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Moral Courage:

Is it Possible to Increase This Social Good?

An Evaluation of a Training for Adolescences.

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Abstract

Many schoolchildren suffer from being bullied during their school time. Therefore, this study examines whether moral courage can be increased by a moral courage training in order to intervene in such situations. Furthermore, this study should find out if adolescences who receive a moral courage training have more adequate skills to intervene against bullying as before. These questions were examined in a secondary school in Austria. The sample consists of 59 adolescences (26 females and 33 males). The results of this study revealed that the important social good of moral courage can be increased by a moral courage training. The participants of the moral courage training have more intervention skills for acting morally courageous against slogans as before. Additionally, they are equipped with more skills to show moral courage at school and against physical violence than before participating in the training. Therefore, a moral courage training is a valuable possibility to reduce bullying.

Keywords: Moral courage, training, evaluation, increase moral courage, bullying

Moral Courage:

Is it Possible to Increase This Social Good?

An Evaluation of a Training for Adolescences.

"Courage is rightly esteemed the first of human qualities . . .

because it is the quality which guarantees all others." (Joseph Chamberlain)

Ten minutes before the first lesion is going to start. One well known bad boy is beating one of his "favorite" victims while the rest of the class is watching this spectacle. Many school children know this scenario to well. Therefore it is important that adolescences acquire opportunities to stop bullying, because the findings of O'Connell, Pepler, and Craig (2007) showed that 38% of school children had been bullied "once or twice" during a school year and 15% stated that they had been bullied "more than once or twice". In the work of O'Connell et al. (2007) bullying is defined as negative actions (physical or psychical) which have a hostile intent, repeated over times and involve a counterbalanced power ratio. More detailed information of bullying will be given later in this work.

According to the results of O'Connell et al. (2007) this work is going to evaluate a moral courage training program (especially for adolescences) which should reduce the rates mentioned above. To realize an adequate evaluation of the training it must be embedded in a theoretical background. Therefore I want to give, first, an overview of help-giving research (including factors which increase or decrease this phenomenon). After that I will point out the similarities and dissimilarities of help-giving and moral courage (including its predictors), because for a long time researchers had not been discriminated between this two approaches (Bierhoff, 2002), even they are distinguishable among many factors (Fischer et al., 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2007; Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004; Kayser et al., 2010). Subsequent, an overview of the phenomenon of bullying should be given. Furthermore, I want to point out why an increase of moral courage (especially in school context) is so important to decrease

the prevalence of bullying. Additionally, this work should shed light on the question if moral courage can be increased by a moral training in the adolescence.

The research on help-giving was or is heavily influenced by one infamous event, namely by the brutal murder rape of Kitty Genovese in the year 1964. Kitty Genovese had been killed in front of her apartment in New York while 38 individuals of her neighborhood witnessed (from the safety of their apartments) this cruel event without intervening. Although there are doubts about the number of the people who had observed this murder (cf. Manning et al., 2007). Referring to this event Lantané and Darley (1970) postulated their famous process model of help-giving. Their model assumes that a bystander who is witnessing a case of an emergency has to pass five steps (described below) before he or she is going to intervene. (1) a critical situation must be noticed, (2) the situation must be evaluated as a case of emergency, (3) a person have to develop feelings of personal responsibility to take action, (4) it must be approved if he or she has the right skills for intervening, and (5) a conscious decisions for helping must be done. Connecting to my starting example that means a boy or a girl has to notice that something is going to happen in the class (step 1). After that, the act of bullying must be interpreted as a situation which efforts intervention (step 2). Subsequent a bystander must produce feeling of personal responsibility for helping the victim (step 3). Furthermore it must be approved if he or she has the right skills (e.g. physical strength) to intervene (step 4). At least a decision has to be done. Either a bystander decides to help a victim of the bully attack or not (step 5). But what psychological processes or factors have influence on the decision for taking action in a case of emergency or not?

Three important psychological processes have been identified which can interrupt the five steps of the help-giving model noted before. First to mention is process of *diffusion of responsibility* (Cacioppo, Petty, & Losch, 1986; Latané & Darley, 1969; Latané & Nida, 1981; Latané & Rodin, 1969). Diffusion of responsibility means that the more bystanders are present, the less responsible any bystander feels. In other words, the personal responsibility to

help is divided by the number of bystanders. For example, if one guy is watching the act of bullying in his class he has the full responsibility to intervene. But if there are three other guys (in sum four), all bystanders share the responsibility. That circumstance leads to a decreased feeling of personal responsibility. In numbers, one bystander perceives 100% responsibility while one of the four bystanders perceives 25%. The second process is called *pluralistic ignorance* (Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973; Latané & Darley, 1969, 1970; Latané & Nida, 1981). It results when people have to define a new ambiguous situation which can be a potential case of emergency. If surrounding people show no intention to help then bystanders interpret an ambiguous situation not as an emergency. As example imagine the following situation. You are in a relatively filled tube wagon and it seems to you if one guy is threatening by another. But it isn't clear for you if the two involved guys are stranger or friends. Therefore you start looking into the faces of the people who are standing closer to them. No one of the people who are surrounding the guys show intention to help. According to this information you decide not to intervene. This example should illustrates how pluralistic ignorance work. The third process is *evaluation apprehension* (Latané and Darley, 1970) and is determined by the fear of individuals to act in public and being judged by others. People who have made the decision to help are afraid of acting inadequately or making mistakes while others are watch them.

Influencing factors on helping behavior

Now, an overview of influencing factors on the prevalence of help-giving (with a strong relation to bystander research) should be given. But before I'm going into detail it have to mention that there have not been made a distinction between dangerous (such as moral courage scenarios) and non-dangerous situations in the history of help-giving research for a long time (Fischer et al., 2006, 2011; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Niesta Kayser et al., 2010).

The first factor, and one of the most investigated in history of help-giving, on which I want to shed light is the number of bystanders. Latané and Nida (1981) have summarized studies which have examined the question if the prevalence of help-giving is affected by the number of bystanders. Their results showed evidence that the more bystanders are present the less individuals are willing to help due to the three psychological processes mentioned before. This is in line with the findings of the meta-analyses of Fischer et al. (2011). But the presence bystanders must not always inhibit the helping rate in a case of emergency. The participants of Darley, Teger, and Lewis (1972) had to work on a visual task while sitting in a room. They were sitting in three different patterns (face-to-face, non-facing, or alone). Four minutes after working on the visual task a staged emergency took place. Participants who were sitting either alone or in the face-to-face condition had shown nearly the same helping rate. Only if bystanders were sitting in the non-facing condition, they had shown typical bystander behavior. Further evidence for reducing the typical bystander behavior is described in the meta-analysis of Fischer et al. (2011). For example, they have found that individuals are less willing to help if other bystanders are present, but for dangerous situations they find no bystander behavior. They reasons for termination of bystander behavior is going to be discussed later in this work.

Typical bystander behavior patterns can also observed in virtual reality environment. The research results of Kozlov and Johansen (2010) indicate that people in a virtual reality task show less willing to help if virtual bystanders are present during a problem solving task. Furthermore Markey (2000) had examined bystander behavior in a web based environment. Therefore he asked people in several chat-rooms (with different group sizes) for help. He found out if the number of people are present in a chat group is higher, the less people are willing to help.

According to the findings of Kozlov and Johansen (2010) an interesting question reveals. Namely, is a simple mental representation of others are strong enough for creating

typical bystander behavior? In a series of studies of Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, and Darley (2002) investigated this question. Their participants had been instructed to imagine the presence of a group with strangers (sitting in a crowded movie theatre) or not (sitting in a movie theatre with a friend). After that the participants were asked how much of their future annual income they are willing to spend for an alumina fund (which will be used to supply important needs of the university). Garcia et al. (2002) found that individuals who had been instructed to imagine the presence of unknown others are significant less willing to spend money. These findings are in line with the results of Latané and Nida (1981). But the findings of Garcia el al. (2002) are partly contrary to the findings of Levine et al. (2010). Levin et al. (2010) replicated the studies of Garcia et al. (2002) but additionally they manipulated the social category of mentally presented bystanders (cf. Garcia et al., 2002; Levine et al., 2010). The results of Levine et al. (2010) yielded that individuals who had to imagine the presence of friends were less willing to show helping behavior by an increasing number of bystanders. This is in line with the results of Garcia et al. (2002). But participants who had to imagine strangers showed no typical bystander behavior. Taken together, mentally represented bystanders can as well increase or decrease the willing to help in the dependency of the bystanders' social category.

There are some factors which can improve the rate of intervening in emergency situations, although other bystanders are present. In the study of Baumeister et al. (1988) participants were primed either as group leaders or assistants. Subsequent they had to work on a discussion task via an intercom. During the discussion the participants heard a staged call for help (a woman attacked by a man). Individuals who had been primed as group leaders had been significantly more likely to take action. In other words, group leaders are more willing to intervene, because they feel more personal responsibility and this prevents people of diffusion of responsibility (Baumeister et al., 1988).

An important factor which has an effect on the prevalence of help-giving is the victim itself. Greitemeyer, Rudolph, and Weiner (2003) have investigated the question if people are more willing to help an acquaintance who is not responsible for his or her plight or a sibling who is responsible for being in a bad situation. Their participants had to imagine two different situations, a non-emergency situation (being left by a former partner) or a life-or-death situation. For both situations they manipulated the responsibility of the affected person (being responsible vs. not being responsible for the situation). The results of Greitemeyer et al. (2003) showed that individuals who had to imagine the non-emergency situation are more willing to help a non-responsible acquaintance than a responsible sibling. But in the life-or-death situation people are more willing to help a sibling. Summarizing the findings of Greitemeyer et al. (2003) individuals give more help to people who are not responsible for their plight, but if a sibling is in a life-or-death situation this effect terminates.

Further leads a previous wrong accusation to more helping behavior (Harrell & Glotz, 1980). Their participants had been sitting in the university library while others were present, and had wrongly accused, or not, that they have stolen a book of an experimenter's confidante. After that another confidante tried to steal a book of the first confidante. People who had been wrongly accused before, intervened more often than not accused one. They argued that a wrongful accusation can lead to serious negative consequences, like losing a job, being wrongly imprisoned or being embarrassed in public. Furthermore Harrell and Glotz (1980) found that individuals are more willing to help a needy victim (manipulated by the income of the victim), especially by female participants. Further Solomon, Solomon, and Maiorca (1982) have also found that people are more likely to help a needy victim. These results are in line with findings of a meta-analysis of Rudolph et al. (2004).

