí otro valor como es el de 'opinar'."

49 The few examples of parenthetical **recuerdo** I have found (not enough occurrences to be included, failing to satisfy the criteria) show that this form is employed as a performative.
they alleviate (indirectly, though, as all evidentials do) the speaker's responsibility regarding the truth of the sentence.

An important and large group of evidential RPCs derives from verbs expressing the semblance or appearance of a state of affairs. These RPCs either alleviate the speaker's responsibility (e.g., Fr. *me semble-t-il*) or remove it (e.g., Fr. *paraît-il*):

(44) L4 […] un éclairage une vision qui évidemment est fort éloigné(e) *me semble-t-il* - de certains éclairages de certaines visions […] (CRFP.AIX-PUB001)
[An illumination a vision that, evidently, is far away, it seems to me, from certain illuminations certain visions]

(45) L2 […] c'était dans la région d'Aigues-Mortes où il y a eu - *paraît-il* les premières vignes […] (CRFP.MON-PRI001)
[It was in the region of Aigues-Mortes where there have been, it seems, the first vineyards]

Besides *parece* and *me parece* (cf. Haverkate 1994: 126), the Spanish texts contain *me parece a mí*, which underlines the speaker's involvement and responsibility even more.

Among the parentheticals referring to the semblance or appearance of a state of affairs, there is an interesting Italian form that stands out from the others. In spoken language, one may find *mi sa* (or *me sa* in texts from Rome) governing noun clauses:

(46) A: […] *mi sa* che l'ha chiamato proprio lei (CLIP.RA9)
[It seems to me that exactly you called him]

The meaning of the expression *mi sa*, which can roughly be translated as 'it seems to me, I have the impression, I have the feeling', may be explained with the fact that the Italian verb *sapere* has maintained the two meanings of 'know' and 'taste' it had originally.\(^50\) The expression with the meaning given above is used regularly as a parenthetical expression reducing the responsibility of the speaker:

(47) O: era il primo *mi sa* che aveva avuto _questa_
A: questa intuizione (CLIP.FC6)
[O: It was the first one, it seems to me, who had that
A: that intuition]

Obviously, *mi sa* has nothing to do with 'know', i.e., it is not an epistemic RPC.

The nature and limits of evidentiality are the subject of debates, a point of major concern being the distinction between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Quite obviously, there are overlaps between the speaker's evaluation of the

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\(^{50}\) Latin *sapēre* (or *sapēre*) meant 'taste' and also 'be sage, wise' (see Cortelazzo & Zolli 1999: 1438).
truth of his or her statement and the speaker's description of the evidence on which the truth of the statement is based. Expressions for sensations (e.g., Fr. *me semble-t-il*) and inferential expressions (e.g., Fr. *je suppose*) are typical borderline cases. Albeit indirectly, evidential expressions express speaker commitment, since the quality of evidence indicates what kind of responsibility the speaker is able to assume for his or her statement. Moreover, there are many languages in which the two types of information (speaker commitment and evidence) are coded by the same means, while pure evidential systems are much rarer (Palmer 1986: 66). This is the reason why evidential, epistemic, and doxastic parentheticals are sometimes put under the same umbrella (cf. Ifantidou 2001; Kärkkäinen 2003: 19). Urmson (1952) does not mention parentheticals such as *you see*, *they say*, or *I remember*; but, when dividing the parenthetical verbs into three groups, he writes that verbs such as *know*, *believe*, *guess*, *suppose*, *suspect*, *estimate*, and (in a metaphorical use) *feel* and adverbs such as *certainly*, *possibly*, etc. are […] used to indicate the evidential situation in which the statement is made (though not to describe that situation) and hence to signal what degree of reliability is claimed for, and should be accorded to, the statement to which they are conjoined. (Urmson 1952: 485)

However, already Prince, Frader, & Bosk (1982: 89ff.) distinguish between hedges that involve doubt of the speaker and those that simply attribute a belief to someone other than the speaker, the speaker's commitment being only indirectly inferable.

