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Title
On Parfit's Ontology
AuthorMintz-Woo, Kian Ak Joseph
Published in
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Online), 2017, Vol. 0, Issue 0
PublishedTaylor & Francis, 2017
Edition
Publisher version
LanguageEnglish
Document typeJournal Article
Keywords (EN)Abstracta / metaethics / ontology / Derek Parfit / Platonism / reasons / truth / On What Matters
ISSN1911-0820
URNurn:nbn:at:at-ubg:3-4646 Persistent Identifier (URN)
DOI10.1080/00455091.2017.1381935 
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 The work is publicly available
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On Parfit's Ontology [1.63 mb]
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Abstract (English)

Parfit denies that the introduction of reasons into our ontology is costly for his theory. He puts forth two positions to help establish the claim: the Plural Senses View and the Argument from Empty Ontology. I argue that, first, the Plural Senses View for ‘exists can be expanded to allow for senses which undermine his ontological claims; second, the Argument from Empty Ontology can be debunked by Platonists. Furthermore, it is difficult to make statements about reasons true unless these statements include reference to objects in reality. These arguments show the instability of Parfits claimed metaethical advantages over naturalism.

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