Another characteristic of a victim which influences the willingness to help in an emergency is the type of a victim. In a vignette study Laner et al. (2001) examined this. Their participants had to read a description of an emergency situation which takes place in a parking

lot. They should imagine that a man is attacking a victim. The dangerousness of the man (140 – 150 vs. 180 – 190 pounds), the type of the victim (6-year old child vs. woman vs. a 40 pound dog) and the relationship between victim and perpetrator (stranger vs. close related) were manipulated. Laner et al. (2001) found, in the study described before, that individuals who are willing to help make no distinction between the types of a victim. Their explanation for this result is that people who have the appropriate capacity and beliefs will take action independent of a victim's strength. This way of reasoning will be picked up later in this work. A further result is that the gender of a bystander has an influence on the willingness to help. Women are more willing to help children than other women while men are more willing to help women. Laner et al. (2001) argued that a woman would not be able to handle the attacker better than another woman, but they feel more powerful than children. In addition to the results mentioned before, the relationship between victim and attacker has no influence on the rate of help-giving. But individuals who are experienced with breaking up fights are more willing spring into action. Taken together, people will help in an emergency independently of the relationship between victim and perpetrator, the dangerousness of the attacker, and the type of a victim (Laner et al., 2001). Individuals are also more willing to help victims when they have empathy for them (Niesta Kayser et al., 2010). Furthermore can help-giving influenced by very little things, like a gaze. They field study results of Valentine (1980) had shown that people's will to help a handicapped person (with a sling around her most frequent used arm) is increased by a victims gaze.

An important factor which influences the willingness for helping or not in a situation which efforts acting is the situation itself. In the study of Clark and Word (1974) participants were exposed either in clear or highly ambiguous emergency situations. They have found that people in the clear condition show more help than in the highly ambiguous situation. But there is also empirical evidence that bystanders can increase the rate of help-giving in an ambiguous emergency situation. In a study of Levine et al. (2002) participants watched a

short video tape with a hard to identify attack on a man by two others (one man and one woman) in the presence of two confederate bystanders. The bystanders introduced themselves before, either as in-group members (from the same college) or out-group members (from another collage). Immediately after the video stopped the confederates indicated if they are willing or not to intervene in the depicted situation. Subsequent participants had to indicate on a questionnaire if they will or not intervene in a similar real-life incident. Levine et al. (2002) found that individuals who were surrounded by confederates who were willing to intervene in the depicted situation show more will to intervene in a similar real-life scenario.

Beyond that Chekroun and Brauer (2002) investigated the question if individuals are show more intention to intervene when they feel more personal involvement in a situation. They observed people who are joining a norm violation in an elevator of a shopping mall (a male confidante was painting a graffiti in the elevator) or in a small neighborhood park (two female confidantes was littering the park with plastic bottles). For the individuals in the mall condition typical bystander behavior was observed. But, in the park condition bystanders did not decrease the rate of intervening due to personal responsibility. In addition it has to be noted that a questionnaire study has found that bystanders reduce the frequency for both situations described before. These findings are in line with the results of the meta-analyses of Fischer et al. (2011) who have found evidence that the presence of bystanders increases helping behavior more in experimental than in realistic environments. To sum up Chekroun and Brauer's results, people who feel personal involvement in a situation are more willing to help as people who feel no personal involvement.

Further is the decision to help in a situation always influenced by personal costs and rewards. Imagine the following situation. An old helpless looking woman is standing next to you, surrounded by a few people, at the bus station. She is carrying three large, heavy looking shopping bags. As her bus arrives you ask her if you should help her to get into the bus. She said yes and you lift the bags for her into the bus. Subsequent the old woman thanked you for

giving her a helping hand. What are costs and rewards in this example? Costs can be personal time and physical efforts (especially when you have problems with your back) and rewards are personal thank of the old woman. Piliavin, Piliavin, and Rodin (1975) have investigated the question how help-giving is linked with costs and rewards in the presence of bystanders. Concerning the costs it has to mention that costs can not only arise for a help-giving individual when he or she helps, costs can also arise of non-helping. Two examples should illustrate this. First, remember the scenario with the old woman. There are relative low costs for the woman if you do not carry her bags into the bus. Second, you are again at the bus station and suddenly a person collapsed next to you and blood is running out of his or her nose. If you are not helping in this situation the costs for the person who is lying on the floor are very high (in the worst case he or she can die), while your costs are quite similar as in the first example. Piliavin et al. (1975) also argued that people who join an emergency experience an arousal (physical or psychical) which leads to an unpleasant feeling. As individuals tend to reduce this unpleasant state they will reduce by helping. In other words, the more arousal people experience in a case of emergency the more they are willing to help (Piliavin et al., 1975). Furthermore, it is also possible that costs for non-helping a victim in an emergency are higher than costs for helping (Fischer et al., 2011). I will go deeper in this case in the moral courage part.

If people are willing to help in a case of emergency is also affect by social categorization processes (Fischer et al., 2011; Levine, 1999; Levine, Cassidy, & Jentzsch, 2010; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine & Crowther, 2008). Imagine the following situation. You see two ten year old boys and a two and a half year old upset looking boy who are coming outside of a shopping mall. They walk down the street where other people could see them. All the way long the two and a half year old boy was sobbing. Three days later you read in a newspaper that the older boys have killed the younger one. This case took really place in a city of Great Britain (cf. Levine, 1999). Levine (1999) has analyzed

testifies of the witnesses of this murder. Most of the witnesses report that they had perceived the tree boys as brothers and therefore they did not intervened, although they had realized that the little boy was sobbing. Witnesses (bystanders) had failed to help, because the perceive them as associated to the same social category (Levine, 1999). In other words, if the bystanders had seen the two boys as perpetrators and the young boy as victim, they would be more like to help. But there is also some empirical evidence that the belongingness to a social category can increase the rate of bystander intervention.

For that reason Levine et al. (2002) investigated the question if the social category has an influence on bystander intervention. Therefore, their participants had to watch a short video clip, in the presence of confederate bystanders, where an emergency could be seen. Before watching the video the participants were informed that the victim is either from an in-group or an out-group. This had been manipulated by the belongingness to a collage. After watching the video, participants had to indicate how much they are willing to help the depicted victim. Individuals who were informed that the victim is an in-group member indicated more willing to help the victim than individuals in the out-group condition. To sum up, people show a higher intent if a victim is perceived as an in-group member. Further evidence for the before mentioned findings was found in a study of Levine and Crowther (2008). Their participants had to imagine an attack on a woman by a single man on a street. The attack took place either in the presence of five other persons (strangers, students or friends) or without being surrounded by anyone. After working on a task which was used to enhance the manipulations (cf. Levine and Crowther, 2008) individuals had to fill out a questionnaire about how they would to engage in a similar situation. Participants who had imagined the presence of strangers showed typical bystander behavior (the presence of others increases the readiness for intervening). Same was found for the student condition. But for individuals who were instructed to imagine the presence of friends, no bystander effect was found. In a further, quite similar, experiment Levine and Crowther (2008) replaced the student

condition by a gender condition. Bystanders were depicted now as strangers, males or females, or friends. The remaining experiment was done in same way as described before. Levine and Crowther have found that women are more likely to intervene, when they imagined five women than one. If women imagined the presence of strangers and men they showed typical bystander behavior. Whereas the presence of others induces male participants show less likelihood to help in a similar situation. Independent of the social category of the imagine bystanders. According to these results Levine and Crowther (2008) assumes that the bystander effect only emerges when bystanders are constructed as strangers and not if bystanders are friends. Additionally, Levine and Crowther (2008) argue that not only a group of friends led to a higher likelihood of intervening also a shared social category of a victim and bystanders can promote intervention.

Further have Levine, Prosser, Evans, and Reicher (2005) investigated the question if a shared social category leads to more willingness to help in a real life scenario. For that reason they searched for participants who were fans of a particular English football club. They did this for making a social category salient. Individuals who were fans of this particular club and willing to join that study had to fill out a questionnaire about their fan behavior (e.g. How long have you been a fan?, How often do you watch your team?, etc.). Subsequent the experimenter informed the participants (everyone participated alone) that they have to watch a video in another building of the campus. On the way to the other building a staged emergency in three conditions took place. The victim (a stranger confederate) who was crying for help was either wearing a shirt of the same club which the participants support, or a shirt of a long rivaling team or a plane shirt. Levine et al. (2005) observed in their study that people are more willing to help a stranger victim if he or she is perceived as a group member. Further they have found that it makes no difference if a stranger victim is wearing a shirt of a rivaling team or a plan shirt.

As you see, help-giving is influenced many different factors (e.g. number of bystanders, characteristic of a victim, social category, etc.). Now I want to point out similarities and dissimilarities of helping behavior and moral courage.

Similarities and dissimilarities of helping behavior and moral courage

Helping behavior and moral courage are subtypes of pro-social behavior (Bierhoff, 2002; Fischer et al., 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Niesta Kayser et al., 2010). For a long time research had not made a distinction between this two constructs (cf. Bierhoff, 2002). But moral courage and helping behavior differ in quite a few attributes (Fischer et al., 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Niesta Kayser, 2010). Before going into detail I will give a definition for both constructs. *Helping behavior* is defined as a voluntary assistance with a benefitting intent to individuals (Bierhoff, 2002). For moral courage there is no clear definition (cf. Fischer et al., 2004; Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Labhun et al, 2004). *Moral courage* is summarized defined as a brave behavior, mostly out of a minority position, which is shown after an individual's subjective sense of justice is violated in situations implying increased negative social consequences (cf. Fischer et al., 2004; Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Labhun et al, 2004).

According to the definitions, moral courage and helping behavior can be distinguished among the expected negative social consequences (Fischer et al., 2004; Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006). Imagine the following two scenarios. First, you are helping an old helpless looking woman to cross the street. Second, you are sitting with four work mates in an intimate bar. After being there for around two hours, suddenly a colleague starts complaining about high rate of former Turkish fellow man in your country. Two other colleagues consent him. As you have strong sense for treating all people equally you begin to counter your work mates. Think about the possible social consequences for you. In the first scenario (help-giving) you will receive more than likely thank for your help. In the second

scenario you can probably reckon with negative social consequences, like getting sidelined by your work mates. Fischer et al. (2004) have done something quite similar in their vignette study in a Western and Eastern European country. Their participants had to read descriptions of possible scenarios. Subsequent they had to rate them about possible negative social consequences. Fischer et al. (2004) found, independent of the state of origin, that individuals ascribing moral courage situations more negative social consequences than help-giving situations.

Furthermore can moral courage lead to norm violations, while help-giving does not (Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004). Imagine following scenario. You are walking down a small street and see a mother who is playing with her six year old daughter in their garden. Suddenly, you hear a loud scream. You turn around and have to observe that the mother is beating her daughter. What rules can be violated by encroaching in this situation? Intervening in this scenario means that you have to break the right of privacy. But as Jonas and Brandstätter (2004) argue, that people who show moral courage act by higher-ordered subjective norms. In this case an individual have to violate the right of privacy for maintaining the right of unharmed life. According to Levine (1999) people sometimes do not show moral courage because that they are not willing to violate norms. Levine (1999) had analyzed testifies of witnesses of the James Bulger murder (cf. Levine, 1999). Quite a lot of the witnesses had indicated that they did not intervene for the reason that they had perceived the three boys as brothers.

Help-giving and moral courage situations can be also distinguished by the social constellation (Fischer et al., 2004; Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004; Niesta Kayser et al., 2010). In moral courage situations you always have triads consisting of a victim, a perpetrator and an intervening person. It has to mention that the victim must not be personally present in a moral courage situation (remember the bar scenario depicted before). While in help-giving situations

there is only a dyadic interaction between a victim and help-giver (Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004).