In subsections 6.4.2 and 6.5.2, I will illustrate why I treat the epistemic parentheticals based on Fr. *savoir*, It. *sapere*, and Sp. *saber* separately from doxastic parentheticals. Now I focus on the differences between evidentials and the doxastics illustrated in subsection 6.4.1. Firstly, most evidential parentheticals are not in the first person singular of the present indicative, i.e., there is a morphological criterion that helps to distinguish them from doxastics. Secondly, evidentials only indirectly act on speaker commitment, that is, on the neustic. It is furthermore legitimate to ask whether some of the evidential parentheticals I cited (e.g., Fr. *je me rappelle* or Sp. *me acuerdo*) increase rather than reduce speaker commitment. I touched upon this issue in section 5.1, when discussing the role of expressions of certainty. As pointed out by Hübler (1983: 148), expressions of certainty and, in my view, also evidential parentheticals cannot increase speaker commitment above the level of the corresponding categorical assertion. What they do, however, is to prevent the hearer from considering alternative propositions and to negate the asserted proposition. Another reason for introducing a separate class of evidential parentheticals is that, with the exception of Fr. *me semble-t-il* and its Italian and Spanish equivalents, these do not pass Borillo's (1982) polar question test (see section 7.3).

Finally, the governing capabilities of evidential parentheticals are quite different from those of doxastic parentheticals and point to a semantic property. The difference, however, only becomes manifest when they are negated. Borillo (1982: 50f.; see also Hooper 1975: 117) notes that the complement clause after *je n'ai pas noté* and other evidentials may either be a declarative with *que* or an
interrogative with *si:*

(48)  
Est-ce que les prix ont baissé?  
a) Je n'ai pas noté qu'ils aient baissé.  
b) Je n'ai pas noté s'ils ont baissé.

[Have the prices fallen?  
a) I haven't noticed that they have fallen.  
b) I haven't noticed if they have fallen]

In relation to a similar example, Venier (1991: 72f.) says that a potential ambiguity of evidentials surfaces here. In the first answer, the truth of the dependent clause is presupposed; in the second, it is not. This fact is a consequence of their *semi-factivity*, a property first observed by Karttunen (1971) in relation to verbs like *discover, realize, find out, see, notice*, etc., later becoming a much-debated issue (see Hooper 1975; Terrell 1976; Klein 1977; Lleó 1979: 168-175; Arbasi 1986: 172-215; Venier 1991; Schneider 1999: 158ff.). Semi-factivity means that, in certain contexts, these verbs allow both a factive (see Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970) and a non-factive interpretation. Evidential parentheticals, though, always rely on the non-factive interpretation of the verb.

In the corpora, the factive version of an evidential is rarely used to govern a clause. That means that an affirmative evidential like, e.g., Sp. *me acuerdo* governs declarative clauses, while its negative *no me acuerdo* usually governs polar or focused interrogative clauses. When negated, evidentials lose their indirect mitigating function entirely. They cease to be evidentials because there is no statement for which supporting evidence is needed.

Differences between evidentials and doxastics also appear when one reacts with a parenthetical to another speaker's statement:

(49)  
Hay mucha diferencia entre el Árabe de primero y el de segundo.  
a) Me acuerdo.  
b) *Creo.

[There is much difference between the Arab course in the first and in the second year.  
a) I remember.  
b) I believe]

Only evidentials but not doxastics may be used to confirm a statement by saying that one has obtained evidence of its truth. On the other hand, only with a doxastic may the speaker refute the interlocutor's statement:

(50)  
Hay mucha diferencia entre el Árabe de primero y el de segundo.  
a) *No me acuerdo.  
b) No creo.

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51 According to Lleó (1979: 170) certain semi-factives are not even acceptable as parentheticals:

(i)  *El Honorable, noto, va a cultivar su jardín.
(ii) *El Honorable, me he enterado, va a cultivar su jardín.
There is much difference between the Arab course in the first and in the second year.

a) I don't remember.

b) I don't believe]

6.5.2 Knowing

In subsection 6.4.2, I illustrated how the speaker may reduce commitment and responsibility by saying that he or she does not know. Now I discuss another aspect which makes the Romance equivalents of know relevant for mitigation: The speaker may attribute to the addressee a certain knowledge. By saying that the addressee also knows, the speaker divides responsibility for what he or she is stating. Instead of referring to his or her belief or absence of knowledge, the speaker refers to external circumstances that might corroborate the statement. As in the case of evidential parentheticals, this is a way to indirectly mitigate the neustic.

