This thesis examines pricing processes within the scope of crowding. This work provides a comprehensive and detailed overview on the current crowdfunding market and its pricing process is presented. The contractual conditions, such as interest rates, duration, or the profit-dependent company valuation, are currently determined by the crowdfunding platforms in cooperation with companies. Hence, it is not possible for Crowdfunding Investors to influence this process. They can only opt for or against an investment. Therefore, supply and demand have no effect on the price, which leads to unfair contracts for investors. However, the emitting process for equities and bonds shows that comparable securities have established fair pricing processes in which investors are included in the pricing. This leads to the questions addressed in this thesis, i.e., which of the existing pricing methods is most applicable to crowdfunding, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of using them in crowdfunding. To answer this question a comparison is drawn between the different characteristics of crowdfunding and shares and bonds. To analyze the transferability of the pricing methods, crowdfunding contracts are divided into contracts with and without an enterprise value participation. While the pricing methods of current crowdfunding contracts without corporate value participation show great potential for investor involvement, the pricing methods for contracts with corporate value participation are not applicable. To present a fair pricing process for these contracts, this thesis finally discusses a solution for a fair pricing process for crowdfunding contracts with an enterprise value participation.