Independent if an individual show helping behavior or moral courage he or she have to pass all five stages of Latené and Darley's (1970) process model of helping, even the model cannot be simply transferred in moral courage situations (Greitemeyer et al., 2006). As mentioned before people must first notice that a situation is critic (attention). Second, the situation must be recognized as a potential case of emergency (emergency awareness). Third, an individual has to take personal responsibility for helping a needy person (attribution of responsibility). Fourth, people have to check if they have the right abilities to help (helping skills). Fifth, a conscious decision must be made (decision to help). Greitemeyer et al. (2006) found quite a few differences between moral courage and help-giving among the process model of helping. Their participants had to write either an essay about a situation in which they showed moral courage or helped another person. After finishing their essays the participants were asked to answer some questions about the situation they depicted. Greitemeyer et al.'s questions derived from the process model of helping. I indicate one example for each step. I observed my surroundings very carefully (attention). For a long time I was not sure how to interpret the critical situation (emergency awareness). I felt personally responsible to intervene (attribution of responsibility). I knew that I had the ability to intervene (helping skills). Concerning the decision to help they asked for (a) costs and benefits (e.g. When I intervened, I accepted getting in trouble with others), (b) salient norms (e.g. I felt personally obligated to advocate justice) and (c) affective processes (e.g. I became angry in that situation). Greitemeyer et al. (2006) found that moral courage situation are perceived faster as help-giving situations, are associated with more personal responsibility and a higher degree of expected negative social consequences. This is in line with the findings of Fischer et al. (2004). Further is moral courage connected with a higher salience of societal norms and more anger. Therefore help-giving situations provide more evaluation

apprehension and empathy (Greitemeyer et al., 2006). According to these findings people are more willing to help a victim who is not responsible for his or her situation (see also Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Harrell & Glotz, 1980). But for the decision to show moral courage there are different findings. According to Greitemeyer et al. (2006) and Niesta Kayser et al. (2010) empathy for the victim has no effect, but according to Labuhn et al. (2004) empathy is a predictor for showing moral courage.

In a series of studies Niesta Kayser et al. (2010) manipulated the mood-state of their participants to investigate the question how mood effects help-giving and moral courage. They found that people in a negative mood, compared to people in a neutral mood show less helping behavior if they are confronted with little benefit. But if people (in a negative mood condition) confronted with a high benefit from helping they are willing to show more helping behavior as people in a neutral mood. On the other hand participants in a good mood helped more regardless costs and benefits (Niesta Kayser et al., 2010). Contrary, in moral courage situations are individuals not affected by their actual mood-state. Furthermore, people indicated in these studies of Niesta Kayser et al. (2010) that they feel more anger about the perpetrator. This is in line with the results of Greitemeyer et al. (2006). Additionally, Niesta Kayser et al. (2010) examined also the importance of norms in their studies. They found that people who are willing to show moral courage are strongly driven by internal norms.

Help-giving and moral courage can also be distinguished by the costs for acting (Fischer et al., 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Jonas and Brandstätter, 2004; Niesta Kayser et al., 2010). Help-giving is mostly connected with relative low personal costs (e.g. Niesta Kayser et al., 2010) while moral courage implicates high personal costs (e.g. Greitemeyer et al., 2006), especially negative social consequences (Fischer et al., 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2006). Further revealed the meta-analyses of Fischer et al. (2011) that perceived personal costs of intervention moderates the magnitude of bystander intervention, however perceived costs of non-intervention to the victim did not. In other words if individuals observe their

personal costs as high (e.g. physical costs) then they are willing to intervene in an emergency but, if the anticipated costs for the victim are high then people will not take action. Fischer et al. (2011) substantiate these counterintuitive findings as follow. When individuals recognize that there is a possibility of getting injured in a case of intervention, they realize that they are confronted with a serious dangerous situation, not only for themselves also for the victim. People process the possibility of being self injured more directly as out of a third persons view and therefore people infer projective high costs to a victim. This is in line with the findings of Fischer et al. (2006). They have found that participants are more willing to intervene in a staged emergency when a perpetrator is perceived as dangerous, independent of the presence of a bystander. Auxiliary, Fischer et al. (2011) had found that the bystander effect is reduced in dangerous situations. According to their assumptions three processes are accountable for that. First, dangerous emergencies are perceived more clearly as non-dangerous emergencies. Second, additional bystanders reduce fear of intervening, because they provide physical and psychical support. And third, dangerous emergencies can be resolved better (or anyway) by coordination and cooperation among a greater number of bystanders.

To realize an effective moral courage training which should increase the frequency of intervening in a case of bullying, it is important to know the predictors of moral courage. But there are less empirical findings concerning the predictors of moral courage because research had not distinguished between helping behavior and moral courage (Jonas & Brandstätter, 2004). Therefore, I will indicate factors which have been found in "pure" moral courage research (for factors which were found in connection with helping behavior c.f. Jonas and Brandstätter, 2004). Niesta Kayser et al. (2010) found in their studies that individuals are more willing to act in a morally courageous manner if they have a high sense for justice, tolerance, freedom, and human dignity. Furthermore their results revealed that people will also show moral courage if they feel anger for the perpetrator. For example, if a neo-Nazi is

spreading paroles in the near of you, you are more willing to intervene if you feel anger for the parole spreading person. Further the possibility that individuals will act in a morally courageous way will be increased by resistance to group pressure and the willing to show civil disobedience (Niesta Kayser et al., 2010). These findings are in line with the detected predictors of Jonas and Brandstätter (2004). Accessory Labuhn et al. (2004) found that the willingness to show moral courage is negatively correlated with social domination orientation and positive correlated with intergroup contact. But there are controversial findings concerning the empathy for a victim. Labuhn el al. (2004) found that moral courage is positively correlated with empathy for a victim whereas there are more findings (Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Niesta Kayser el al., 2010) that empathy has no effect on the prevalence of moral courage. Further Laner et al. (2001) found that the type of a victim can also predict the prevalence of moral courage (note: The study has been already described before in the context of help-giving but the used scenarios are conforming moral courage criteria. e.g. social constellation). According to their findings men are willing to help women, while woman are more willing to help children.

Taken together help-giving and moral courage can be distinct among several characteristics (e.g. social constellation, costs and rewards, etc.) and moral courage can be predicted by quite a few factors (societal norms, mood, etc.). Now I will point out why it is so important that bullying has to be decreased and why this could be affected by a moral courage training.

Why can a moral courage training be a good possibility to increase the rate of intervening during bulling situations?

Before I can answer this question it is important to know how bullying takes place, what aims pursue bullies, and how bullying is influenced by peer involvement. Two examples should illustrate how bullying happens. First, a twelve year old girl is sitting alone at her

school desk while all other girls are standing in a circle in front of the classroom. The lonely

sitting girl has a question and moves to the other girls. As she arrives at the circle no one cares

about her. She asks if somebody can answer her question but no one of the other girls replies.

Subsequently, she moves back to her desk and thinks why again? Second, during the last

break of the school day a well known "bad guy" spots one of his favorite victims on the

schoolyard. The bad guy passes the court and as he arrives at the victim he beats him twice

and walks back to his friends. The first example show an indirect form while the second show

a direct form (e.g. beating) of bullying in school environment (Craig et al., 2000; O'Connell

et al., 1999; Thornberg, 2007; Salmivalli, 2010). Bullying must not only occur in a school

context, it can also happen in other environments, like prisons or organizations (cf. Salmivalli,

2010).

According to Salmivalli (2010) bullies are driven by a quest for high status. This

circumstance is reflected by their self-reported goals of being admired, respected, and

dominant (Salmivalli, 2010). On that score bullies choose their victims, time and place for

their assaults in a way that the chance of demonstrating their power to peers is maximized

(Salmivalli, 2010).

Quite a few studies (Craig et al., 2000; O'Connell et al., 1999; Thornberg, 2007;

Salmivalli, 2010) showed that in merely fifteen percent of bullying episodes no peers are

involved. But what influences have the presence of peers during bullying episodes? Peers can

either reinforce bullies' behavior or take action for a victim. Reinforcement can be done by

direct assisting a bully (Salmivalli, 2010) or by providing positive feedback, like cheering or

laughing (O'Connell et al., 1999; Salmivalli, 2010). If peers act like described before, a bully

receives rewarding for his or her behavior hence he or she will show bullying again (Craig et

al., 2000; O'Connell et al., 1999; Thornberg, 2007; Salmivalli, 2010). Peers can also intervene

in an appearance of bullying (Craig et al., 2000; O'Connell et al., 1999; Thornberg, 2007;

Salmivalli, 2010). If peers help in a case of bullying the likelihood that a bully will bully

again is decreased (Craig et al., 2000; O'Connell et al., 1999; Salmivalli, 2010). Furthermore, victims who received help reported less anxiety, less depression, and a higher self-esteem than victims which did not receive help (Salmivalli, 2010).

But why peers do not intervene in bullying episodes? First, several research (e.g. Craig et al., 2000; Salmivalli, 2010) showed that peers do not have adequate skills for intervening. Second, peers do not feel responsible for helping a victim of bullying due to diffusion of responsibility (Craig et al., 2000; O'Connell et al., 1999; Thornberg, 2007; Salmivalli, 2010). This is in line with findings of bystander research (cf. Latané & Nida, 1981). Third, peers transfer their responsibility for intervening to their teachers (Thornberg, 2007). Fourth, if peers decide to help a victim there is a possibility that he or she is becoming the next victim (Thornberg, 2007). This is in line with the cost reward model (Piliavin & Piliavin, 1975). Fifth, Thornberg (2007) found that bystanders of a bullying episode perceived it as not so dangerous or as a joke.

Therefore, a moral courage training should increase intervention skills (not only in the bullying context). According to the process model of help-giving, people proof if they have the right skills to intervene. Following to that peers should intervene more often if they have the right skills. On that score participants should have more intervening skills after the training as before (H1) and these skills should be also available after a longer period (H 2). Furthermore participants of the moral courage training should be in the situation to evaluate a dangerous situation better due to the reason that peers evaluate a bullying situation not as dangerous as it is. Following to the findings of Fischer et al. (2006) individuals are more willing to intervene if they perceive a situation as dangerous. Therefore participants should have a more adequate assessment of emergency situations after the training as before (H 3) and it should be available for a longer period (H 4). Additionally it should be proved if the training has an effect on the participants' mood (positive: H5, and negative: H 6).

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Method

Participants and Design

The sample was recruited at a secondary school in Feldbach (Styria, Austria). All classes of the fourth grade (last class of secondary education in Austria) of the school participated. The sample consisted of 59 adolescences. 26 of them were female and 33 male. They were between the ages of 13 and 16 years ($M = 14.10$, $SD = 0.74$). In the sample were six nations represented, Austrians (81.4%), Turks (10.2%), Slovenes (3.4%), Hungarians (1.7%), Russians (1.7%), and Bosnians (1.7%). All adolescences with other states of origin are German speaking at quite a high level. Participants received no payment for their participation. Permissions of the parents of the participants and the headmaster of the school had been sought. One participant had to be excluded from the research due to a missing permission of the parents. A 3 (time of measuring: pre vs. post vs. follow-up) x1 (all participants) was employed.