The interlocutor may be addressed with the familiar second person singular or with a non-familiar form, as in the following two examples with Sp. sabes and It. sa:

(51)  \texttt{<H1> Huy, a mí me tocó una mesa ... una mesa de ... de cajón grande. Grandita como ...}

\texttt{[...]
\texttt{<H1> Y luego, \textit{sabes}, me tocó ... (COREC.CCON021B)}

\texttt{[I had to take a table, a table with with a big drawer, quite big as .... and then, you know, I had to take]}

(52)  \texttt{A: embe’ ci vuole \textit{sa} Filidoro_ (CLIP.RB12)}

\texttt{[Well, we need, you know, Filidoro]}

In the Spanish example, H1 repeats a preceding utterance almost literally, hence H1 can count on the shared knowledge and use the declarative \textit{sabes} to refer to it. We should not forget, though, that all the forms mentioned in this subsection may also be interrogative parentheticals with phatic function, inviting the addressee to cooperate and controlling the effectiveness of communication (for Spanish \textit{¿sabes?} cf., e.g., Briz Góm\'ez 1998: 224ff.). In that case, they do not modify the speaker's responsibility.

Brown & Levinson (1978: 125, 1987: 120) observe that Engl. \textit{you know} (or \textit{ya know}) may not claim that the hearer's knowledge is as detailed as the speaker's, but it suggests that the hearer knows the kind of situation in general. This is probably the case in the two Spanish and Italian passages above. Davoine (1981) distinguishes three uses of Fr. \textit{tu sais} and \textit{vous savez}: the "\textit{tu sais} cognitif", the "\textit{tu sais} d'identification", and the "\textit{tu sais} de justification". The first use corresponds closely to the knowledge and responsibility dividing exemplified in the two passages above. In the identifying use, a term which is not sufficiently clear to identify its referent is followed by a complementary and explanatory term. It is shown by the following example with Fr. \textit{vous savez} (see also Hölker 1988: 74f.):
P: [...] ça faisait une petite plaque
A: Qui
P: chais pas, cinq millimètres sur trois, quoi, vous savez
A: Qui
P: avec un peu de sang dedans, quoi [...] (HOELK.5.5.238)
[P: There was a small plaque
A: Yes
P: I don't know, five by three millimeters, you know
A: With some blood inside]

In the justifying use, the explanation introduced by tu sais or vous savez is new, that is, the explanation does not refer to a preceding term (for Spanish cf. also Briz Gómez 1998: 226):

EF - [...] j'ai vu des maisons qui avaient que cinq étages alors comme x m'a dit qu'il y avait six étages je me suis dit <mon Dieu je me suis trompée de numéro> non c'est parce que le central était derrière tu sais (CREDF.HE20.286)
[I saw houses that had only five floors. Since X had told me that it had six floors, I said to myself "My God, I went to the wrong number". No, that's because the central was behind, you know]

Hölker (1988: 74) remarks that both the identifying tu sais and the justifying tu sais mark explanations. In my opinion, it is more important that in the examples above, the addressee actually does not know or knows only partly. There is a fundamental difference, then, between a 'you know' where the addressee actually knows the contents of the host sentence and a 'you know' where the addressee in reality does not know.

In the second case, the speaker may imply, furthermore, that the addressee should know. In fact, according to Morel & Danon-Boileau (1998: 96f.), Fr. tu sais frequently implies that the speaker should know and that actually it should not be necessary to draw the addressee's attention to that particular point. In other words, the RPCs discussed in this subsection may serve as rhetorical devices aimed at forestalling possible refutations by the interlocutor (cf. Hübler 1983: 148; Bazzanella 2001: 253f.):

That the addressee often does not know is indirectly confirmed also by Bazzanella (2001: 254), who notes that declarative It. sai as a parenthetical near the beginning of a turn is often used to draw the addressee's attention to the following utterance:

B: sai io chiedo e poi (CLIP.NB63)
[You know, I ask and then]

52 As outlined in Schneider (1997b, 1999: 163), there are many instances in which It. sapere che does not necessarily mean that the addressee knows, although it is a cognitive factive. In these cases the clause is rhematic not thematic.
Here, too, the addressee does not know. Undoubtedly, this use of *sai* is a border-line case between the reduction of speaker responsibility and a call for attention, i.e., a phatic (cf. also Spitzer 1922: 80f.).

