Even though environmental, health, and infrastructure-related concerns promote an increase in the use of Styrian commuter trains instead of private cars, they are still, in comparison, only used to a minor extent. In the process, avoidable costs arise on two levels. First, on the economic or institutional level, the costs of continuous over-capacity of commuter trains, among other things, must be financed and the high costs of such environmental damage caused by automobile usage must be covered. Second, on the individual level, several disadvantages arise for those who use automobiles. There is an increased expenditure towards environmental action as well as opportunity costs, for instance, because time spent in the car could be used for office work or recreational purposes. This approach attempts to answer the question of why individuals, as stakeholders, opt for automobiles in spite of arguments in favor of commuter trains made by the government on the institutional level, which the stakeholders themselves are a part of. Based on the fact that a voluntary switch to commuter trains is preferable to being forced into it, a justification is laid out as to why this change is not being carried out voluntarily. Based on the assumption that the comparison of goods and the ensuing consumption are inextricably bound with an information status that is determined on a case by case basis it will be shown how a voluntary switch, in spite of certain individual resistance, can be reached.In line with these considerations, with respect to only two goods four decision rules will be defined for achieving long run welfare maximizing allocations of all market goods. As an institutional prerequisite, an information agency is defined to ensure the accessibility to the information relevant to goods to all stakeholders despite the interests of certain dominant stakeholders.