Procedure

Three to five days before the moral courage training started the participants were greeted by the trainer in their classrooms. The trainer introduced himself to the participants in presence of the teacher which was in the classroom at that time. A short overview of the training was given (e.g. that it will be worked with tutorials or how much time the training will take). But no information about the special exercises was indicated. Subsequently, the participants had to fill out a series of questionnaires (for the used ones see *Appendix)* with written instructions. The first page of the questionnaire asked for socio-demographic information (sex, age, school attendance, school class, profession of the parents, and state of origin) and a two items for generating a participant code (first three letters of the first name of mother and father). Remaining pages asked question concerning moral courage, their mood,

and social desirability (for a detailed information see *Dependent Measures*). Before the participants started answering, they were informed by the trainer that if there are questions about using the measurement or everything is unclear, they should feel free to ask. Furthermore the experimenter and attendant teacher oversaw that the participants worked on their own questionnaire, because it can be problematic if adolescences answer questionnaires in groups. The same procedure was progressed for every single class.

After the first testing the participants received an established moral courage training (the training is going to be described below) from the experimenter (a certificated moral courage trainer). Participants were trained for two days, five hours per day. The training took place in the classroom of the participating class and started at the same time as the normal teaching starts (7:45 a.m.). For the reason that the training happened in the class rooms it was regarded that breaks fitted with regular breaks during a school day. Otherwise participants had been distracted by the noise level which occurs on a hallway during a break.

The post testing took place within five days after finishing the moral courage training. The participants had to answer the same series of questionnaires as before. For investigating if the training has a long time effect participants had to answer the series of questionnaires after five weeks of finishing the training.

Description of the Moral Courage Training

The moral courage training used in this research is an adaption of the established moral courage training "zsammgrauft" (cf. Frey et al., 2007). The used exercises are the same as in the original training but a few language adoptions had to be done. All exercises are in line with the process model of help-giving of Latané and Darley (1970). At the beginning of the training every participant got a name plate (first name) and were informed that they could stop an exercise at any time if they feel unpleasant. Following topics were discussed with the participants after every tutorial, (a) How did you experience the exercise?, (b) What was

important that the exercise works?, (c) What was the aim of the exercise?. Summarizing reflections were done at the end of the first day, the beginning and ending of the second day. The training included following exercises. Exercises 1-9 were conducted on the first and 10-16 on the second day.

    1. "Stay to your opinion". The participants (including the trainer) are sitting in a circle. The trainer stands up and gives a short positive statement (e.g. "I like travelling."). All participants should give a non-verbal feedback on the given statement. If they agree ("I like also travelling.") they have to stand-up, if they do not agree ("I do not like travelling.") they remain seated. If someone is undecided, he or she stands up half. After every participant has given feedback the trainer sits down. Two or three rounds more are preceded by the trainer as example. Then every single participant gives a statement and the others have to give non-verbal feedback (stand up, stand up half, or remain seated).

    The main aim of this exercise is that the participants increase their self-confidence and moral-courage. Additionally, they are aware how multifaceted their group is.

    2. "Node". An even number of participants (e.g. eight or ten) are standing in a circle and stretch their hands to the center. Subsequently, every participant reaches for two different hands, but not for the hands of the person who is standing next. If every hand has found another one the participants have to disentangle the node without unclasping their hands.

    In this exercise the participants learn how to communicate in a group to solve a problem which is very important in moral courage situations.

    3. "Ice floe". All participants have to put their chairs into the middle of the room. The trainer instructs them to climb on their own chair. Subsequently, the trainer begins to remove one chair by another. The participants should stand on as little as possible chairs.

    The aim of this exercise is that the participants improve their communication skills and especially to get to know how to take responsibility for each other.

4. "Violence scale". The trainer places a scale (in form of cards) in the middle of the room, reaching from *0 = "no violence"* to *100 = "violence"*. Every participant receives a card with a short statement (e.g. "A girl is excluded of the class community due to her clothes." or, "To scuffle for fun.") or single terms (e.g. "A boxing match" or "Video games"). After receiving the card the participant has to read the statement or the single term to the audience, who should remain in silence. Subsequently, he or she has to place the card beside the violence scale without commenting why he or she does so. When all cards are placed at the scale the participants have the possibility to rearrange the cards according to their own assessments. Now they are allowed to discuss their ratings. After a few minutes (two to three minutes) the trainer stops the rearrangement because the participants do not agree on a consistent rating.

In this exercise the participants adept that everyone rates violence in a different way. Furthermore, they learn that a victim decides if an act (e.g. making jokes about somebody) is violent or not.

5. "Small circles". Two volunteers are asked to leave the room. The volunteers are instructed as follows. "Imagine you are joining a new class. You do not know anyone. Try to get into contact with the people of the new class and introduce yourself. You can do everything you want to reach your goal." The remaining participants in the room are instructed to build two closed circles within they could communicate. Further they receive following instruction. "You have to exclude him or her if he or she returns into the class. Do not talk with him or her. Do not give him or her a glance, no matter whatever they try to get into contact". Subsequently, the first volunteer is requested to come inside and behave according the instructions. After two or three minutes (or even shorter if you see it is time to stop the exercise) the practice is interrupted by the trainer. The first volunteer is readopted by the group. Same procedure is performed with the second volunteer. Finalizing, the participants are asked how they felt during this tutorial.

In this practice the participants acquire a sensibility for social exclusion processes. Additionally a sense for the impact of psychological aggression should be developed.

6. "The wall". Two volunteers are asked to leave the room. The volunteers are instructed as follows. "You are on the way to the train station and you are quite late. It is important that you catch the train because you are invited to a mattering interview. Therefore you have to pass a small alley, as it is the shortest way to the train station and the only possibility to catch your train." The trainer returns. In the room circa six participants have to build "the wall" in the room for simulating an alley. The distance between "the wall" and a wall of the room should be approximately one meter. Participants who are building "the wall" do not interfere in the tutorial. The remaining participants have to observe the happening. The first volunteer is requested to return into the room and to pass the alley. At the end of the alley the trainer obstructs the way. After the first volunteer has tried to pass the trainer anyhow the trial is broken. Same procedure is performed with the second volunteer.

"The wall" aims at the sensibility for dangerous situations and adequate behavior patterns in such situations.

7. "Saying yes". All participants are sitting in a circle. In the first trial they are instructed to say "yes" participant by participant, without further comments. In the second trial the trainer asks a short question (e.g. "Do you like soul music?"). Subsequently, participant by participant have to answer this question with "yes". No other answers are allowed. Assuming that not everybody likes soul music the pronunciation of "yes" will be quite different.

In this trail the participants get a sensibility for the different meaning of words and also for body language.

8. "STOP!". The participants are divided in two even groups. After that, the groups are standing in opposite rows. One row has to remain. The other group approaches the remaining in a threatening way. Participants in the standing row are instructed to stop the

"perpetrator" if he or she oversteps a subjective privacy border with a loud and clear "STOP!" underlined with loudness, mimic, a sidestep, and movement of the hand toward the perpetrators chest. Subsequent the roles of the participants are exchanged. Following to that participants have train this pair wise.

This practice is designed for getting a sensibility for privacy and how to protect with a simple non-aggressive method. Furthermore, the participants experience the difficulty of setting personal borders in public.

9. "The bus". The trainer recreates a seating arrangement of a public transport bus with chairs. One chosen participant is sitting in the front left to figure the drivers' role. The trainer frames a realistic bus ride with stops, announcements, boarding and exiting passengers. During the tutorial the participants have to play different passengers (e.g. an old lady, two friends who are coming from the football training, four girls who want to go shopping, or a single cool young man). After a while the trainer boards the bus and starts to hassle the young man (who is alone in the last row). The trainer continues hassling and observes how the other participants in the bus react. After the first reaction concerning the trainer (e.g. somebody tried to intervene anyhow), he stops the tutorial.

In this tutorial the participants learn to recognize possible dangerous situations. Furthermore, they acquire de-escalating competences for acting right in such situations. For example, if someone is a witness of a similar attack he or she should disembarrass the victim with simple non-violent methods.

10. "Tornado". The trainer (he has no chair) is standing in the middle of the seated participants and starts the tutorial with an example like this, "The tornado blows everyone away who has green eyes!". Subsequently, all participants with e.g. green eyes have to stand-up and search for a new seat, including the trainer. The one who remains without a seat is going to introduce the next round in the same way as the trainer had demonstrated it in the example. After a few rounds (approximate ten) the trainer stops this exercise.

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Tornado is the warm-up exercise for the second day. It reduces tenseness and splits up buzz groups.

11. "Pendulum". Two volunteers are asked to leave the room. Eight volunteers of the remaining participants are instructed to build a circle wherein a volunteer could oscillate. The first volunteer is requested to return into the room. Subsequently, he or she receives commission to stand in the middle of the circle and to drop like a pendulum. The participants who are building the circle move him or her to all sides. After three minutes the trainer stops the tutorial.

Within this exercise the participants increase their faith in people and learn how to take responsibility for others.

12. "Falling backwards". A table is standing in the middle of the room. Next to it a gymnastic mat is placed. Eight participants are standing on the mat facing one other. They hold out their arms in a way that it looks like a zip fastener. The volunteer on the table has to move to the edge, to turns his back to the participants who are standing next to the table, and to close his or her eyes. After that he or she asks if the others were ready to catch him or her. Only if everyone has answered with a loud and clear "yes" the volunteer drops. This tutorial aims at the same as "Pendulum".

13. "Standing humans". One volunteer is asked to lie down on his or her back on a gymnastic mat in the middle of the room. The supine volunteer can choose another person who is going to stand on his or her body. Before the chosen person is going to climb on the volunteer the trainer asks systematically where it will be all right to stand on him or her with a special hint for the vulnerability of every part of the body. The trainer asks for example. "Is it alright for you that X (the name of the person who is going to stand on the volunteer) stands on your fingers?" Subsequently, the chosen person climbs on a part of the volunteer's body where he or she had agreed on before that was all right.

The aim of this exercise is that the participants obtain a sensibility for the vulnerability of a human body, especially if someone is a victim of a violent act.

14. "Influenced by bystanders". Two volunteers are asked to leave the room. Both receive a foam basher. They are instructed to make an exhibition fight for the audience. The participants in the room are divided in two groups. The bystanders (remaining participants in the room) are instructed to cheer either rival A, or rival B, or both after a determinant signal (e.g. raising the right arm means cheer rival B). Furthermore, they have to stop on a signal. The encouragement should be practiced. After practicing, the volunteers return and start battling. The bystanders have to act as practiced. After five minutes the trainer gives the signal for stopping the cheering. According to the stop signal the volunteers end normally their exhibition.

In this tutorial the participants learn how bystanders influence an emergency, in a positive and negative way.

15. "Defense with a knife". One volunteer receives a fake knife (e.g. a pen) for self-defense. Subsequent he or she has to imagine that he or she is waiting alone at a bus stop surrounded by a few other waiting people. After a few moments the trainer starts basseting the volunteer and asks for money. The aim of the trainer is that he presses the volunteer in a corner of the room where he or she has no chance to escape. When the victim of this staged attack shows a reaction (e.g. drawing the knife) the trainer ends the tutorial.