6.6 Reporting speech

In the analyzed corpora, there are a few RPCs that serve to mark a passage as previously said by another or by the same speaker. All of them are based on Fr. and It. *dire*, and Sp. *decir*:

(56) L1 [...] la droite *dites-vous* n'a pas pu apporter une réponse satisfaisante aux aux données [...] (CRFP.POI-PUB001)
[The parties of the right, you say, couldn’t provide a satisfactory answer to the data]

(57) <H1> [...] "Después de ducha ..." ¡Oooh! "... me pongo túnica mora", *ha dicho su mujer*. [...] (COREC.ALUD007A)
["After the shower", oh!, "I put on the Moorish tunic", said his wife]

In the examples above, an utterance is reported - partly or completely - as it was said before. Only in (57), however, can it be clearly seen that the deictic orientation of the reported utterance remains unchanged, that is, (57) has two deictic centers, one pertaining to the reporting RPC, the other one to the reported utterance.

Whereas (57) illustrates the use of free direct speech, in the following example, the boldfaced RPC reports a sequence of free indirect speech:

(58) C: gliel'hai ridata indietro quella scheda riassuntiva che c'aveva lei?
A: sì perché *dice* c'aveva solo quella copia [...] (CLIP.FA4)
[C: Did you give her back that summary card she had?
A: Yes, because she says she had only that copy]

In free indirect speech, some or all deictic elements of the reported sentence are oriented towards the deictic center of the parenthetical (see Bally 1912a, 1912b; Hummel 1999; Maldonado González 1999: 3551ff.; 3572; Mortara Garavelli 2001: 464ff.). Usually, *free direct speech* and *free indirect speech* both refer to speech reported without an introductory verb and a complementizer (Weinrich 1982: 801ff.; Hummel 1999: 1636; Andersen 2000: 144). Free indirect speech may be transformed into indirect speech, without changing the orientation of its deictic elements, by adding a complementizer.

Reporting RPCs in the present tense often refer to utterances actually said in the past (historic present). In the following Italian example, *dice* reports such an utterance and refers to the same time and person as the introductory *ha detto che*:

(59) B: # ha detto che ha preso un sei nel compito *dice* questa bambina *dice* potrebbe fare di più *dice* ma è una bambina molto timida (CLIP.FA14)
[She said that she got a six on the test, she says, this girl, she says, could do more, she says, but she's a very shy girl]
Similar examples can also be found with It. dico and Sp. digo, which are usually plain performatives.

Palmer (1986: 67, 71) considers reporting expressions (sentence-initial governing verbs and RPCs) as being part of the evidential system. However, in my view, reporting parentheticals, especially those reporting direct speech, should be set apart from evidentiality. Palmer (1986), in fact, does not mention direct speech or cite examples of it when writing about reporting expressions. Reporting parentheticals are an extreme form of suspending speaker commitment. Since the speaker in reported speech explicitly marks the statement as not being his or her own, he or she neither has to nor is able to give a guarantee for what he or she is saying. Although the speaker is saying a sentence, he or she is not actually stating, asking, requesting or ordering. The illocution (statement, question, directive) expressed by the sentence is not the illocution of the actual but that of the reported speech act. Reported statements do not reflect the judgment of the speaker and hence should be considered as cases of objective modality (see Lyons 1977: 797ff.). They are actually outside the realm of mitigation.

There is a crucial difference between reporting another person’s utterance without being committed to it, on the one hand, and making a statement and downgrading commitment by describing the evidence one has for it, on the other. That is why in this book I prefer to treat reporting parentheticals as a group separate from evidentials.

I admit, however, that a separation of reported speech from evidentiality and from mitigation in general can be problematic. E.g., since in free indirect speech a statement is reported from the deictic perspective of the speaker, objectivity becomes formally lost and the distinction between merely reporting the statement of another person and expressing one’s own statement is blurred.

