FORUM: BOOK REVIEW SYMPOSIUM

Adcock: Liberalism and Political Science

Comments by Emily Hauptmann, Erkki Berndtson and Thibaud Boncourt

Response by Robert Adcock

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Introduction to the Symposium by Thibaud Boncourt

The following contributions stem from a roundtable held in Poznan, Poland in July 2016 at the International Political Science Association’s Congress. The roundtable was put together by IPSA’s Research Committee 33, which focuses on the history of political science as a discipline. Contributors produced a stimulating debate on Robert Adcock’s award winning Liberalism and the Emergence of Political Science: A Transatlantic Tale.

As its title suggests, this important book weaves two narratives together. First, it sheds a new light on the history of liberalism, by highlighting the way in which liberal political thought changed between the early 19th century and the early 20th century. Adcock highlights the transition from “democratised classical liberalism” to alternative conceptions of the liberal tradition such as “progressive liberalism” and “disenchanted classical liberalism”. Second, the book documents the history of the emergence of American political science. By studying the pioneers of this discipline, Adcock analyses the progressive spread and institutionalisation of political science in America until the landmark creation of the American Political Science Association (APSA, 1903).

These two stories are interesting in themselves but what makes Adcock’s argument more so is that he weaves these two trends together. He shows continuously how the development of one of the biggest political discourses and the institutionalisation of political science fuelled one another. By linking the history of the discipline to that of political power, Adcock’s impressive study resonates with other great work on the subject such as those of Sonja Amadae (2003) and Nicolas Guilhot (2005).

Another of the book’s strengths lies in the choice of adopting a transatlantic perspective. In line with recent literatures, Adcock goes beyond nation as shaped by “national
traditions" to emphasise the transnational exchanges that shaped the history of political thought. Thus, Adcock traced the history of liberalism in Europe, before analysing how it was imported in American academia. The book tells the story of the "Americanisation" of liberalism, understood as the way in which European liberal beliefs were adapted by American scholars to address American political and economic realities. 

In order to discuss several aspects of this stimulating, multi-layered book, the roundtable gathered specialists in the history of political thought, history of political science as a discipline, and the internationalisation of the social sciences. The following three contributions raise some of the topics that were discussed at the roundtable, as well as new ones. Robert Adcock's rejoinder discusses these topics by expanding on the book's argument. (All references in the text refer to Adcock 2014a, if not stated otherwise.)

Comments by Emily Hauptmann

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Each time I have revisited Adcock’s Liberalism and the Emergence of Political Science, I have been drawn to different themes and questions. This is a multi-layered book: re-reading reveals different aspects of it rather than reinforcing one central notion of what the book is about. I say this to explain why I’m offering a substantially different set of remarks in this forum than I did at our roundtable last summer. At that meeting, I had raised questions about Adcock’s historiographical reasons for attributing various liberalisms to his central cast of self-identified liberal 19th-century characters and for declining to make “American exceptionalism” a prominent feature in his account of their early political scientists. Because I think Adcock answered my questions fully last summer, I felt it might be better to ask a few new ones. So I returned to his book once more. When I did so, I realised that I had not fully engaged with the book as a narrative about political science nor with Adcock’s account of the part political scientists played in the intellectual and political life of the U.S.

In that spirit, I have recast my comments to prompt Adcock to expand on the implications of his argument that 19th-century political scientists were crucial agents in the development of liberalism. If I understand Adcock’s argument correctly, he claims that although Eliot, Sumner, Lowell and others did not call themselves liberals, they should nonetheless be seen as the first “agents” in the “Americanisation” of liberalism (2, 281). I return to his book once more. When I did so, I realised that I had not fully engaged with the book as a narrative about political science nor with Adcock’s account of the part political scientists played in the intellectual and political life of the U.S.

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Lieber, Sumner, Lowell and Wilson but also about the European liberalisms with which they engaged.

In my view, however, the second part of the story—how the liberalisms cultivated by U.S. political scientists prepared the ground for the development of the liberal political culture of the early 20th c.—is told mostly as fully as the first. This is, I acknowledge, partly because the book’s principal historical narrative ends with the founding of the American Political Science Association in 1903. Still, to stress, as Adcock does, that 19th c. political scientists should be seen as the “lead agents of the Americanization of liberalism,” implies that the academics set a discourse in motion that was later taken up by a wider array of people in public life. At least that’s what highlighting the agency of these 19th c. political scientists suggests to me.

Perhaps, however, this overstates the role Adcock believes 19th c. political scientists played in setting the terms of 20th c. U.S. political discourse. In other passages in his conclusion, Adcock portrays the relation between political scientists’ incipient liberalisms and what came into wider political currency in the first decades of the 20th c. much more tentatively, saying that their adaptations of European liberalism merely “prefigure[d]” or lent themselves to being “mapped onto” (275, 276) what liberalism came to mean in 20th c. U.S. politics. So we’re early political scientists “lead agents of the Americanization of liberalism”? That is, did they help set the terms of what liberalism would come to mean in 20th c. U.S. politics? Or are the similarities almost token between them the fault of the American political culture? I’m trying to do more here than split hairs. Even if answering these questions fully would pull the narrative further into the 20th c. than intended, I think these formulations invite some further questions about how Adcock understands the relation of early political scientists to public life.

On the one hand, as Adcock notes, many 19th c. U.S. political scientists sought public office, only the prominence of the offices Woodrow Wilson held, therefore, was unusual, not his pursuit of them. Moreover, the political involvement of its members was affirmed and encouraged by the American Political Science Association at its founding. But on the other hand, the professionalization of the social sciences that began in the late 19th c. is often read as a deliberate retreat from the public engagement of earlier generations, an attempt to win legitimacy as experts on social and political life by speaking from a space above the partisan political fray. And this more guarded view of how early political scientists engaged in public life is one I believe Adcock also affirms (cf. 272–274). These two somewhat incompatible claims about political scientists’ political involvement led me to extend my earlier questions about how Adcock understands the relation between political scientists and 19th c. U.S. political liberalism. If political scientists were indeed the “lead agents” of the liberalism that so profoundly shaped American political life, in what venues and by what means did they exercise that agency?