The aim of this tutorial is that the participants learn how to react in situations like that without using any weapons. Beyond this they recognize that a weapon cannot prevent from a violence act. Furthermore, they learn that the use of weapon for self-defense increases the risk of an escalation.

16. "The elephant". The participants are divided into two groups, one larger ("herd of elephants") and a smaller one ("hunters"). The elephants sit on a gymnastic mat and have to clasp each other. The hunters are instructed to split up the herd with every method. But,

depending on the group there are some basic rules like, "It is forbidden to beat or to kick".

Besides, the hunters are allowed to discuss their strategy outside of the room. Further, the

hunters are informed that they have to stop their attack if one of the elephants shouts "Stop!".

The elephants are instructed that they can introduce new rules. They have to shout "Stop!" for

stopping the attack of the hunters. So, they can introduce a new rule (e.g. "It is not allowed to

tickle anymore!"). The new rule will be written on a flipchart, and only when this is done the

hung goes on. The trainer operates as observer in this exercise. When a rule is violated he can

stop the attack to point out to the application of the rules.

In this exercise the participants learn once more that they are responsible for each

other, they increase the attentions to possible norm violations, and recognize that they can be

supportive for their fellow men.

Dependent Measures

The dependent measures are an adaption for adolescences of the established moral-

courage questionnaire "MÜZI", the "EWL 40-KJ", a German inventory for children and

adolescences which gathers mood, and the German version of the social desirability scale

"BIDR".

MÜZI. The MÜZI of Kastenmüller, Greitemeyer, Fischer, and Frey (2007) is an

inventory which measures moral courage on three factors, (a) *moral courage by slogans*

($\alpha = .77$), (b) *moral courage at workplace* ($\alpha = .74$), and (c) *moral courage by physical*

violence ($\alpha = .67$). The whole inventory has a retest-reliability of $r = .73$. The retest-

reliabilities for the factors are (a) $r = .68$ (moral courage by slogans), (b) $r = .74$ (moral

courage at workplace), and (c) $r = .67$ (moral courage by physical violence).

The factor for moral courage by slogans consists of four items (e.g. "A superior

spreads cracker-barrel slogans against foreigners in the presence of your work group." or,

"Four aggressive and drunken men are spreading cracker-barrel slogans against foreigners.").

Moral courage at workplace is measured by five items (e.g. "Some of your colleagues try to isolate another colleague." or, "One of your female colleagues is forced by a superior to sort out tasks which are under her qualifications."). And moral courage by physical violence is measured with four items (e.g. "Two extreme right wing troublemakers are harassing a young woman in the tube." or, "You hear that a well known and liked neighbor maltreats his wife.")

Due to the reason that the MÜZI is developed for adults it has to be adopted for adolescences. The adopted version of the inventory measures the perceived danger of acting morally courageous in a situation and intervention skills on three factors (see below). In Table 1 you find the origin (MÜZI) and the adopted (MÜZI-KJ) items. The factors for the adopted inventory (MÜZI-KJ) are described as (a) *moral courage by slogans* (perceived danger of acting α = .76; intervention skills α = .70), (b) *moral courage at school* (perceived danger of acting α = .69; intervention skills α = .73), and (c) *moral courage by physical violence* (perceived danger of acting α = .87; intervention skills α = .76).

For the perceived danger of acting morally courageous the participants were asked to rate (0 = *not dangerous*; 6 = *very dangerous*) concrete situations. They received following written instruction. "You are finding some situations in which you could intervene. Please rate how dangerous it would be for you if you intervene in the described situations. Please answer all questions. There are no right or wrong answers."

For the intervention skills the participants were asked to rate (0 = *don't know how*; 6 = *know exactly how*) the same situations again concerning their assessed intervention skills. The participants received following written instruction. "You are finding the same situations again. What do you think, do you know how to help in these situations? Please answer all questions. There are no right or wrong answers."

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Table 1.

Origin (MÜZI) and Adopted (MÜZI-KJ) Items

	Origin	Adopted
1.	Some of your colleagues try to isolate another colleague.	Some of your classmates try to isolate another colleague.
2.	Your superior is shouting at an older female colleague daily.	A teacher is shouting at a classmate daily.
3.	One of your female colleagues is forced to sort out tasks which are under her qualifications by a superior.	One of your classmates receives a too difficult task from a teacher in front of the class.
4.	Your superior is spreading the whisper that one of your female colleagues suffers from mental decease.	Your classmates are spreading the whisper that one of your colleagues has bats in the belfry.
5.	A superior spreads cracker-barrel slogans against foreigners in the presence of your work group.	A teacher is spreading slogans against foreigners in front of your class.
6.	Information is deprived of one colleague repeatedly.	After a classmate returns from illness, he or she deprived the information that a test takes place the next week.
7.	Four aggressive and drunken men are spreading cracker-barrel slogans against foreigners.	Four aggressive and drunken men are spreading slogans against foreigners in a pub.
8.	You are on a train. A group of adolescences are telling hostile jokes to foreigners.	You are on a train. A group of adolescences are telling hostile jokes to foreigners.
9.	Two extreme right wing troublemakers are harassing a young woman in the tube.	Two extreme right wing troublemakers are harassing a young woman in the bus.
10.	A strong looking man is beating brutally his three year old son in the zoo.	A strong looking man is beating brutally his three year old son on the playground.
11.	You hear that a liked relative is sexually abusing his daughter.	You hear that a liked relative is abusing his daughter.
12.	Extreme right wing troublemakers are spreading paroles against homosexuals and handicapped persons.	Extreme right wing troublemakers are spreading paroles against homosexuals and handicapped persons.
13.	You hear that a well known and liked neighbor maltreats his wife.	You hear that a well known and liked neighbor maltreats his wife.

Note. The linguistic differences are stronger in the German version of the inventory.

Table 2.

Origin and Adopted Items of the Inventory to Gather Social Desirability on Two Factors

	Origin	Adopted
1.	The first impression I get of other people mostly come true.	The first impression I get of other people mostly come true.
2.	Sometimes I lie, if I have to. (N)	Sometimes I lie, if I have to. (N)
3.	It could happen that I am not honest to myself. (N)	It could happen that I am not honest to myself. (N)
4.	It have been occurred that I impose on somebody's kindness. (N)	It have been occurred that I impose on somebody's kindness. (N)
5.	I always know why I like something.	I always know why I like something.
6.	I never cuss.	I never cuss.
7.	It is hard for me to edge out a worrisome thought. (N)	It is hard for me to edge out a worrisome thought. (N)
8.	Sometimes I prefer to pay somebody something back than to forgive and forget. (N)	Sometimes I prefer to pay somebody something back than to forgive and forget. (N)
9.	Sometimes I miss something because I am too slowly in my decision. (N)	Sometimes I miss something because I am too slowly in my decision. (N)
10.	It happened that I received too much change without informing the shop assistant. (N)	It happened that I received too much change informing telling the shop assistant. (N)
11.	I am a rational thinking individual.	I am a rational thinking individual.
12.	Principally, I always indicate everything I have to tariff.	Principally, I always indicate everything I have to pay.
13.	I seldom can take criticism. (N)	I seldom can take criticism. (N)
14.	Sometimes I drive faster as it is allowed. (N)	Sometimes I stay out longer as it is allowed. (N)
15.	I am sure of my decisions.	I am sure of my decisions.
16.	I have done things of which I untold anything. (N)	I have done things of which I untold anything. (N)

Note. Items marked with (N) are formulated negative.   (continued)

Table 2. (continued)

Origin and Adopted Items of the Inventory to Gather Social Desirability on Two Factors

	Origin	Adopted
17.	Sometimes I doubt on my skills as an enthusiast. (N)	Sometimes I doubt on my skills as a friend. (N)
18.	I never take things which are not mine.	I never take things which are not mine.
19.	I do not always know the reasons of my actions. (N)	I do not always know the reasons of my actions. (N)
20.	I have not been in school or work due to a staged illness. (N)	I have not been in school or work due to a staged illness. (N)

Note. Items marked with (N) are formulated negative.

EWL40-KJ. The EWL40-KJ of Janke and Janke (2005) measures mood on two independent dimensions (positive vs. negative). Positive mood is gathered with three subtests, (a) serenity (α = .65), (b) joviality (α = .84), and (c) activeness (α = .60). Negative mood is gathered with seven subtests, (a) infuriation (α = .50), (b) ill-humored (α = .73), (c) anger (α = .75), (d) aggression (α = .75), (e) anxiety (α = .51), (f) upset (α = .71), and (g) des-activity (α = .80). Each subtest consists of four items (e.g. "even", "relaxed", "laid-back", and "fast" for serenity). The participants have to rate (0 = *not at all*; 3 = *very*) how they feel at the moment.

An inventory to gather social desirability on two factors. This inventory of Musch, Brockhaus, and Bröder (2002) is the German version of Paulhus' "Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding" scale. The inventory of Musch et al. (2002) measures two distinguishable components of social desirability: self-deceptive enhancement (α = .66) and impression management (α = .65). Each scale consists of ten items. For example, "Sometimes I lie, if I have to." (impression management) or "I am sure of my decisions." (self-deceptive enhancement). The participants have to rate (1 = *I do not agree*; 7 = *I absolutely agree*) how they concur with the statements. Some of the items had to be adopted for adolescences (see Table 2).

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Results

An overview of the sample's means and standard deviations of the used inventories is

found in Table 3 (MÜZI-KJ), Table 4 (An inventory to gather social desirability on two

factors), and Table 5 (EWL 40-KJ).

Table 3.

Sample Means and Standard Deviations MÜZI-KJ

	Time 1[a]		Time 2[b]		Time 3[c]	
Scale	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Perceived danger of acting						
Moral courage by slogans	2.98	1.54	3.26	1.57	3.02	1.64
Moral courage at school	1.65	1.10	2.00	1.20	1.82	1.19
Moral courage by physical violence	4.03	1.76	4.15	1.84	3.45	2.00
Intervention skills						
Moral courage by slogans	2.51	1.44	3.04	1.69	2.88	1.45
Moral courage at school	3.59	1.39	4.01	1.51	3.59	1.39
Moral courage by physical violence	3.68	1.56	4.17	1.70	3.71	1.67

Note. [a]$n = 55$; [b]$n = 51$; [c]$n = 42$

Table 4.

Sample Means and Standard Deviations of the Inventory to gather Social Desirability on Two

Factors

	Time 1[a]		Time 2[b]		Time 3[c]	
Scale	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Self-deceptive enhancement	4.24	0.73	4.09	1.05	4.13	0.75
Impression management	4.33	1.03	4.18	1.19	4.08	1.11

Note. [a]$n = 55$; [b]$n = 51$; [c]$n = 42$

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Table 5.

