This thesis analyses various voting procedures and their properties. The aim of the thesis is to determine if there exist one or more voting procedures that are optimal for political elections.In the first part of the thesis, voting procedures are presented in general and their most important properties are explained. The voting procedures presented include ranked and non-ranked procedures, such as the plurality method, the Condorcet method and the Borda count, as well as procedures that require the allocation of points (e.g. range voting, cumulative voting). Then, the most general properties, such as monotonicity, irrelevance of independent alternatives and anonymity, as well as the theorems which are related to those properties, namely Arrows Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, are presented.In the second part of the thesis, different voting procedures are applied. This analysis is based on a survey among the students of the University of Graz on the 2015 ÖH election and the preferences voiced by the surveys participants. In an attempt to answer the central question of this thesis, the results of the simulation are then analysed. The focus of the analysis lies on the differences between the various voting procedures. Moreover, there is a deep-dive on the possibility of majority cycles.Overall, the results achieved by the various procedures are all very similar. Some lists move a rank up or down, but the main trends remain the same. In general, there is no such thing as an optimal voting procedure. In the case of the ÖH election there is no immediate need to change the voting procedure. If ever such a change were to be made, approval voting might be worth considering.