The object of this study are the economic consequences, especially possible increases of efficiency, of conservative accounting within debt contracts. In a signaling model separating and pooling equilibria of the agency problem under adverse selection are determined. A sen-sitivity analysis with regard to variations in the distribution of the types of the firms, to varia-tions in the costs of insolvency ?, to variations and the effects of endogenizing the account-ing parameter ?, examines the stability properties of the models. Regarding a common oc-currence of adverse selection and moral hazard, negative as well as positive effects, com-pared to the preceding results, prove as possible. In contrast to usual assumptions, the causal mechanism developed above is not based on lower signaling costs of the ?good? (less risky) firm; contrary to intuition, a high probability of success is not decisive regarding the profitability of signaling. Within the context of the equilibrium conditions derived, the individ-ual project risk determines only the realizable interest difference, whereas the probability of certain signaling costs does not determine the cost-benefit-relation. Rather specific, risk-independent project properties enable the successful separating of equilibria. Furthermore, the usual argument for credit security, namely a timely warning of creditors as regards nega-tive developments proves finally irrelevant in the model given. The demonstration of a possi-ble positive influence on the efficiency of contracts is in favour of leaving the choice of the adequate accounting method to the firm.