Sample Means and Standard Deviations EWL40-KJ

	Time 1[a]		Time 2[b]		Time 3[c]	
Scale	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Positive mood	1.62	0.69	1.65	0.67	1.24	0.71
Serenity	1.52	0.74	1.58	0.78	1.14	0.77
Joviality	1.84	0.90	1.85	0.90	1.45	0.97
Activeness	1.49	0.75	1.54	0.76	1.14	0.75
Negative mood	0.59	0.49	0.57	0.52	0.63	0.70
Infuriation	0.77	0.61	0.73	0.63	0.62	0.65
Ill-humored	0.40	0.64	0.48	0.77	0.55	0.83
Anger	0.40	0.67	0.45	0.75	0.60	0.99
Aggression	0.50	0.78	0.50	0.78	0.63	0.96
Anxiety	0.28	0.48	0.33	0.50	0.36	0.63
Upset	0.40	0.62	0.38	0.62	0.47	0.77
Des-activity	1.36	0.85	1.12	0.82	1.20	0.98

Note. [a]*n* = 55; [b]*n* = 51; [c]*n* = 42

MÜZI-KJ

A t-test for paired samples revealed that participants who passed the moral courage training had a higher level of intervention skills for situations in which paroles appear than before the training, $t(46) = -3,22$, $p = .002$, one-tailed, $d_z = -0.47$, $1 - \beta = .94$. All means, standard deviations, t-values, p-values and d values are depicted in Table 6. Furthermore, the moral courage training increased the individuals' intervention skills for acting morally courageous at school, $t(46) = -3,07$, $p = .004$, one-tailed, $d_z = -0.45$, $1 - \beta = .91$. The moral courage training had also an effect on individuals' intervention skills against physical violence. A t-test for paired samples revealed that individuals had more skills for intervening in situations where physical violence occurs after the training as before, $t(46) = -2.71$, $p = .009$, one-tailed, $d_z = -0.40$, $1 - \beta = .85$. These results underline my first hypothesis (H 1)

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that individuals should have more intervention skills after the moral courage training as before.

However, the moral courage had no effect on the perceived danger of acting morally courageous in situations where slogans appear, $t(46) = -1.51$, *n.s.*, one-tailed, $d_z = -0.22$, $1 - \beta = .44$. Additionally, the moral courage training had also no effect on the perceived dangerousness of intervening in situations which require moral courage at school, $t(46) = -1.59$, *n.s.*, one-tailed, $d_z = -0.23$, $1 - \beta = .48$. Further the training had no effect on the perceived danger of taking action in situations where physical violence appears. The participants rate the dangerousness of acting morally courageous in violent situations in the same way after the training as before, $t(46) = -0.20$, *n.s.*, one-tailed, $d_z = -0.03$, $1 - \beta = .07$. These results do not support my third hypothesis (H 3) that the moral courage training increases the possibility to rate situations more adequately which requires moral courage.


Figure 1.   Means for intervention skills. Before (t1) and after (t2) the moral courage training.

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Table 6.

Contrasts Before (t1) and After (t2) the Moral Courage Training (MÜZI-KJ)

Scale	t 1		t 2		t(46)	p	Cohen's d_z
	M	SD	M	SD			
Perceived danger of acting							
Moral courage by slogans	2.95	1.54	3.23	1.57	-1.51	.138	-0.22
Moral courage at school	1.72	1.12	2.08	1.22	-1.59	.119	-0.23
Moral courage by physical violence	4.16	1.75	4.20	1.80	-0.20	.845	-0.03
Intervention skills							
Moral courage by slogans	2.42	1.41	3.01	1.68	-3.22	.002	-0.47
Moral courage at school	3.54	1.33	4.10	1.43	-3.07	.004	-0.45
Moral courage by physical violence	3.65	1.58	4.30	1.64	-2.71	.009	-0.40

Note. $n = 47$

Participants who passed the moral courage training had a higher level of intervention skills for situations after the training as before, but no long time effects could be observed. A 3 (time of measuring) x1 (all participants) ANOVA for repeated measures revealed that the moral courage training did not increase the intervention skills for acting morally courageous against slogans over a long period, $F(2,31) = 2.59$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.08$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .50$. Furthermore, the moral courage training had no increasing effect on the participants intervention skills for showing moral courage at school, $F(2,32) = 1.66$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.05$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .34$. Individuals who participated in the moral courage training showed also no long time effect for their intervention skills against physical violence although an ANOVA for repeated measures revealed a significant overall effect, $F(2,31) = 4.85$, $p = .011$, $\eta^2 = 0.14$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .78$. But, a *post-hoc*-Test (LSD) showed that participants had only more intervention skills as before ($p = .007$) directly after the moral courage training in comparison to a period of four to

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six weeks (p = n.s.). These results did not support my second hypothesis (H 2). Individuals who attended the moral courage training had more intervention skills after the training but not for a longer period.

It was also proved whether the moral courage training has a long time effect on the perceived dangerousness of acting morally courageous. A 3 (time of measuring) x1 (all participants) ANOVA for repeated measures revealed that participants rated the perceived dangerousness for acting morally courageous against slogans not differently after the training, $F(2,32) = 0.56$, $n.s.$, $\eta^2 = 0.02$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .14$. A similar ANOVA revealed also that the moral courage training has no long time effect on the perceived dangerousness of acting morally courageous at school, $F(2,32) = 1.75$, $n.s.$, $\eta^2 = 0.05$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .35$. Furthermore, the moral courage training had no long time effect on the perceived danger for taking action in situations where physical violence occurs, $F(2,32) = 1.67$, $n.s.$, $\eta^2 = 0.05$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .34$. These findings do not support my fourth hypothesis (H 4) that participants should have more skills to assess emergency situations adequately after the training than before, neither on short nor on longterm.

EWL40-KJ

A t-test for paired samples revealed that the moral courage training had no effect on the positive mood of the participants, $t(46) = -0.08$, $n.s.$, two-tailed, $d_z = -0.01$, $1 - \beta = .05$. Further it was proved if the moral courage training had an effect on the positive subscales of the EWL40-KJ. Participants who passed the moral courage training showed the same level of serenity after the training as before, $t(46) = -0.04$, $n.s.$, two-tailed, $d_z = -0.01$, $1 - \beta = .05$. The moral courage training had also no effect on the participants' joviality, $t(46) = 0.09$, $n.s.$, two-tailed, $d_z = -0.01$, $1 - \beta = .05$. Furthermore, the training did not influence the individuals activeness, $t(46) = -0.34$, $n.s.$, two-tailed, $d_z = -0.05$, $1 - \beta = .06$. These results do not support

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my fifth hypothesis (H 5) that the moral courage training should affect the positive mood of the participants.

A t-test for paired samples revealed that the moral courage training had no effect on the negative mood of the participants, $t(46) = -0.02$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = -0.01$, $1 - \beta = .05$. They had the same level after the training as before. For the subscale infuriation no further calculations have been effected due to the reason that no normal distribution was given and the times of measuring did not correlate. The moral courage training did not affect the ill-humored level of the participants, $t(46) = -0.99$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = -0.15$, $1 - \beta = .16$. Individuals who joined the moral courage training had the same level of anger after the training as before, $t(46) = -0.47$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = -0.07$, $1 - \beta = .07$. The moral courage training had no effect on the participants' aggression level. They were at the same level after the training as before, $t(46) = 0.06$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = 0.01$, $1 - \beta = .05$. Furthermore, the level of anxiety was also not affected by the moral courage training. As the participants were at same level before and after the training, $t(46) = -0.42$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = -0.06$, $1 - \beta = .07$. Furthermore, individuals who joined the moral courage training were not more or less upset after the training as before, $t(46) = 0.0$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = 0.00$, $1 - \beta = .05$. At least, the moral courage training did not affect the participants' level of des-activity. They had the same level of des-activity after the training as before, $t(46) = 1.40$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = 0.20$, $1 - \beta = .28$.

It was also proved wheter the moral courage training had a long time effect on the positive mood of the participants. A 3 (time of measuring) x1 (all participants) ANOVA for repeated measures revealed that the moral courage training had an effect on the positive mood of the participants, $F(2,31) = 5.07$, $p = .011$, $\eta^2 = 0.14$, $1 - \beta_{\text{ERR PROB}} = .80$. A *post-hoc*-Test (LSD) showed that the participants had the same level of positive mood before ($M = 1.65$, $SD = 0.54$) and directly after ($M = 1.61$, $SD = 0.70$) the moral courage training. But, the long time measurement ($M = 1.27$, $SD = 0.68$) showed that participants had less positive mood at the

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last time of measurement (p = .004). Similar results occurred for the participants' serenity, $F(2,31) = 3.25$, p = .045, $\eta^2 = 0.10$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .60. A *post-hoc*-Test (LSD) revealed no difference of the level of serenity before (M = 1.53, SD = 0.64) and directly after (M = 1.50, SD = 0.80) the moral courage training. But the level of serenity decreased at the third (M = 1.17, SD = 0.71) time of measurement (p = .018). The moral courage training did not affect the joviality of the participants after (M = 1.82, SD = 0.94) the training compared to before (M = 1.95, SD = 0.70). But, it had an effect on the long time measurement (M = 1.52, SD = 0.97), $F(2,32) = 3.60$, p = .033, $\eta^2 = 0.10$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .63. The *post-hoc*-Test (LSD) showed that joviality of the participants decreased at the last time of measurement (p = .009). Similar results are present for the individuals' level of activeness, $F(2,32) = 4.47$, p = .014, $\eta^2 = 0.13$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .75. A *post-hoc*-Test (LSD) revealed that individuals had the same level of activeness before (M = 1.45, SD = 0.63) and after (M = 1.51, SD = 0.76) the moral courage training, but the individuals indicated less activeness at the last time (M = 1.11, SD = 0.72) of measurement compared to the measurement before (p = .008) and directly after (p = .016) the moral courage training.

The moral courage training had no long time effect on participants negative mood, $F(2,32) = 0.03$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.00$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .05. Individuals' who joined the moral courage training were not affected for a long time concerning their level of infuriation, $F(2,32) = 1.83$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.06$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .37. Participants were ill-humored to the same extent at all three times of measurement, $F(2,32) = 0.74$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.02$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .17. Furthermore, people who attended the moral courage training showed no differences concerning their level of anger at all measurement times, $F(2,32) = 0.56$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.02$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .14. The moral courage training neither in- nor decreased the participants' degree of aggression over the three times of measurement, $F(2,32) = 0.56$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.02$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .14. The magnitude of anxiety remained at the same level over all three times of measurement, $F(2,32) = 0.33$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.01$, $1 - \beta_{ERR\ PROB}$ = .10. Furthermore, the extent of upset were at

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same level over all times of measurement, $F(2,32) = 0.35$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.02$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .17$.

At least, the moral courage training did not affected the degree of des-activity over all times

of measurement, $F(2,32) = 0.50$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.03$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .22$. These results did no

support my sixth hypothesis (H 6) that the moral courage training affects the participants'

mood over a long period.

Table 7.

Correlations of Overall Scales of the MÜZI-KZ and the Overall Impression Management

Scale.

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Impression management	–						
2. M.C. by slogans (d)	.24	–					
3. M.C.at school (d)	.28*	.58**	–				
4. M.C.by physical violence (d)	.32*	.76**	.47**	–			
5. M.C.by slogans (i)	.12	.33**	.09	.19	–		
6. M.C.at school (i)	.22	.27*	.08	.37**	.54**	–	
7. M.C.by physical violence (i)	.22	.38**	.26*	.45**	.52**	.45**	–

Note. M.C. = moral courage; (d) = perceived danger; (i) = intervention skills; $*p = < .05$;

$**p = < .01$.