I am aware that my questions focus on a claim advanced most fully in the book’s conclusion rather than one developed in its core. In my defense, I would cite the depth and completeness with which Adcock treats his principal themes as my license to ask such “what happened next?” questions. These extended in the entirety of political science have much to learn from this book—and from what Adcock chooses to do next.
Liberalism and the Emergence of American Political Science is one of the most important studies on the history of social sciences in recent years. Its focus on the relationship between liberalism and the emergence of political science as a discipline in the 19th century United States is not itself new, as this relationship has been discussed in earlier studies (e.g. Crick 1959; Ceaser 1990). However, Adcock’s book differs from earlier studies in two ways. First, he frames his analysis using a transatlantic and comparative perspective, looking at how American scholars interacted with British, German, and French scholars and how they learned from each other. Secondly, he analyses the relationship between liberalism and political science through varieties of liberalism, offering “a history structured in terms of ... multiple-liberalisms.” The early 19th century study of politics was a product of democratized classical liberalism, but political scientists of the late 19th century were mostly progressive liberals or disenchanted classical liberals. In this sense, the book is a critique of Crick’s classic study of American political science, as Crick understood liberalism as a monolithic ideology. Adcock presents “pioneering political scientists as helping to import ‘the liberal tradition’ into American thought and Americanize it, whereas for Crick ‘the liberal tradition’ was a ‘pre-existent consensus’” (5-6).

The book also contains many other new insights for the study of the history of political science, which make reading the book rewarding. For instance, Adcock’s “central” argument that the study of politics and the transformation of liberalism were framed by changing political and economic realities, “the spread of democratic belief in popular sovereignty and the political capacity of the common man,” and secondly, “the growth of large-scale industry, which altered the structure and power of social classes while confronting governments with novel policy demands” (3), allows him to analyse the study of politics in a wider perspective. It is essential to notice how important historical research and political economy were to the study of politics, as the discipline was transformed from a wide political science of the early 19th century to a narrow political science of the late 19th century. As Adcock argues, paying attention especially to the role of political economy in the history of the discipline is a novel move (10).

Adcock’s book is a rich and detailed study and it contains many interesting things to discuss. In the following, however, I will only address two major questions which need more critical scrutiny: liberalism and the transatlantic perspective, and secondly, the origins of a narrow political science with reference to other disciplines.

Liberalism and the transatlantic perspective. If Crick understood American liberalism as a monolithic ideology, Adcock, on the other hand seems to downplay the importance of the liberal heritage in the United States. It must be remembered that political thinkers who laid the foundation for liberalism (e.g. Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu) were an important part of teaching already at colonial colleges (see Haddow 1939). And, of course, The Federalist Papers and the U.S. Constitution are a mixture of liberal political thinking and republican political theory (e.g. Lienesch 1988). In that sense, there was a liberal political tradition in the United States already before Adcock’s “transatlantic tale.”

I agree with Adcock that the interaction between American and European scholars was important for the development of political science as a discipline. However, the problem is that what was liberal and what was conservative political thinking and action during the 19th century is a matter
of interpretation. Political ideologies and political systems, in the sense we know them today, were only coming into existence. From today's perspective, the arguments in the first chapter of the book (The “Political” in Political Science. The Liberal Debate about Democracy) are easy to understand and accept, as the chapter discusses the ideas of, e.g., François Guizot, Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill.

The second chapter (The “Science” in Political Science. The Historiographic Debate about Method) is more problematic. In the chapter, Adcock discusses the methodological tradition he labels as developmental historicism. Later in the book, he shows how historicism was an important part of the American study of politics. However, when he attempts to weave together the “science” and the “political” in European thinking, he runs into difficulties. Using Johann Bluntschli, Henry Maine and Edward Freeman as examples, Adcock argues that, “[t]ogether these three Europeans exemplified both political variety within liberalism and methodological variety within developmental historicism, relative to which I will subsequently analyze American figures” (43).

However, of these three, only Freeman can be said to have been a liberal, as he was a historian and a liberal politician. The ideas of Henry Maine, on the other hand, have usually been interpreted as having a conservative rather than a liberal bent. In addition, Johann Bluntschli had sometimes been described as a moderate conservative (party), is described as the arch-conservative, and although he had liberal nationalist sympathies, he can also be described as a racist and anti-feminist (which, of course, applied to many other European and American scholars as well).

In that sense, conservatism and liberalism mixed with each other in many ways. Germany is a good example, not only because the majority of American scholars went there to study in the late 19th century. German political liberalism became divided in the 1850s into “progressive liberalism” and “national liberalism”, the latter group objecting to Chancellor Bismarck’s economic policies. Bismarck, in turn, was challenged by the “national socialists”. The question now is, how did American political scientists understand these varieties of German liberalism when studying in Germany and after returning home? Most German liberals favored free trade, as did American scholars, but it was Bismarck as a Chancellor who developed social legislation which many American progressive liberals also favored. The question is, what kind of Berliner were the main characters in Adcock’s tale, such as, Francis Lieber, William Graham Sumner, John W. Burgess, A. Lawrence Lowell, and even Woodrow Wilson? Could the title of Adcock’s book have been Liberalism, Conservatism and the Emergence of American Political Science? The development of political science can also be analyzed as a struggle between liberalism and conservatism (with radicalism in the background).

