Executive pay is subject to ongoing criticism, especially after the financial and economic crisis. The reason is that, from an incentive perspective, conventional compensation concepts used for executives have certain weaknesses that were found to have contributed to the emergence of the crisis. In this thesis, the bonus bank concept is shown as a possible approach to incentivize long-term, value-based management decisions. Relative to other approaches this concept has various advantages. For example, by using a bonus bank, several weaknesses of traditional bonus plans can be corrected: Due to the delay of bonus payments short-term increases in earnings are not rewarded anymore and, at least to some extent, a management-participation in company losses can be achieved. Apart from that, the bonus bank offers advantages, both compared to a stock-based compensation and relative to the adaptation of accounting and profit determination rules: The reason is that the bonus bank is not only suitable for non-listed companies and executives of lower hierarchical levels, but also doesnt require unusual, project-specific depreciation methods. However, an in-depth analysis of the bonus bank reveals the limits of the concept, which become particularly obvious, when it comes to its practical implementation: Difficulties are for example caused by extreme negative bonus bank balances and the early departure of executives. In addition, there are still some legal uncertainties: For instance, it is questionable, whether certain approaches, that have been developed to solve the problems stated above, are legally feasible and enforceable. In the course of this thesis also possible reasons for the previously low distribution of the bonus bank are discussed as well as some of the factors mentioned, which are likely to be decisive for the future success of the concept.