An inventory to gather social desirability on two factors

A t-test for paired samples revealed that the moral courage training had no effect on

the self-deceptive enhancement of the participants. They had the same extent of self-

enhancement before ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 0.74$) and after ($M = 4.20$, $SD = 0.90$) the training, $t(44)$

$= 0.26$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = 0.04$, $1 - \beta = .06$. Furthermore, it was proved if the participants'

extent of self-deceptive enhancement change over the three times of measurement. An

ANOVA for repeated measures showed that the level of self-deceptive enhancement did not

changed over the measurement times, $F(2,29) = 2.93$, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.09$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .55$.

Same calculations had been done for impression management. Participants had the same level

of impression management before ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 1.10$) and after ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 1.22$) the

training, $t(44) = 0.61$, *n.s.*, two-tailed, $d_z = 0.09$, $1 - \beta = .09$. Furthermore, the participants

level of impression management did not changed over all three measurement times, $F(2,29) =$

0.19, *n.s.*, $\eta^2 = 0.01$, $1 - \beta$ ERR PROB $= .08$.

Correlations were conducted to control whether the results were affected by social

desirability. Results of these correlations are shown in Table 7 and Table 8.

Table 8.

Correlations of Overall Scales of the MÜZI-KZ and the Overall Self-Deceptive Enhancement Scale.

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Self-deceptive enhancement	–						
2. M.C. by slogans (d)	.08	–					
3. M.C.at school (d)	-.05	.58**	–				
4. M.C.by physical violence (d)	.27*	.76**	.47**	–			
5. M.C.by slogans (i)	.24	.33**	.09	.19	–		
6. M.C.at school (i)	.21	.27*	.08	.37**	.54**	–	
7. M.C.by physical violence (i)	.50**	.38**	.26*	.45**	.52**	.45**	–

Note. M.C. = moral courage; (d) = perceived danger; (i) = intervention skills; *p = < .05;

**p = < .01.

Discussion

The results of this study clearly underline my assumption that moral courage can be increased by a moral courage training (which was the first time realized in such a way in Austria). Adolescences who participated in the moral courage training had more intervention skills after passing the training. They acquired skills to intervene morally courageous at school, against slogans, and against physical violence acts. But in contradiction to my assumptions, the participants of the moral courage training do not have more intervention skills for a long period. One possible reason for this circumstance is the high mortality of the participants over the measurement times. Nearly 50% of the participating people had to be excluded from the study due to their absence at one measurement time. At the first time of measurement 59 individuals were present, at the second time 44, and at the last time (long time measurement) only 33 remained.

Against my assumptions individuals who passed the moral courage training did not rate moral courage situations in a different way after participating. They rated the perceived dangerousness of acting morally courageous against slogans in the same way after the training and also at the long time measurement. Same results revealed concerning the perceived dangerousness of showing moral courage at school and against physical violence. A possible reason for these results is also the high mortality of participants over measurement times.

Furthermore, the results of the EWL40-KJ in this study revealed that the moral courage training did not affect the mood of the participants, which is also contrary to my assumptions. There are even some weak significant results for the overall positive scale and also for the subscales. But, no significant results appeared for the negative mood scale. Participants indicated the same low level of negative mood (including all subscales) before and after the training, and also at the long time measurement. Individuals who passed the training showed neither a higher nor a lower level of positive mood after participating. But, a

long time effect for positive mood occurred. Participants of the moral courage training showed an overall decreased level of positive mood at the last time of measurement. Additionally, the training did not affect the individuals' serenity, joviality, and their level of activeness before and after the training. However, they showed decreased levels of serenity, joviality, and activeness at the long time measurement. Possible reasons for these counterintuitive results are going to be discussed below (see *Limitations and Future Research*).

Further, this study controlled whether the results were influenced by social desirability. Therefore, it was proved first if the magnitude of impression management and self-deceptive enhancement changed over the times of measurement. The results show that the magnitude of impression management did not change over the measurement. Same results were observed for the self-deceptive enhancement. Second, correlations between the social desirability scales and the scales of the MÜZI-KJ were computed. Results of these computations showed that impression management did not correlate with the intervention skills of the participants. Additionally, there was also no significant correlation between the perceived dangerousness of acting morally courageous against slogans and impression management. But, impression management is moderately correlated with the perceived dangerousness of acting morally courageous at school and against physical violence. The tendency of self-deceptive enhancement of individuals who participated in the moral courage training is only moderately correlated with the perceived dangerousness of showing moral courage in situations where physical violence appears and strongly correlated with intervention skills of the individuals against physical violence. No other significant correlations revealed regarding self-deceptive enhancement. Due to these results it could be reasoned that the observed results are affected by the moral courage training and not by social desirability. These results also support the strength of this study.

How Can Increased Intervention Skills Reduce Bullying?

First, participants of the moral courage training will intervene in bullying situations more often than before the training due to their increased intervention skills. This way of reasoning is in line with the findings of Thornberg (2007). He asked in his field study the participants why they did not intervene when bullying occurs. Most of the respondents indicated on this question that they did not intervene because they had not the right skills to intervene. For that reason participants of the moral courage training are more likely to intervene in situations where bullying happens as before.

Second, individuals who joined the moral courage training increased their specific intervention skills for acting morally courageous at school. According to the findings of Banyard (2008) people who are equipped with more specific intervention skills perceived a higher level of effectiveness. Further Banyard (2008) argued that people are more willing to help victims due to their higher level of perceived effectiveness. Therefore, participants of the moral courage training should have an increased willingness to take action for a victim of a bullying attack.

Third, the participants of the moral courage training experienced in the tutorials what different types of moral courage situations (e.g. bullying) can occur and how these situations could be solved adequately. This circumstance should lead to a higher sensitivity for moral courage situations, especially bullying situations. According to Banyard (2008) an increased level of sensitivity for such situations leads to a higher willingness to intervene. For example, participants of the moral courage training got to know how social exclusion works, what effects it could have, and how it could be reduced. The reduction of social exclusion is particularly important. Because the results of Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, and Wager's (2010) fMRi-study revealed that victims of social exclusion processes suffered from the same pain as people who were harmed physically.

Fourth, individuals who joined the moral courage training increased their intervention skills for showing moral courage against slogans. This circumstance is crucial for stopping verbal bullying. Because the findings of Craig et al. (2000) showed that verbally bullying is hard to detect and adolescences did not intervene in situations where a victim were derided by a bully due to missing intervention skills. Inasmuch, individuals who attended the moral courage training should be in the situation to detect verbal bullying faster and should be able to stop it in consideration of their increased intervention skills.

Fifth, participants of the moral courage training are equipped with more intervention skills to stop physical violence as before participating. For example, participants are in the situation to stop a physical attack non-violently, which minimizes the potential risk that a situation will escalate. Therefore, participants of a moral courage training will intervene more often in bullying situations where physical violence appears due to their increased intervention skills. This way of reasoning is in line with the findings of Laner et al. (2001). The results of their vignette study revealed that people are willing to intervene in a situation where physical violence appears if they are experienced with breaking up such situations.

Sixth, according to Beaman, Barnes, Klentz, and McQuirck (1978) individuals are more willing to intervene in a situation acquiring intervention if they are simply informed about mechanisms of helping-behavior. In their studies the participants were more willing to help a victim of a staged emergency if they had attended a lecture about pro-social behavior or had seen a video about pro-social behavior. Therefore, participants of the moral courage training should show an increased likeliness of acting morally courageous if it is necessary than individuals who did not take part in the moral courage training. As people who participated in the moral courage training are informed about the mechanisms of showing moral courage in determined situations and are more equipped with special intervention skills to act adequately. For example, participants of the moral courage training learned how to solve a situation if somebody is beset by a perpetrator in a public transport bus.

Seventh, during the moral courage training the participants had to pass several tutorials in which they had to take responsibility for each other. Therefore, they should perceive themselves stronger as a shared social category. Several studies (e.g. Fischer et al., 2011; Levine, 1999; Levine, Cassidy, & Jentzsch, 2010; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine & Crowther, 2008) have showed that a shared social category lead to more bystander intervention. For example, Levine et al. (2005) manipulated the belongingness to a social category of a victim of a staged emergency. The victim was depicted as either a fan of the same football, or the rivaling club, or a non football fan to the bystanders. Their results revealed that people are more willing to help a victim if he or she shares the same social category. Therefore, participants of the moral courage training should more often intervene in bullying situations as before.

At least, a higher intervention rate signals the bully that his or her behavior is not tolerated. According to Salmivalli (2010) this is an important factor which decreases the prevalence of bullying, as the reward and reinforcement processes for a bully are lost. Taken together, the moral courage training should reduce the prevalence of bullying due to increased intervention skills and a higher sensitivity for the influencing effect of bystanders in bullying situations.

Implications

The results of the present study support the idea that the important social good of moral courage can be increased already in the adolescence age by a specific moral courage training. Moreover, the moral courage training equips the participants with special skills to show moral courage in determined situations. These can be situations where slogans against others appears, where moral courage has to be shown in everyday school live, and where physical violence take place.

These implications are strengthening by the fact that the moral courage training fulfills several requests of previous research how such a training should be performed and evaluated. According to Jonas and Brandstätter (2004) moral courage trainings should generally convey self-assurance and adequate behavior patterns for moral courage situations. They also argued that moral courage trainings must be embedded in reasonable theories. The conducted moral courage training fits these requirements.

First, the participants of the conducted moral courage training acquired behavior patterns for acting morally courageous. They obtained skills to show moral courage at school. For example, they received adequate behavior patterns to stop a bullying attack without bringing themselves into danger. Additionally, individuals who passed the moral courage training achieved adequate skills for stopping slogans. For example, participants of the training know how to act if someone is spreading cracker-barrel slogans against foreigners. Furthermore, participants have more skills to intervene in situations where physical violence appears as before. Therefore they are in the situation to intervene right in such situations

Second, the conducted moral courage training is embedded in the process model of help-giving of Latané and Darley (1970). Their model assumes that a bystander who is witnessing a case of an emergency has to pass five steps before he or she is going to intervene. A bystander must (1) notice that a situation is critical, (2) must evaluate the situation as a case of emergency, (3) develop feelings of personal responsibility to take action, (4) must approve if he or she has the right skills for intervening, and (5) a conscious decisions for helping must be done. Every single tutorial fits with these steps. One example for each step will be given. The exercise "Stay to your opinion" increases the participants' attention (step 1). Furthermore, individuals of the completed moral courage training learned in the tutorial "Violence scale" that situations can be an emergency for a person who is affected by it if they would not rate a situation as violent (step 2). During the tutorial "Ice floe" the participants acquired a sense of responsibility for each other (step 3). Further, the participants

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of the moral courage training experienced in "The bus" tutorial how to intervene in an attack without bringing themselves into danger (step 4). In the discussion round it was pointed out that how important it is to intervene in moral courage situations

(step 5).