From wide to narrow political science: Analyzing the emergence of political science as an academic discipline, Adcock pays attention to the study of history and political economy which were important parts of the study of politics (wide political science) before political science developed into a distinct narrow academic discipline. In many ways, as Adcock is well aware of, the development from wide political science to a narrow one was due to specialization. Before the Civil War colleges were small. One scholar specializing in politics hardly made a discipline. It was no wonder that the study of politics was grouped together with other subjects, e.g., history, economic or legal studies. After the Civil War, larger universities were established and various topics and did not identify themselves solely as historians, economists, legal scholars or etc.
political scientists. The growth of universities led to specialization. It was not only political scientists who wanted to become specialists. As Anna Haddow has shown, “Moral philosophy, the old vehicle for teaching politics, was changing into ethics in the modern sense and was losing most of its former great interest in political forms and duties. The study of law was being separated from its early connections with the study of philosophy and politics, and becoming a technical and analytical study of American law, designed for the budding practitioners rather than the educated citizen. Political economy was moving forward rapidly as a distinct subject, later to be called “economics,” with a primary interest in the production, distribution, and consumption of economic goods. History was progressing more slowly, and its attention was being given mainly to political and constitutional developments. The study of political economy was, therefore, dealing the field of politics to economists upon their special interest, while the teachers of history were beginning to ignore political and constitutional studies. Later, when the historians turned more to cultural, social, and economic history, the field of political studies was left more definitely to the specialized group of political scientists (Haddow 1939:167).

In spite of this, law was still an important framework for political scientists when the American Political Science Association was founded in 1903. The legal emphasis in the study of politics was natural as many political scientists at that time had a legal education. It is odd that Adcock does not pay any attention to this. As Westel Woodbury Willoughby, the first Secretary of the American Political Science Association wrote in his 1904 Report of the Secretary, “In order to cover effectively the whole field of Political Science, the Association will distribute its work among sections, devoted respectively to such topics as International Law and Diplomacy, Comparative Legislation, Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Administration, Politics, and Political Theory” (Willoughby 1904:27).

In the same manner, Frank J. Goodnow, the first President of the American Political Science Association, stated in his 1904 Presidential address that until the formation of the Association there had existed no other association which had assembled “on a common ground those persons whose main interests were connected with the scientific study of the organization and functions of the state” and “one of the most important objects of the association is just this study of the public law. For it is only by a study of law, sometimes a most detailed study, that we can arrive at an accurate idea of the form and methods of a governmental system. Indeed, it is very doubtful whether one can be a political scientist in any sense without a knowledge of the law governing the systems subject to study” (Goodnow 1904:42).

To understand the legal emphasis of early political scientists is important for two reasons. First, when a narrow political science was formed, the most pressing political problems were constitutional and administrative (which Adcock acknowledges through his analysis of the writings of Woodrow Wilson and Frank J. Goodnow). In that sense, the third changing political reality influencing the study of politics was the functioning of political institutions at the time when a “New American State” was built (Bochenek 1981).

The second reason for the need to understand the role of public law in the history of political science is that it gave a systematic framework to the study of political systems. This argument differs from Adcock’s interpretation that it was James Bryce, whose “The American
Commonwealth deserves to be hailed, or harangued, as the grounding work of this new kind of political science" (235). However, as Bernard Crick already argued, Bryce's use of facts was non-theoretical and his influence on American political scientists was ambiguous. Bryce was skeptical about general ideas in the study of politics and his advice to 'stay close to the facts', probably meant something different to Americans than it meant to him, as Americans were becoming increasingly possessed by a general idea of politics (Crick 1959: 113-117). In that sense, it was public law and legal reasoning that gave political scientists theoretical means to focus on politics systematically.

In conclusion, there is still one open question which needs to be asked. If the emergence of American political science was due to the transatlantic interaction between American and European liberal scholars, why did the narrow political science not develop in Britain, Germany or France in the 19th century? Maybe Crick was right after all when he argued that political science was an American idea, rooted in American culture. It was born out of a peculiar relationship between a common sense of science, the idea of citizen training, the habits of American democracy, and embracing all these, the belief in an inevitable progress or manifest destiny for American society (Crick 1959: xv). This may well at least be part of the explanation for the question, why a distinct discipline of political science began to develop in the United States during the 19th and early 20th century and not in Europe. The notion of American "exceptionalism" still has merits in understanding intellectual developments in the United States.

Comments by Thibaud Boncourt

I will not go back to the many qualities of Robert Adcock's Liberalism and the Emergence of Political Science, raised both during the roundtable and in the introduction to this symposium. Like all stimulating studies, Adcock's book answers as many questions as it opens new avenues for research. In the following, I would like to prompt Adcock to reflect on some of these avenues and elaborate on some aspects of his argument.

When reading the book, I first reflected on Adcock's use of the term "liberalism". When using such categories, authors tend to choose one of two options. Some start from their own understanding of liberalism and project it onto the past, so that they are the ones who decide what belongs to liberalism and what does not. Others reject this a priori approach to let actors themselves define what they are and, in particular, whether they claim themselves within a given intellectual tradition (in this case, liberalism) or not—and, conversely, whether they claim themselves within a given intellectual tradition (in this case, liberalism) or not—and, conversely, whether they are relevant to the story told.

Unconventionally, Adcock chooses to do both. He first "introduces liberalism with reference to what the words 'liberalism' and 'liberal' meant as they first entered into political use in early-to-mid-nineteenth-century Europe". He then "carries the [European] language of 'liberalism' with [him]" as he moves across the Atlantic to tell the American part of his story, even though "'liberal' and 'liberalism' lacked resonance in nineteenth-century American politics" (7). These choices contrast with those he makes in the case of the label "political science". When tracing the origins of the discipline in America, Adcock looks for the institutional uses of the term "political science", i.e., in the naming, first of academic chairs, then of schools and departments, and finally the APSA. (10-11).
This leads me to prompt Adcock to reflect on the consequences of these choices for his narrative or, in other words, on the alternative book he could have written, had he fully embraced an approach created in the semiotic tradition where he is interested in. This is tantamount to wondering why the “American” took time to gain currency in American political debates and who were those who first fully embraced it, while some of their contemporaries did not.

