This Master Thesis investigates the incentives for a mixed merger between a public and a private firm in an oligopoly with Cournot competition. Therefore, a game theoretic model is developed. The analyzed markets consist of two private firms, which maximize their own profits, and one public firm, which maximizes overall welfare. Three different markets will be analyzed. First it is assumed, that firms have asymmetric technologies, i.e. the costs for production are different for each firm. In this market, the incentives to merge are analyzed considering varying costs. Further, the welfare enhancing degree of privatization will be analyzed with respect to different costs for themerging firms. After the merger took place, two scenarios are distinguished. In the first scenario non-transferable technologies are assumed, so the merging firms stick to their technologies. In the second scenario transferable technologies are assumed, i.e. the merged firm produces with the better technology of both merging firms. From this basic scenario, where firms compete in a homogeneous product market and therefore products are perfect substitutes, heterogeneous products, i.e. differentiation, are introduced to the model. Again, the incentives to merge and the welfare enhancing degree of privatization are analyzed with respect to a varying differentiation level of the products. In the last analyzed market, network effects are introduced to the industry and the merger incentives as well as the welfare enhancing degree of privatization are analyzed considering different intensities of the network effects.