This master thesis deals with the problem of intergenerational equity in the economic utili-zation of natural resources. Three questions are being addressed: 1) Is a sustainable use of resources feasible under free competition? 2) What characterizes an intergenerationally equitable use of resources? What resource policy instruments are capable of implementing an intergenerationally equitable use of resources? For the purpose of answering these ques-tions, this thesis introduces a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping genera-tions and a renewable natural resource. It is demonstrated that, under laissez-faire, the con-servation of the historically given per capita resource stock along a steady state growth path is impossible in general. It is further established that, in the special case of linear regenera-tion, sustainable growth, while feasible in theory, is unlikely if the model parameters are chosen realistically. In addition there is a possibility in this model of a steady decline and eventual depletion of the resource stock which entails the extinction of the model economy. In the second step this thesis examines how a perfectly informed social planner with com-plete control over the economy would solve the problem of intergenerational equity. The allocation chosen by the social planner is characterized by a constant per capita stock of re-sources and intergenerational efficiency. This intergenerational ?first best? is used as a benchmark for the subsequent evaluation of various resource policies. Four different policy instruments are being discussed: Redistribution of income between generations via lump-sum taxes and transfers, nationalization of the resource management, a combination of re-source harvest taxes and resource investment subsidies, and open market interventions in resource markets. The only policy capable of implementing the first best involves nationaliz-ing the resource and compensating its original owners by introducing fiat money.