(a) A second, related point is the way in which the book approaches intellectual history. Adcock pays tribute to the “conceptual approach” notably pioneered by James Farr and John Gunnell, which approaches the history of political science through that of the concepts used by political scientists. While Adcock’s book contains rich conceptual discussions, it also moves away from this approach by studying the institutionalization of the discipline into academic departments, chairs, and professional associations, and by tracing the sociological connections between some of the actors in its history. For example, in a fascinating Chapter 3, Adcock shows that intellectual exchanges between Francis Lieber, the earliest occupant of a chair of political science in America’s academy, and Alexis de Tocqueville, were funded by an ongoing friendship forged during Tocqueville’s tour of America. Intellectual exchanges were, thus, supported by the tangible circulation of authors across the Atlantic and their interactions.

This sociological picture, however, is sometimes incomplete. While the book provides an impressive picture of the intellectual debates of the time (what Pierre Bourdieu called the “space of positions-taking”), the sociological connections between relevant actors (the “field of positions”) and the concrete channels through which ideas circulate are not always made explicit. When Chapter 2 describes, for example, the intellectual proximities between Benjamin Constant on the European side and James Kent on the American side, the discussion stays at the conceptual level. Can we identify key translations, interactions, or forums through which ideas circulated? Did some of these scholars form tangible transnational networks?

(b) Key to Adcock’s argument is the idea that early political scientists played an instrumental role in the emergence of an American blend of liberalism that profoundly shaped US political life in the twentieth century. However, while the “Americanization” of liberalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is described in detail, the impact and legacy of this process is less clear. In her comments, Emily Hauptmann asks how early political scientists became “lead agents” of liberalism. In addition to this, I wonder how the processes that Adcock describes relate to later interactions between American political science and democracy. Stimulating research, by Adcock and others, on the development of behavioralist political science between the two world wars, has highlighted the close connections between this paradigm and the defense of the American model of pluralist liberal democracy. Did Lieber, Lowell and the other protagonists of Adcock’s history foreshadow or prefigure these developments? How do later dominant conceptions of liberalism differ from the blends identified in the book? In other words, how was the process described in the book for the later formulations of American political science and liberalism, and how is it understood today?

Some of these comments go, of course, way beyond the main topic of Adcock’s study. I hope that they can still be part of a discussion that does justice to the quality, depth, and innovativeness of a book that is already a landmark for historians of political science and political thought.
It is a privilege to have this opportunity to respond to these three excellent commentaries on my Liberalism and the Emergence of American Political Science: A Transatlantic Tale (2014a). Let me begin by expressing my great gratitude to Thibaud Boncourt for organizing the International Political Science Association roundtable on the book and now this successor symposium, and to Emily Hauptmann and Erkki Berndtson for joining Boncourt in engaging with my work so very thoughtfully in person and now print. In beginning her commentary Hauptmann generously describes the book as “multilayered” in the array of themes and questions that it touches on. Turning her description into a metaphor, I worry that this array is all too akin to a display of artifacts from an archaeological dig presented without information about what layer of the dig they came from. I will hence use this response in part as an opportunity to provide some background information on how my approach and themes shifted during the course of the almost a decade and a half of research and writing that culminated in the book. First, I discuss a dimension of the book that I remain especially happy with: my approach to political science. Second, I revisit my transatlantic perspective, where the commentaries spur me to articulate some broader conjectures implicit at best in the book itself. Finally, I address the methodological and substantive questions raised by the commentaries regarding my treatment of liberalism. Framing the book around such a fraught and variously interpreted ideological label has always made me anxious. I welcome the chance to reflect here on the choices underpinning my approach to liberalism, and to speculate upon issues raised by my all-too-preliminary concluding comments on the Americanization of liberalism.

Political Science with Adjectives: “Old,” “Harmon,” and “New” Political Science

Any historian of political science who looks back before the institutional watershed of the 1903 founding of the American Political Science Association (APSA) faces challenges regarding: 1) which figures fall within their remit, and, 2) what aggregate category to use when formulating more general claims. I started my research under the influence of three approaches. Revisiting political science’s pre-APSA pioneers has been part of the American discipline’s discourse about itself since Charles Merriam first told a disciplinary history almost a century ago. Figures he attended to, such as Francis Lieber and John Burgess, subsequently retained their prominence through generations of disciplinary histories down into the works of John Gunnell and James Farr, who inspired me as the latest most methodologically sophisticated practitioners of the genre I aimed to contribute to. I was also, however, informed by intellectual historian Dorothy Ross’s use of “historico-politics” as an aggregate grouping that situated Lieber and Burgess in a broader nineteenth-century field of knowledge only divided between political science and history in the era of APSA’s formation (Adcock 2003). Ross called my attention to figures like Andrew D. White (the first president of the American Historical Association, AHA) not usually accorded a major role in political science’s disciplinary histories. Finally, I was further inspired by Bernard Crick’s examination of sociologists William Graham Sumner and Lester Frank Ward in his study of what he called “the American 1

For my views on the development of disciplinary history in political science see Adcock 2014b. Seeing that edited volume chapter as a meta-accompaniment to my book, I said relatively little about my relationship to my precursors in the book itself, instead trying to move quickly on to begin my own narrative due to my stylistic preference for histories that do this and leave fuller discussions of meta-issues for other venues (such as this symposium!).
 science of politics”. Blending these influences, my dissertation identified its overall remit as the “American science of politics” (seen to potentially include any American writing on politics with a scientific self-identity). Within that all-encompassing rubric I more specifically studied and compared (with considerable help from traditional disciplinary history figures) several other figures of late nineteenth century politics.