In other cases, there is ambiguity between marking an utterance as being reported and merely citing as evidence for a statement the fact that others have said it before. E.g., in the following sentence invented by Reinhart (1983: 179), *Ed will be late* can either be a reported or stated:

(60) Ed will be late he said.

According to Reinhart's terminology, if *Ed will be late* is stated, it is speaker-oriented; in that case, the parenthetical *he said* is functionally equivalent to a modal sentence adverb. In section 9.1, I will illustrate the phonological aspects of Reinhart's reasoning.

Due to their objective character, reporting RPCs are not specific to a certain sentence type, that is, they report statements as well as questions (and presumably also directives):

(61) C2w E allora - cerco io qui, dice? (PIXI.BOF.215)
[And now, I search here, you say?]
(62) <H1> ¿Cuántos espectadores ha dicho? (COREC.AENT033A)
[How many spectators, you said?]
6.7 Summary
Taking in consideration the deictic orientation and the sentence type (declarative, imperative, interrogative), I distinguished clauses alleviating speaker responsibility from those removing and those dividing speaker responsibility. All these clauses reduce communicative responsibility and they are at the center of this book. Initially I also took into account RPCs with phatic function, i.e., I isolated a group of addressee-centered imperative and interrogative clauses which do not reduce speaker responsibility but invite the addressee to cooperate and control the effectiveness of communication.

The rest of the chapter focuses on mitigating RPCs. Taking into account the perspective of the logical structures of utterances and the functions of RPCs, I identified and described four main classes of RPCs that reduce communicative responsibility:
1. clauses mitigating the phrastic (propositional content);
2. clauses indicating the tropic (illocution) and mitigating the phrastic or the neustic (speaker commitment);
3. clauses directly mitigating the neustic;
4. clauses indirectly mitigating the neustic.
Several clauses mitigate more than one utterance component. That is, they may alternate between two components (typically phrastic or neustic) or operate on two at the same time (e.g., tropic and phrastic, tropic and neustic).

Furthermore, I identified a class of clauses reporting discourse. Since, ideally, these clauses take communicative responsibility completely away from the speaker and speaker commitment is not at stake, they constitute an extreme form of responsibility reduction or lie even outside it.

The most prominent representatives of the first class are Fr. disons, It. diciamo, and Sp. digamos. The second class consists of plain performatives, notably It. dico and Sp. digo, and hedged performatives, e.g., Fr. je veux dire, It. voglio dire, Sp. quiero decir, Fr. je dirais, It. direi, Sp. diría and yo diría. Besides indicating the tropic, these parentheticals always do something else: They either mitigate another component of the utterance or have some other additional function (hesitation, self-correction, etc.). The third class consists of clauses expressing belief, i.e., they are the classical RPCs in Urmson's sense (e.g., Fr. je crois and je pense), and of forms of the verb Fr. savoir, It. sapere, and Sp. saber that express absence of knowledge on behalf of the speaker. The fourth class comprises evidential clauses, i.e., clauses that describe the source, type or reliability of a statement, and forms of Fr. savoir, It. sapere, and Sp. saber that attribute knowledge to the addressee or to everybody. The evidential parentheticals derive from verbs expressing sensory perception (e.g., Fr. voir) or the obtaining (or activation) of knowledge (e.g., Fr. je me rappelle), from an utterance verb (e.g., Sp. decir), or from verbs expressing the semblance or appearance of a state of affairs (e.g., Fr. sembler).

The analysis indicates that reducing speaker responsibility is not the sole discourse function of RPCs. Besides the phatic function, the indication of the illo-
utionary force, and reporting someone else's utterance, one has to take into account several other functions which are loosely or not at all related to responsibility reduction. These, e.g., highlighting self-corrections, explanations or repetitions, concern one of the general felicity conditions of speech acts, namely that the procedure must be executed correctly and completely (see Austin 1976 [1962]: 15; Caffi 2001: 450).

Tables 6.2-6.4 are parallel to tables 4.2-4.4 and assign to each RPC one or more of the functions illustrated in this chapter. The following abbreviations are used in tables 6.2-6.4: pha = phatic, phr = phrastic, p_per = plain performative, h_per = hedged performative, dox = doxastic, not_k = not knowing, evi = evidential, k = knowing, rep = reporting.
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