Negotiations for a global climate protection framework reach the media over and over again. The most famous examples for the failure of efficient contracts for climate protection are the Kyoto-Protocol and the negotiations for its successor in Copenhagen 2009. By reasoning over economic theory, the illustration of the impossibility of multinational conventions is the main objective of this thesis. Regional agreements with a limited number of participants and subject to certain economic conditions of the participants (factor endowment, income level and distribution, international debt position) are more likely to lead to a sustainable protection of world?s climate. Models of political economy, game theory and welfare economics will be used to elaborate on this claim. In case of the political economy the median-voter approach will be chosen. It will be shown, that besides the endowment of a country with emission intensive and clean production capacities, the average level of income and the distribution of income are important. By using game theory the public good character of climate policy and the problem of free-riding will be analysed. Climate policy does not necessarily end up with a Nash-equilibrium, where all states maximize their benefits individually. Stable treaties must have a limited number of signatories. The welfare economic approach focuses on the interdependence of two large, open economies exhibits welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral climate policy. The welfare change of a strict climate policy (=reduction of the amount of emission trading certificates) depends in both highly developed states on the international debt position of the state, the dynamic efficiency of the world economy and the preference of the population for climate protection.