I formulated the institutional approach to political science Berndtson highlights only as I rethought my project post-dissertation. The immediate spur came from finding that Sumner had been hired in the early 1870s as Yale’s “Chair of Political and Social Science,” and his introductory lecture had differentiated between political science in “its narrower and its wider significance” (Adcock 2014a: 113–14). Sumner’s formal introduction to political science, “was also formally institutionalized in the naming of the ‘School of Political Science’ opened at Columbia in 1880. Focusing on these formal institutional moves, I dropped the “American science of politics” (as well as Ross’s “historico-politics”) as aggregate categories. I reframed my work instead in terms of an older “wide political science” and a narrower offspring of it institutionalized with APSA’s founding. Attending to institutions and their naming enabled me to identify my research more precisely on American academics employed in a chair, department, or school with “political science” as part of its title (even if the later differentiation of the social sciences has led some figures to be seen retrospectively as historians, economists, or sociologists, rather than political scientists). The institutional approach I settled on led to a major exclusion—I dropped Ward from my book— as well as a pivotal inclusion—I added Richard T. Ely and via him the attention to political economy that Berndtson generously highlights as a novel move of mine.

I was and remain satisfied with my institutional approach. Attaching the adjective “wide” before political science provides a category under which to group pre-APSA figures that is compatible with Gunnell and Farr’s methodological call to connect to the historical use of language, especially when that usage differs from our own. But it seems to me as if I had hoped it would also help in choosing my category and a boundary criterion for it I consciously constructed a perspective, towards political economy, but also as a way of including other facets of the past into shadow. Berndtson’s observation that I overlook the role of public law in the emergence of American political science compellingly shines a light on one such area of shadow. Law schools began to be founded in the American academy (for example, Harvard’s Law School in 1817 and Yale’s in 1824) several decades before chairs, departments, or schools with “political science” as part of its title (even if the later differentiation of the social sciences has led some figures to be seen retrospectively as historians, economists, or sociologists, rather than political scientists). The institutional approach I settled on led to a major exclusion—I dropped Ward from my book— as well as a pivotal inclusion—I added Richard T. Ely and via him the attention to political economy that Berndtson generously highlights as a novel move of mine.

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made moves in my book to lower the relative profile of the Columbia School and its founder. Cornell's White and Yale's Sumner got central billing in Chapter 4, with Columbia's slightly later School of Political Science not introduced until mid-chapter, and unmentioned in its title. Chapter 5, in turn, jumped ahead to 1880s developments at Hopkins and led by its faculty. My revisionary moves contributed to downplaying public law because ties between the law school and political science at Columbia were especially (I think exceptionally, Berndtson might disagree) close at Columbia. Public law was notably prominent in the first two books of the "Systematic Series edited by the University Faculty of Political Science". Burgess's Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (1891) and Frank Goodnow's Comparative Administrative Law (1893). I discuss both books in Chapter 8, but in a way that advances my revisionary push. I argue there that Burgess's book was poorly received and notably less influential than Bryce's American Commonwealth, and that Goodnow's approach shifted between his 1893 book and his Politics and Administration (1900) in ways that specifically illuminate Bryce's influence. My revisionist moves regarding Columbia and Burgess thus shaped two features of the book that Berndtson questions: the relative absence of public law and relative prominence of Bryce. I hope our exchange helps readers to consider my Chapter 8 with a fuller awareness of what I aimed at. But I trust that the chapter's documenting of changes in works by Harvard's A. Lawrence Lowell and Goodnow as each began to employ Bryce's "political system" approach provides solid evidence of Bryce's influence in American political science (in my reading it was no accident that Bryce, like Goodnow and Lowell, served as an early APSA president, while Burgess played no role). I remain convinced there was much right in Lowell's crediting of Bryce as "the master and guide of all students of modern political systems" (Adcock 2014a: 267). Judging the relative influence of late-19th-century figures matters, in turn, for how we plot the subsequent trajectory of political science in America. Consider the subtitle of Israel and Tanenhaus's (1967) The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism. If we instead used the transatlantic figure of Bryce to set up the trajectory "From Bryce to Behavioralism" we would see continuities—not least the concept of the "political system"—that question the characterization of behavioralism as a revolution wielded by its proponents and later its critics (Adcock 2007). While disagreeing with Berndtson over Bryce's influence, his challenge has made me all too aware of conceptual ambiguity in my addition of adjectives to political science. When adding adjective intended to flag a contrast with "wide political science," I switch between "new" and "narrow" in discussing political science during the period of the APSA's founding. This may obscure the fact that, while the association's remit was narrower than "wide political science" had been, it carried forward strands of scholarship from its precursor—such as public law and institutional history—that were far from new. What I meant to flag with the phrase "new political science" in Chapter 8 was only the new strand of work on modern political systems I credit Bryce with inaugurating. I believe this differed significantly from older strands of public law and institutional history, but it all found a home together in the APSA. So, to clarify my adjectives: "new" political science was only one strand of "narrow political science as institutionalized in the APSA.

A Transatlantic Tale: PLEASING OUT MY PERSPECTIVE WITH CONJECTURES

I subtitled the book "A Transatlantic Tale" with the hope of flagging two transatlantic concerns in a single phrase. First, as all three commentaries discuss, I was concerned to situate pioneering American political scientists in transatlantic intellectual exchanges with British, French, and/or German figures. Second, I sought to stress the role played in the work of these political scientists by Somit and Tanenhaus's (1967) The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism. If we instead used the transatlantic figure of Bryce to set up the trajectory "From Bryce to Behavioralism" we would see continuities—not least the concept of the "political system"—that question the characterization of behavioralism as a revolution wielded by its proponents and later its critics (Adcock 2007).
transatlantic comparisons that located America relative to developments in European nations. My introduction explicitly tied the book to the rising trend of historians supplementing, or even supplanting, national with transnational narratives. But reading the commentaries makes me fear that in hitching myself to the transnational turn in history, I directed readers’ expectations toward exchanges at the expense of comparisons. In revisiting my transatlantic perspective here, I first take up Boncourt’s question about how I treat transatlantic ties, and then Berndtson’s question about APSA’s founding, which he briefly poses using a transatlantic comparison. Both questions have pushed me to think about issues I did not engage in the book, and in responding I try out some conjectures more sweeping than anything my own research alone could substantiate.

