W. V. O. Quine is famous for defending empiricism, naturalism and behaviorism. Furthermore, he calls himself a “robust realist”. However, critics argue that his views are incompatible with realism. My main goal will be to present an interpretation of Quines philosophy that is able to reconcile these positions.At the beginning, I explain Quines confirmation holism and clarify the role of observation sentences. These are the sentences that connect the level of empirical evidence with theory. I then try to classify Quines epistemological position and argue that he did not give up normative epistemology, and I classify Quine as a fallibilist foundationalist with strong coherentist tendencies. Next, I discuss how we can know what there is. Here, Quines naturalism appears we should only look to science, and not to some prior philosophy, to answer that question. However, it is useful to regiment scientific theory by translating it into first order predicate logic in order to make its ontological commitments clear.Afterwards, I talk about general characteristics of realism and then distinguish three forms of scientific realism. Semantic realism science aims at truth and the terms of scientific theories have to be interpreted literally. This view, however moderate, is stable through Quines whole philosophy. Metaphysical realism the world exists independently of mind and language. Epistemological realism knowledge of the world is obtainable through scientific investigation. I argue that Quine advocates a metaphysical and epistemological realist position from the mid 50s onwards.However, there are two main threats for Quines epistemological and metaphysical realism that originate in his own philosophical thinking: his views on ontological reduction, and his concept of ontological relativity. I argue, finally, that Quines naturalism saves his realism from these threats.