This paper deals with the general problem of justifying moral norms or principles. We find a lotofdifferent theories that are dedicated to that issue and some of them are able to offer at least partly convincing solutions to the relevant questions, but the task of my research was to look for a theory that combines all forms of reasonable or sound argumentations in ethics. For this purpose I contrast two distinct approaches, which try to give an answer to the question of justifying moral norms in a way that is open to different impacts from other ethical theorizing. The two theories I focus on, the ?Diskursethik? of Jürgen Habermas and the ethical constructivism of Brian Barry, do have a lot in common, as I assert in my work, but there is one parallel which deserves special attention: In fact, I describe one distinction that I suppose to be a basic idea of both conceptions. In this case I refer to Ernst Tugendhat, who explicates the distinction between the ?moralischenStandpunkt? and the ?Repräsentant des moralischenStandpunkts?. These two terms provide the basis on which I try to understand the theories of Habermas and Barry. In the following work the ?moralischeStandpunkt? is described as an ideal of justifying moral norms and the ?Repräsentant des moralischenStandpunkts? as a procedure for an actual justification, that should be as approximated as possible to the ideal of the moral point of view (?moralischerStandpunkt?). The next step is to ask how the two distinct conceptions defend the characteristics of the moral point of view and to point out differences in the way of their argumentation. A further task is to compare the procedures for approximating to the ideal of the moral point of view that the approaches propose. With the help of Barry?s constructivism and Habermas? ?Diskursethik? and their comparison we should get an idea of the way in which the problem of justifying moral norms could be solved.