Bourdieu’s comparative institutional approach, Boncourt also sees a sociological approach to my work, specifically when I trace transatlantic connections between actors. He observes, however, that I do this in differing extent with different figures. Comparing Chapter 3’s tracing of Lieber–Tocqueville ties to my earlier noting of Kent–Constant parallels without associated transatlantic links, Boncourt asks whether there would be such links. The contrast here arises from my chapter structure, in which Chapters 1 and 2 give broad brush portraits of “liberalism” and “historicism,” with specific figures involved (Kent, Constant) for illustrative purposes. Only in Chapter 3 with Lieber—the first figure that my institutional approach categorizes as a pioneering American political scientist—did I first pursue the research needed to supplement summaries of arguments with details about transatlantic ties. Pondering Boncourt’s question now, however, pushed me to step back from my (over)embracing the transatlantic turn. Rather than assuming significant transatlantic ties waiting to be found for Kent–Constant, I would instead assume that the extent of transatlantic links evolved historically in connection with technological changes and war/peace, and on this basis I would conjecture that transatlantic links were sparser in the era of Constant and Kent than they became through the course of the rest of the nineteenth century. Let me motivate (without claiming to substantiate) this conjecture. Looking back now across the chapters (3 to 8) in which I place pioneering American political scientists in transatlantic links, I see a step-by-step growth in transatlantic intellectual ties, sandwiched between disruptions before and after. My detailed narrative ended in the opening years of the 20th century, shortly before World War One, which would, of course, also massively reshape transatlantic intellectual links. Its remaining impacts form new and challenging insight back into my research. 

Technology transformed cross-oceanic communication between Tocqueville’s era and Bryce’s (the timing of this communications revolution and its influence on British liberal thought about international relations is explored in Bell 2007 and 2016). Alongside technological change, I would also expect that war vs. peace influenced the extent of transatlantic exchanges. My narrative picked up at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, which also saw the end of the War of 1812 between the US and Britain. Considering these with the succession of transatlantic tensions associated with the world of revolutionary France, and the great disruption of the War of Independence, I would expect that American admiration of Kent’s generation (Kent graduated from Yale in 1803) gave way to a more critical view of the US and its role in the world. My detailed narrative ended in the opening years of the 20th century, shortly before World War One, which would, of course, also massively reshape transatlantic intellectual ties. Its remaining impacts form new and challenging insight back into my research.
Turning from exchanges to a transatlantic comparison, let me now take up Boncourt’s concluding question: "Why did the narrow political science not develop in Britain, Germany, or France?" The paradox of this question is that the development of narrow political science in the United States is not unique but could be found in other countries. The key point is that the development of narrow political science was not just about ideas but also about institutional conditions. I would emphasize that the idea of political science as just one among many social sciences could have occurred to figures in Europe too. It required academic conditions conducive for the successful institutionalization of that idea. I would argue that a key condition in which America was exceptional at the time of APSA’s creation was the rate of expansion and institutional innovation in its academy. As the twentieth century began, America was several decades into a process of academic transformation that produced new institutions of multiple kinds at multiple levels. Entirely new universities—such as Cornell (1868), Johns Hopkins (1876), the University of Chicago (1890), and Stanford (1900)—had been opening at the same time as former colleges—such as Harvard and Columbia—underwent major reforms and expansions. Entrepreneurial scholars based in the new and/or reforming universities led the way in establishing national level associations that promoted the social sciences and their advancing differentiation. My book focuses specifically on the American Historical Association (1884) and American Economics Association (1885), and a generation later, the APSA (1903). These can be situated, moreover, as part of a broader dynamic that also included the founding of the American Psychological Association (1892), American Anthropological Association (1893), and American Sociological Society (1905). Recognizing the broader condition of rapid academic expansion and institutional innovation helps make sense of how the idea of a narrow political science embodied in APSA would be successfully institutionalized via the subsequent proliferation of freestanding departments of narrow political science such that these became the academic norm by the 1920s or so. The parallel story of sociology's relative success in America further illustrates the import of broader academic conditions. While the idea of sociology was thoroughly European in origin, institutional academic space was created for it sooner, more rapidly, and more widely in America than Europe. If this conjecture about academic conditions being favorable to institutionalization of narrow political science is plausible for America, we may then extend it by asking if the post-WWII decades during which narrow political science later gained institutional traction in Britain, Germany, and France were an era of major academic expansions and reforms. It was in Britain, but Boncourt and Berndtson would know better if this conjecture fits continental European cases or not.