Additionally, the executed moral courage training complies with the request of O'Connell et al. (1999) that such trainings should be realized in the school context. Beyond that O'Connell et al. (1999) and Salmivalli (2010) argued that a training for decreasing the prevalence of bullying should be accomplished in groups in order to make bystanders sensitive for their role they play in bullying situations. This is crucial for two reasons. First, if bystanders do not intervene in bullying episodes they reward and reinforce the behavior of a bully as this circumstance signals the bully that his or her behavior is accepted. As a consequence a bully will not stop his or her behavior. In contrary, he or she will prolong bullying (O'Connell et al., 1999; Salmivalli, 2010). Second, O'Connell et al. (1999) argued that it is important that a bully is stopped by someone. Because if not he or she can be perceived as a strong model in the sense of Bandura's model learning theory. Thus, bystanders who witnessed a bullying situation could perceive the bully as a strong model who is unsanctioned for his or her behavior. This fact could increase the likelihood that observers of bullying situations become self a bully. Inasmuch it is vitally important to train a group of potential bystanders, empower them with intervention skills and make them aware of their responsibility they have.

Limitations and Future Research

First of all, it has to be mentioned that a moral courage training has never been conducted and evaluated before in such a way in Austria. This study has to be limited as the training was affected only in one school and without a control group. Therefore, following studies should be progressed in different schools. Furthermore, the participating schools

should be located in different municipalities to investigate the question if the moral courage training has distinct effects on rural and urban schools. Additionally, participants of future studies should have various school backgrounds (e.g. secondary school vs. secondary modern school) for investigating the question if the training has distinct effects on individuals with different school backgrounds. Future research should also examine the question if the training has different effects on participants in hotspot schools compared to non-hotspot schools.

As mentioned above, the participants' negative mood were not affected by the moral courage training. But, the positive mood decreased at the last measurement time. This could be reasoned by the high mortality of the participants over time. Further, the time of this study was not well chosen because it was completed at the end of school year. The end of the school year brings a lot of stress for the adolescences due to final exams and so on. Especially, the participants of this study were at the last year of secondary education which increased their stress level caused by important decisions they had to make (e.g. decisions about their future career). Therefore, future studies should be conducted at the beginning of a school year.

This study has also to be limited due to the used series of questionnaires. Two of the three inventories which were used in this research had to be adopted for adolescences. Although, the adopted versions of the MÜZI and the inventory to gather social desirability on two factors satisfactory *Cronbach α* values, these inventories have to be validated. Further, some items of the used questionnaires have to be reconsidered because several participants expressed problems with the understanding. The most difficulties appeared about the meaning of an item of the inventory to gather social desirability on two factors ("I am a totally rational thinking person."). Inasmuch, future studies should use better validated and special instruments for adolescences. At least, future studies should examine the question if the moral courage training has an effect on the participants' perceived implication. According to the results of Chekroun and Brauer (2002) individuals are more willing to take action in a situation if they feel personal implication.

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Appendix. Used Questionnaires

Institut für Psychologie
Abteilung für Sozialpsychologie

Universitätsplatz 2/III
8010 Graz

Liebes Mädchen/Lieber Junge,

vielen Dank, dass du mitmachst und meinen Fragebogen ausfüllst den ich für meine Abschlussarbeit an der Uni-Graz brauche. All deine Antworten werden vollkommen vertraulich behandelt und bleiben anonym, das heißt, niemand außer mir bekommt deine Antworten zu sehen.

Bitte beantworte ein paar Fragen zu dir.

1. Die ersten drei Buchstaben des Vornamens deiner Mutter: _____

2. Die ersten drei Buchstaben des Vornamens deines Vaters: _____

3. Ich bin ein   ❑ Mädchen   ❑ Junge

4. Ich bin _____ Jahre alt.

5. Ich gehe in die _____ Klasse

6. Ich besuche die _____ Schule

7. Meine Mutter arbeitet als _____

8. Mein Vater arbeitet als   _____

7. Staatsbürgerschaft: ❑ Österreich
❑ andere _____

Wenn du etwas nicht verstehst, dann einfach nach fragen.

Danke, dass du mitmachst!

David

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Im Anschluss findest du einige Situationen in denen man helfen könnte. Bitte schätze ein, wie **gefährlich** es für dich wäre in der beschriebenen Situation zu helfen. Bitte beantworte alle Fragen. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.

		überhaupt nicht			mittel			sehr
1.	Einige deiner MitschülerInnen versuchen eine/n KlassenkameradIn aus der Klassengemeinschaft auszuschließen.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
2.	Ein/e LehrerIn schreit eine/n MitschülerIn fast täglich an.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
3.	Ein/e MitschülerIn bekommt an der Tafel eine viel zu schwierige Aufgabe vom /von der Lehrerin vorgegeben.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
4.	Deine MitschülerInnen verbreiten das Gerücht, dass ein/e KlassenkameradIn einen „Vogel" hat.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
5.	Dein/e LehrerIn äußert vor der Klasse Beschimpfungen über Ausländer.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
6.	Einer/m MitschülerIn wird nicht mittgeteilt nachdem sie/er krank war, dass nächste Woche ein Test ist.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
7.	In einem Lokal äußern vier betrunkene und aggressive Männer Beschimpfungen über Ausländer.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
8.	Du sitzt im Zug und eine Gruppe Jugendlicher erzählt neben dir ausländerfeindliche Witze.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
9.	In einem Bus wird eine junge Frau von zwei gewaltbereiten Rechtsradikalen belästigt.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
10.	Auf einem Spielplatz schlägt ein starker Mann seinem dreijährigen Kind brutal ins Gesicht.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
11.	Du erfährst, dass ein Verwandter, den du eigentlich gerne magst, seine Tochter schlägt.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
12.	In der Fußgängerzone brüllen Rechtsradikale Parolen gegen Homosexuelle und Behinderte.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
13.	Du erfährst, dass dein Nachbar, mit dem du dich eigentlich gut verstehst, seine Frau misshandelt.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6

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Im Anschluss findest du die gleichen Situationen wie vorher. Wie gut glaubst du, dass du **in diesen Situationen helfen könntest?** Bitte beantworte alle Fragen. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.

		weiß nicht wie			*mittel*			*weiß genau wie*
1.	Einige deiner MitschülerInnen versuchen eine/n KlassenkameradIn aus der Klassengemeinschaft auszuschließen.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
2.	Ein/e LehrerIn schreit eine/n MitschülerIn fast täglich an.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
3.	Ein/e MitschülerIn bekommt an der Tafel eine viel zu schwierige Aufgabe vom /von der Lehrerin vorgegeben.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
4.	Deine MitschülerInnen verbreiten das Gerücht, dass ein/e KlassenkameradIn einen „Vogel" hat.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
5.	Dein/e LehrerIn äußert vor der Klasse Beschimpfungen über Ausländer.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
6.	Einer/m MitschülerIn wird nicht mittgeteilt nachdem sie/er krank war, dass nächste Woche ein Test ist.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
7.	In einem Lokal äußern vier betrunkene und aggressive Männer Beschimpfungen über Ausländer.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
8.	Du sitzt im Zug und eine Gruppe Jugendlicher erzählt neben dir ausländerfeindliche Witze.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
9.	In einem Bus wird eine junge Frau von zwei gewaltbereiten Rechtsradikalen belästigt.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
10.	Auf einem Spielplatz schlägt ein starker Mann seinem dreijährigen Kind brutal ins Gesicht.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
11.	Du erfährst, dass ein Verwandter, den du eigentlich gerne magst, seine Tochter schlägt.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
12.	In der Fußgängerzone brüllen Rechtsradikale Parolen gegen Homosexuelle und Behinderte.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
13.	Du erfährst, dass dein Nachbar, mit dem du dich eigentlich gut verstehst, seine Frau misshandelt.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6

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Im Anschluss findest du einige Eigenschaftwörter. Bitte kreuze an wie du dich im Moment fühlst. Bitte bearbeite alle Wörter. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.

		gar nicht	etwas	ziemlich	sehr
1.	ausgeglichen	0	1	2	3
2.	freudig	0	1	2	3
3.	aktiv	0	1	2	3
4.	angespannt	0	1	2	3
5.	missgelaunt	0	1	2	3
6.	ärgerlich	0	1	2	3
7.	aggressiv	0	1	2	3
8.	ängstlich	0	1	2	3
9.	betrübt	0	1	2	3
10.	müde	0	1	2	3
11.	entspannt	0	1	2	3
12.	fröhlich	0	1	2	3
13.	aufmerksam	0	1	2	3
14.	aufgeregt	0	1	2	3
15.	missgestimmt	0	1	2	3
16.	gereizt	0	1	2	3
17.	angriffslustig	0	1	2	3
18.	angsterfüllt	0	1	2	3
19.	hoffnungslos	0	1	2	3
20.	schläfrig	0	1	2	3
21.	gelassen	0	1	2	3
22.	glücklich	0	1	2	3
23.	tatkräftig	0	1	2	3
24.	kribbelig	0	1	2	3
25.	schlecht gelaunt	0	1	2	3
26.	sauer	0	1	2	3
27.	streitbereit	0	1	2	3
28.	beunruhigt	0	1	2	3
29.	traurig	0	1	2	3
30.	schlapp	0	1	2	3
31.	locker	0	1	2	3
32.	gut gelaunt	0	1	2	3
33.	wachsam	0	1	2	3
34.	verkrampft	0	1	2	3
35.	übellaunig	0	1	2	3
36.	verärgert	0	1	2	3
37.	streitlustig	0	1	2	3
38.	furchtsam	0	1	2	3
39.	unglücklich	0	1	2	3
40.	verschlafen	0	1	2	3

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Im Anschluss findest du einige Aussagen, bitte kreuze an wie sehr diese für dich stimmen.

Bitte beantworte alle Aufgaben. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.

		stimme nicht zu			teils teils			stimme voll zu
1.	Der erste Eindruck, den ich von anderen Menschen gewinne, bewahrheitet sich meistens.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2.	Manchmal lüge ich, wenn ich muss.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.	Ich bin nicht immer mir selber gegenüber ganz ehrlich gewesen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4.	Es ist schon einmal vorgekommen, dass ich jemanden ausgenutzt habe.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5.	Ich weiß immer, warum ich etwas mag.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6.	Ich fluche niemals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7.	Es fällt mir schwer, einen beunruhigenden Gedanken beiseite zu drängen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8.	Manchmal zahle ich es lieber anderen heim, als dass ich vergebe und vergesse.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9.	Manchmal verpasse ich etwas, weil ich mich einfach nicht schnell genug entscheiden kann.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10.	Ich habe schon einmal zu viel Wechselgeld herausbekommen, ohne es der Verkäuferin zu sagen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11.	Ich bin ein vollkommen rational denkender Mensch.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12.	Ich gebe grundsätzlich alles an, was ich zu zahlen habe.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13.	Ich kann Kritik selten vertragen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14.	Manchmal bleibe ich länger aus, als es erlaubt ist.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15.	Ich bin mir meiner Urteile sehr sicher.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16.	Ich habe Dinge getan, von denen ich anderen nichts erzähle.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17.	An meinen Fähigkeiten als Freund habe ich schon gelegentlich gezweifelt.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18.	Ich nehme niemals Dinge an mich, die mir nicht gehören.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19.	Ich weiß nicht immer die Gründe für meine Handlungen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20.	Ich bin schon einmal wegen einer angeblichen Krankheit nicht zur Schule gegangen.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Vielen Dank für deine Mitarbeit!