Three quintessential perceptions of Whitehead's philosophy are presented, analyzed, and criticized. The central question at hand is the way in which the concepts, actual entity and process, are handled in three specific scientific contexts and which transformations they undergo, both crucial to the understanding of Whitehead's coming into being philosophy. Biological, psychological, and moral theological approaches as well as philosophical differences in dealing with Whitehead's philosophy are investigated. In addition to this work?s presentation and analysis, both a comparison and critique will complete the final chapter. It is apparent from the data that each scientific approach to Whitehead's philosophy undergoes some major, emphatic shifts. These shifts affect both the representational level as well as the basic intentions of his philosophy; that is, they deal with the relationship between stability and dynamics and the critique concerning metaphysics of substance or mechanistic theories. From a philosophical point of view, differences in intention, theoretical level, methodological approaches, and use of terms and contexts as central themes can be examined in order to provide a scientifically valid perception appropriate to Whitehead's philosophy. Keeping the fundamental dissimilarities of the respective sciences in mind, various levels of difficulty are likely to be encountered. Not considering these differences, however, would lead to a significant doubt about the legitimacy of the resulting perception. The extent to which the alleged usefulness for the science is credited to Whitehead's philosophy has oftentimes been said to be much scrutinized.