An important third factor is that the idea of a narrow political science as just one among many social sciences was more prominent in the United States. For example, when considering the founding of national associations for narrow political science in France in 1939, Britain in 1949, and West Germany in 1951, we might also stress international factors. Did America’s post-WWII power and prestige magnify American influence in Europe? Did American influence create the conditions necessary for the institutionalization of narrow political science? If America’s post-WWII influence and prestige helped to promote national political science in Europe, then we might expect to see similar developments elsewhere. But I think it is more plausible that the key factor is the academic conditions that were conducive to the institutionalization of narrow political science in America. In combination with my conjecture about exceptional academic conditions in turn of the century America, a second domestic factor I would stress in explaining the development there of narrow
political science is also institutional. Specifically, I would spotlight the state building that Berndtson flags earlier in his commentary. In early twentieth-century America government was expanding its role at the same time as civil service reform remade the paths to public employment at local, state, and federal levels. I was struck when researching APSA's founding by the role played by the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee and other public servants (Adcock 2014b: 274). While later decades would see the creation of schools of public administration/policy that split the training of future civil servants and policy advice off from narrow political science in America, in its early decades public administration (see the new Stanford Institute) and the APSA provided a vibrant nexus between public service and the academy. Hauptmann notes, however, potential ambiguities in my conclusion’s paean to this lost age of relevance. To clarify I would stress more how civil service reform conceptually and institutionally remade the very character of “public service.” Ever since Lieber, pioneering American political scientists had assumed their mission was to serve a public purpose and be non-partisan. But when a scholar like Sumner pursued a public role by writing in a vigorous style for non-academic audiences he was charged (notably by other academics) with being “partisan.” As civil service reform went from an ideal promoted by political scientists to an institutional reality, political scientists gained new ways to serve a public purpose—such as training future professional civil servants, doing policy research for professionalized audiences, and being appointed themselves to government posts on account of their professional knowledge and skills. Rather than a retreat, I see here the rise of new modes of public service premised on the conceptual/institutional division between political/partisan actors and professional service. If some political scientists—most famously, Woodrow Wilson—successfully pursued a public role in the former mode, others who tried to do so failed, and it was the newer professionalized modes of non-partisan government service through which more could and did serve a public purpose during the heyday of political science’s relevance.

**Liberalism:** Methodological and Substantive Issues

The terrain of liberalism is a contested one. I did not plan to enter when I began researching the history of American political science. I set out to study uses of cross-national comparison and to situate these in the inheritance of methodological traditions from Europe: a naturalistic tradition among sociologists, and a historicist tradition in Ross’s historico-politicals. But as I researched the substance of the comparisons actually made by Americans, what especially struck me was a late-nineteenth-century cleavage cutting across the methodological traditions I had expected to focus on. The cleavage was between intercontinental comparisons that American scholars made in an empirical fashion that might be viewed as more European example, vs. a “laggard” with lessons to learn from one another European country. Interregnum with CTI, optimistic attitude toward the United States, and others with the more pessimistic attitude toward the United States. This cleavage was especially apparent in the work of leading political scientists who were making comparisons was shaped more by political visions than by methodology. In reframing my dissertation to spotlight this cleavage, I built upon an advisor’s suggestion that the political visions I was finding were varieties of liberalism, and interpreted the cleavage as one between “disillusioned classical liberals” vs. “progressive liberals.” Reframing my research in terms of liberalism led into a series of challenges well illuminated by questions raised in the commentaries. I welcome their impetus to revisit methodological and substantive choices I made in relating pioneering American political scientists to the literature of liberalism.
schools. By contrast, when interpreting these scholars as varieties of “liberals” I projected onto them a label they did not apply to themselves. Boncourt asks how my narrative would differ if I had fully embraced an actor-centric approach. I think that doing so would make it hard or even impossible to present a narrative pivoting on the evolving political visions of political scientists. Most American political scientists, from Lieber down to today, have believed in an ideal of non-partisan scholarship. We might see their not labeling themselves as “liberals” as of a piece with them not labeling themselves “Democrats,” “Whigs,” or “Republicans.” Boncourt’s query makes clear that I could have better introduced my methodological choices by explicitly noting that, in narrating the substance of political science as shaped by political visions, I pursued a project that interprets the scholarship of political scientists in a way that sits in some tension with the self-understanding many of these scholars have regarding what they try to achieve in their scholarship.

If some element of projection is necessary to map political labels onto political scientists, the key methodological issue becomes not if, but what, and how to project. My choice to project “liberal” brought my study of the history of political science into the orbit of the huge heated literature on the history of liberalism. As Boncourt notes, a common move in this literature is to project one’s own understanding of liberalism onto the past. A recent, methodologically self-conscious, and substantively excellent example is Edmund Fawcett’s Liberalism: The Life of an Idea. Explicitly disavowing actual usage of the word “liberalism” as a poor guide, Fawcett (2014: 6, 10) projects his own clearly stipulated view of the ideas constituting liberalism. The narrative he proceeds to unfold parallels nine key epochs. It jumps at the end of the Napoleonic wars and presents figures by interpreting them through the common lens of the ideas he has stipulated. I instead sought as much as possible to connect figures by documenting historical links between them. In focusing especially on transatlantic ties, I sought a bridge over which to project historical uses of “liberal” and “liberalism” from nineteenth-century Europe onto American scholars of the period. By projecting within a transatlantic historical context, I aimed (perhaps quixotically) to reconcile projection with the methodological preference I drew from Farr and Gunnell for taking seriously the language of the past. Reflecting back on my choices I wish I had also attended to the way that pioneering American political scientists, although they did not call themselves liberal, did use the word. For example, Lieber wrote a “Liberal” entry for the EncyclopediaAmericana he edited, and Wilson published paeans to the British Liberal party leaders Gladstone, Cobden, and Bright.

Berndtson questions, however, if some of the Europeans I discuss are really liberals. He perceptively points here to a challenge I skated over in the book. While my efforts to project “liberal” within a transatlantic context allowed me to document ties to bridge the Atlantic, I was
sketchy at best in documenting how liberalism was evolving in various European nations in the decades covered. Bluntschli should be labeled liberal relative to the shifting politics of Germanic Europe is a great question I would have to punt to those better versed in the relevant political history. But Berndtson's accompanying question about Maine raises a challenge I did consider with more care. My book interprets Maine beside Spencer as British examples of a "disenchanted classical liberalism" that Sumner and Lowell exemplify for me in America. This transatlantic grouping is based on a web of ties I am confident in. But my label for the group is contentious. While I worked on my book several colleagues suggested labeling it "conservative"—advice that would have led to Liberalism, Conservatism and the Emergence of American Political Science, just as Berndtson envisions. But I limited my re-labeling to a tweak: the "disillusioned classical liberals" of my dissertation became "disenchanted classical liberals" in the book. Why persist in calling them liberal? First, because the liberal vs. conservative issue was forcefully addressed by Spencer, who saw Spencer's views as true liberalism while criticizing Britain's Liberal Party for becoming a "New Toryism" as it came to favor new roles for the state (1882/1884). To call Spencer's views "conservative" would be to take sides and assert by default that the "new liberalism" developing in late-century Britain (and the parallel progressive liberalism in America) had better claim to the liberal label. Second, because a similar debate over what constitutes "liberalism" subsequently occurred in America in the 1920s and 1930s until FDR's use combined with his political dominance to settle the American sense of "liberal" as meaning support for greater state roles. Third, because recent decades have seen, in contrast to this now longstanding American sense of liberalism, use of "neo-liberalism" to identify state-skeptical thinkers and politicians. I sought to narrate liberalism's past in such a way that readers who connect my history to debates in the present could see why both strands of thought could justifiably be identified as liberal. To sum up, I believe that applying "liberal" to both sides of the late-nineteenth century cleavage I presented positions us today to see that this cleavage was never really transcended, with the subsequent history of liberalism in no small part a story of the ebb and flow of traditions descending from each side of this critical cleavage.

