The financial crisis caused numerous reforms. Many parties were accused of their contribution to the emergence of the financial crisis including the audit branch as a result of the deficient understanding of the public that auditors provide almost absolute assurance of fraud and error detection. For that reason, the European Commission published a Green Paper in 2010, questioning the existing framework of auditing. Within the following consultation, almost 700 responses were received. After a long time of discussions and negotiations, the European Union passed a directive for statutory audit and regulation for stricter requirements for auditing public-interest entities. Key measures are the strengthening of independence of auditors and improvement of the audit supervision. The implementation of the new law is, except of the regulations rules, not predictable. At the beginning, this master thesis demonstrates the theoretical characterization of statutory auditing and further institutions, which contribute to enhance the reliability of financial statement. Subsequently, the origination process of the laws, which starts with the financial crisis, is explained. Especially closing options for the expectation gap between the public and the accounting profession are pointed out in this context. The content of a statutory audit is clearly stated, but the publics perception about auditors responsibilities is still deficient. Furthermore, essential new rules of the regulation and directive are explained with a critical reflection of empirical evidences. In the empirical part, qualitative interviews with four auditors were conducted, seeking individual views concerning the regulation. The results show that there is agreement in terms of the comparability, but some of the new rules are possibly not as efficient as they should be to increase the audit quality.