The US public discourse about executive compensation exists for several decades. However, executive compensation increased significantly until the 2000s Corporate-Governance scandals which were partly influenced by a pay-for-performance compensation approach. Furthermore, executive compensation did not decrease as significant as share-prices dropped during the crisis. Additionally, compensation increased continuously until the financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, legislators enacted several rules, laws and standards in order to enforce executive compensation transparency. Nevertheless, jurisdiction discrepancies between countries occurred because of historical and continental differences. On account of this fact, also the implementation of proper executive compensation disclosure differs substantially. How German and US legislations differ from each other and which improvements could be recommended, will be investigated in the course of this thesis.Thus, the examination of compensation theory and its economical problems is necessary and will be conducted firstly. Subsequently, specific rules, regulations and standards in German and US compensation reporting systems will be described. In the next step, an empirical review of previous studies on executive compensation disclosure regarding these two countries will be executed. Hence, the theoretical part and empirical review provide the basis for this thesis empirical research. The research was conducted by analysing compensation reports of 10 Dow Jones and 10 DAX companies with regard to report length and location, compensation height and structure, variable performance indicators and information usefulness. On the basis of the empirical results interpretation, an overview of the systems advantages and disadvantages will be illustrated. Furthermore, the thesis finishes with a recommendation on how the compensation reports could be improved in order to increase information usefulness and report usability.