Speculating about twentieth-century liberalisms bring us to Hauptmann's questions about the extent to which American political scientists influenced subsequent developments in American liberalism. Her focal point here is the claim I make when opening and closing my book (2014a: 2, 280) that political scientists were "agents" in the "Americanization of liberalism." My intent when initially formulating this claim was less ambitious than I now realize it reads. I chose to talk of "agency" to make a point about how the political scientists I studied related to the influences on them. I did not want to replace Crick's (1959) portrait of American political scientists as mere passive participants in the transatlantic transformation of the liberal tradition ("agents") with a portrait of them as actively shaping American liberal beliefs, as they were嘴 active participants in the transatlantic transformation of the liberal tradition ("agents"). Hauptmann's questions make clear, however, that when I conclude my book with a sketch of scenes from the "Americanization of liberalism" that leads to a closing sentence restating my agency claim (now with the adjective "lead" added to make political scientists "lead agents"). It is a claim that rests on how political scientists stood in relative to influence upon others, but agency in the sense of influence upon
American political life would be more varied. I could see claiming anywhere from no/minimal to major influence depending on the figure. I would also distinguish between influence on political visions and influence specifically on the use of "liberal" to talk about those visions. An exemplar from my book of the first kind of influence is Richard Ely. My account of Ely suggests he had an exceptional ability to spur new ways of thinking in others. I presented him as leading his patron Andrew Dickson White to leave behind an earlier embrace of laissez-faire, and transforming the way his Hopkins' students Albert Shaw and Woodrow Wilson thought about economics. These were more than intra-academic influences. They speak also to the cross-party political impact of Ely's progressive vision. White was a Republican, former state legislator, and leading American diplomat; Shaw another Republican who would edit for decades a mass-circulation progressive magazine; and Wilson a transformative Democratic president. A fuller study of Ely would also chart pathways of influence through PhD students that he taught after moving to the University of Wisconsin (such as John R. Commons), through his role in the social gospel movement, and the impact of his books on wide audiences. Ely has a strong claim to be the most important intellectual influence on the formation of progressivism as an American political vision. This is far from a novel claim, and the novelty in my own treatment of Ely is to make this much studied figure part of the history of political science through my conception of wide political science.

The narrow political science intertwined with the founding of the APSA does not stand out with regard to the political visions I charted, but does so with regard to the entry of "liberal" into American politics. Progressivism could have developed as a political vision in American without becoming attached to the language of liberalism. Indeed, if elaborating my conclusion's sketch of how this attachment developed in 1913-1916, I might speculate that it was highly contingent and that it was promoted by the political-public-academic connections mediated by the APSA in its early years. The critical juncture here is Woodrow Wilson's defeat of Theodore Roosevelt in the election of 1912. If Roosevelt had won the presidency as the Progressive Party candidate, the word "liberal" might never have entered American political life. It is specifically in the aftermath of this defeat that we find intellectuals favoring the active state championed by the Progressive Party shift from "progressive" to "liberal" to re-brand their political vision. The first step I have found of "liberal" is in the 1913 speech of future APSA president William F. Willoughby printed in the American Political Science Association's Journal. He was the key figure in this period, for he was the first president of the New Republic magazine, and indeed served on its executive council during 1912-1914. Moreover, Walter Weyl of the New Republic was also an APSA member in this period, and had given a paper at the 1912 APSA conference shortly after Wilson's presidential victory. These associations tie fair at the time a liberal vision of the new political possibility that conversation at the APSA might be a crucial venue in which the new American use of "liberal" was tested and spread to the New Republic figures who then gave it a broader circulation. What we do know from existing research is that the New Republic's use of "liberal" in 1912 was soon followed by Wilson making the word part of his own presidential rhetoric in his famous "Peace without Victory" speech to the US Senate in January 1917. Wilson (1971: 538-39) provocatively declared: "I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty. ... There are no more American Principles, American Policies, than there are liberal Principles of mankind. It is simply a question of whether we mean to extend the ideas of mankind in every nation and of every modern state, or to limit ourselves to a self-sufficient community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail." I would conjecture that Wilson's charged equating of "liberal" with "American Principles" catapulted the word into a broad orbit and motivated competing visions in American political life to lay claim to it.
in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, it is probably no accident that the contest to define the term is most famously captured in the dueling uses of Herbert Hoover and FDR, both of whom had served in Wilson’s administration.

If Wilson had not won election in 1912, and “liberal” had never entered American political life, the development and change of political visions charted in my book would have been the same. But there would be much less of a motivation for me to project “liberal” onto these visions. Both my book, and many other histories of liberalism, would look profoundly different if not for the contingent entry of “liberal” into American politics. If political science did indeed mediate this crucial linguistic turn, then the history of political science matters for the history of liberalism in a fundamental way.
References


