A considerable amount of publishers compete on the market for scientific papers. The publishers phase no significant barriers to enter the market. Nevertheless, there are high profits and the prices increase faster than the inflation. The price developments of journals cause inefficiencies and budgetary problems for the academic community. This effect seems avoidable, since librarians, which provide the main share of demand side, are not compelled to buy every journal. Additionally, scholars have not to write and to provide their services for publishers. Notwithstanding, scholars and librarians unintentionally support the price developments of scientific journals. This master thesis develops a Bertrand price competition model with vertical product differentiation to explain the counterintuitive relation between competition and prices. Three different market participants are considered by this approach, namely authors, publishers and readers. The model emphasizes that the market power of the publishers providing the top-journals increase with an introduction of more competitors. The elaboration of the reasons for the high profits is followed by a solution approach. The first solution is aimed to the publisher side. It suggests a stronger focus on Open Access journals. The second solution is aimed to the librarians and suggest the coordination among single librarians to enable an increase of the bargaining condition against single publishers. Afterwards, the master thesis is aimed to scholars and discusses the possibilities of self archiving and boycott of single publishers. The master thesis conclude with an approach of actual developments and explains why all market participants should be interested and work on solutions. Possible implications of the status quo emphasize the required changes in the market.